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INTRODUCTION
An investment club is an association of individuals who meet periodi-
cally to pool and invest their funds in securities or other property of their
own selection.' The phenomenal post World War 112 growth in the num-
ber of investment clubs has made them an important factor in securities
markets and in the ownership of American industry. At present, the New
York Stock Exchange estimates that there are more than 10,000 clubs with
a combined membership of over 100,000.3 The National Association of
Investment Clubs projects the growth of membership into the millions in
the foreseeable future. Although approximately nine out of ten clubs have
portfolios 4 of less than $10,000,5 each year of activity adds to the size of the
portfolios, often in increasing increments as the maturing members become
able to afford larger contributions.
Investment club members, their counsel and members of the invest-
ment professions have exhibited a keen interest in defining and resolving
the legal problems involved in the formation and operation of an invest-
ment club. To date, there have been no reported cases involving invest-
ment clubs and little or nothing written on the legal questions posed. The
absence of cases in the area, however, cannot be long expected to continue:
as the number of clubs and the size of individual clubs increases, situations
will develop leading to litigation. A prolonged market depression, for
example, might well spur a rash of suits as dissatisfied members or those
with whom the clubs have dealt seek to recoup their losses through resort
to the courts. In the tax and securities legislation fields a growing aware-
ness of the significance of the investment club movement promises increased
activity by governmental bodies. The University of Pennsylvania Law
Review has undertaken this study of investment clubs in an attempt to
crystallize the legal issues and, where possible, to suggest tentative solutions.
1. See generally, ROGERS, SURVEY OF INVESTMENT CLUBS IN THE PHILADELPHIA
ARA (unpublished thesis in Lippincott Library, University of Pennsylvania, 1957).
2. The history of investment clubs traces back as early as 1893; however, the
period of their most significant growth occurred after World War II, and more par-
ticularly, within the past three to five years. See Foreword in NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
OF INVESTMENT CLUBS, ORGANIZATION PLANS (1956) ; Letter from G. Keith Funston,
President of the New York Stock Exchange, to the University of Pennsylvania Law
Review, Oct. 17, 1957, on file in Biddle Law Library.
3. NEw YORK STOcK EXCHANGE, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC RELATIONS AND MAR-
xEr DEVELOPMENT, A REPORT ON INVESTMENT CLUBS (1956).
4. Securities owned by the investment club are generally held in the "street"
name of the club broker, or in the name of an individual club member, or in the name
of the club itself. Holding securities in the street name is by far the most popular
method.
5. Letter from G. Keith Funston, President of the New York Stock Exchange,
to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Oct. 17, 1957, on file in Biddle Law
Library.
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The investment club device serves two purposes. First, it furnishes
a vehicle whereby small investors may diversify their capital interests, while
at the same time retaining more control over their investments than they
might otherwise exercise as participants in, for example, a mutual fund.
Secondly, as to those clubs which intend to deal mainly in securities,0 the
club is an instrument for the education of its members in the operation
of the securities markets, in the assessment of investment opportunities
and in the problems and potentials of the enterprises in which they invest.
Full accomplishment of these purposes generally requires that the club
be composed of a relatively small number of congenial individuals, usually
personal friends or business associates. Often an attempt is made to
attract a lawyer, an accountant and a broker into the club. If the club is
not actually promoted by a broker, at least an arrangement is usually made
with a broker relatively early in the club's history, thereby providing the
club with a channel of information and a means of carrying out its invest-
ment decisions. The club's operations will be governed by a written agree-
ment, generally fairly elaborate, but varying widely in scope and detail
from club to club. Typical provisions in club agreements include a state-
ment of club policy; the duration of the club's existence; the number and
duties of officers; the number of members and their qualifications; the
frequency and location of meetings; possible compensation to members for
services performed for the club; financial contributions of the members
including provisions as to size, frequency and variability; procedures for
investing and limitations on the individuals or committees performing
investment functions; voting rights of the members; treatment of dividends
or other gain accruing to the club; limitations on the alienability of the
individual members' shares in the club assets; method of evaluating the
interest of each member in the club assets; procedures to be followed on
the resignation or death of a member or on the termination of the club;
procedure for amendment of the agreement; and limitations on the ability
of the members to bind the club or the other members.
To a large extent the legal problems created by an investment club
can be controlled by the agreement provisions, making it essential that the
draftsman understand the problems and the alternatives open to him.
Certain problems will exist regardless of the approach adopted in the agree-
ment. These must be recognized and made known to the members if they
create risk of potential liability. In the material to follow, the needs of the
draftsman and the counsellor have been considered and suggestions made
as to what each may do to protect his client. However, the scope of the
treatment is wider. An attempt has been made throughout to consider the
implications to be drawn from evaluation of the social and economic utility
of investment clubs in the resolution of specific legal issues.7
6. Field research revealed that although some few clubs participate in ventures
outside of the securities markets, the vast majority of clubs confine their investment
activities solely to securities.
7. Information for this study was gathered principally through field research
which involved communications with brokerage firms, the national stock exchanges,
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I. THE IMPACT OF SECURITIES LEGISLATION
UPON INVESTMENT CLUBS
The average member of an investment club would seldom suspect
that he or his club could be violating the security laws of his state or of
the federal government, yet the very breadth of the stroke with which the
statutes regulating the sale of securities have been drawn makes their
violation readily and innocently possible. This breadth is understandable.
If the investing public is to be protected against the unscrupulous, precise
applicability of these acts to known practices alone would not achieve the
desired end. Greed, like necessity, fosters invention. And invention would
achieve avoidance.
The protection afforded the investing public by the state and federal
acts controlling the distribution and sale of securities is as varied as the
means used to achieve the protection.8 The acts of most concern to invest-
ment clubs may be divided into three categories: (1) those requiring the
registration of securities about to be sold; (2) those regulating securities
brokers, dealers, agents or salesmen; and (3) those regulating investment
companies.
A. CLUB MEMBERSHIP AS A SECURITY
The common denominator of security legislation is the requirement
that a "security" be involved. Unless a membership interest in an invest-
ment club is found to be a "security" within the meaning of a particular
act, the act will have no greater impact upon an investment club than
upon any private individual investor. For this reason, the initial problem
to be considered in this Part of the Symposium will be whether or not
a club membership is a "security" for purposes of the several acts.
Although variations in the "security" definition 10 or philosophy " of a par-
ticular act may affect the determination whether club membership is a
security, the factors examined by courts and administrators seem to be the
same regardless of the act in question. The discussion which follows out-
lines these factors and suggests possible lines of analysis with regard to
investment clubs generally. Because of the wide variations between clubs,
the conclusions reached in this and subsequent sections of this Part must
be regarded as tentative. Each club should reexamine them in light of its
the forty-eight state securities commissions and the federal Securities and Exhange
Commission, conversations with attorneys participating in the formation or conduct
of investment clubs, questionnaires to individual investment clubs in the Philadelphia
area, the collection and perusal of the by-laws of investment clubs, and meetings with
representatives of the National Association of Investment Clubs.
8. No two acts are identical and each must be examined to be properly understood.
A general discussion of each can be found in either Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION
(1951 with 1955 Supp.) which emphasizes the federal acts, or Loss & CowEr, BLUE
Sxy LAw (1958) which deals with the state acts.
9. In addition, each act will normally contain a provision prohibiting misleading
activities not amounting to common law fraud. In New Jersey the entire act is merely
an anti-fraud provision. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:1 (1955). This act is unique.
10. See text and note at note 16 infra.
11. See text at p. 842 infra.
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peculiar characteristics and in light of each of the several acts to which it
may be subject.1 2
The definition of a security common to all of the relevant federal acts 13
and many of the state acts 14 will serve as a convenient focus for considering
whether a particular membership is a security. A "security" is there de-
fined as
cc... any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of
indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing
agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or sub-
scription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust cer-
tificate, certificate of deposit for a security, . . . or, in general, any
interest or instrument commonly known as a 'security', or any cer-
tificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate
for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or
purchase any of the foregoing."' 5
Some state laws say that "any interest in a security is a security." 18
Because of this breadth the laws cannot be avoided by adopting a non-
corporate form of organization or by deviation from the factual character-
istics of recognized legal entities. A partnership interest 1 and a limited
partnership interest's have been held securities. So also has a "member-
ship receipt" in an oil syndicate been considered a security 19 as well as an
automobile dealer's franchise agreement 2 o and membership in the "Plenoc-
racy" movement 2  One state security commission even decided that
membership in the United Mine Workers was a security.
22
Because the possibility of fraud, misstatement and misunderstanding
are increased by informality and vagueness, the fact that a club's organiza-
12. A holding, however, that one club's membership is or is not a security may be
considered, by some courts, strong authority for finding another club's membership
also a security. See text at pp. 842-43 infra.
13. Securities Act of 1933, 48 STAT. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77(b) (1)
(1952) ; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78(c) (10)
(1952); Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 STAT. 857 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §80(a)-
(a) (2) (35) (1952).
14. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 121Y, § 137.2 (Smith-Hurd 1955).
15. Emphasis added.
16. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §80.01.4 (1946). The original definition in the
Securities Act of 1933 included ". . . certificates of interest in property, tangible or
intangible. . . ." 48 STAT. 74 (1933).
17. State v. Whiteakre, 118 Ore. 656, 247 Pac. 1077 (1926).
18. People v. Hoshor, 92 Cal. App. 2d 250, 206 P.2d 882 (1949).
19. Groby v. State, 109 Ohio St. 543, 143 N.E. 126 (1924).
20. Matter of Tucker Corp., Securities Act Release No. 3236 (1947), as cited
in Loss, SEcURiTis REGULATION 208 (1951).
21. SEC v. Universal Service Ass'n, 106 F.2d 232 (7th Cir. 1939), cert. denied,
308 U.S. 622 (1940).
22. Commonwealth v. United Mine Workers, CCH BLUE Sxy L. RaP. 70,045
(Va. 1947). For a general collection of cases on what constitutes a security, see
Loss, SEcURITIES REGULATION 299-330 (1951 with 1955 Supp.) ; Annot., 163 A.L.R.
1050 (1946).
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tion does not subscribe to a usual pattern may tend to establish the existence
of a security.2 Increasing this likelihood is the tendency of some courts to
construe "security" liberally in order to make available broad anti-fraud
provisions of the applicable statute. In one case, for example, where
members of a social club lent money to an officer in return for a promise
of "financial independence," a security was found to have been sold despite
the vagueness of the promise.
2 4
A club which operates without any written governing agreement and
issues no tangible evidences of ownership to its members may not issue
interests which are securities within those portions of "security" definitions
requiring a "certificate" or "instrument." However, membership may still
be a security since other portions of these definitions usually refer to an
"agreement" or "contract." Clearly, if the club had a written governing
document, this would be the "agreement" or "contract" and might even
constitute a "certificate" or "instrument." 25 Lacking such a document the
members of the club still have an oral "agreement" or "contract." As the
Supreme Court said under the Securities Act of 1933, ". . . it [is] . .
immaterial whether the shares in the enterprise are evidenced by formal
certificates or by nominal interests . . .. " 26 The phrase ". . . in gen-
eral, any interest or instrument commonly known as a 'security' . . ."
when added to the federal act in 1934, was intended according to the House
Report, ". . . to apply the Act to interests commonly known as secu-
rities whether or not such interests are represented by any docu-
ment ... 27
Neither the form of the organization, nor in most cases the presence
or absence of tangible evidence of membership will prevent investment club
membership from being considered a security. Attention turns, therefore,
to factors which might affirmatively prompt a court to hold such member-
ship a security. The most important single factor indicating the existence
23. "There is more reason for the application of this law to unorganized business
or concerns than to those having a recognized legal entity." State v. Whiteakre,
118 Ore. 656, 661, 247 Pac. 1077, 1079 (1926).
24' United States v. Monjar, 47 F. Supp. 421 (D. Del. 1942).
25. See Campbell v. Degenther, 97 F. Supp. 975 (W.D. Pa. 1951) (signed
agreement of the parties constituted the security) ; Corporation Trust Co. v. Logan,
52 F. Supp. 999 (D. Del. 1943) (same); Kinsey v. Knapp, 154 F. Supp. 263 (E.D.
Mich. 1957) (Michigan statute).
26. SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946). (Emphasis added.)
In one case it was contended that the agreement was too vague to qualify as an
enforceable contract and consequently, was not a security. This contention was
rejected. The court said that the document still qualified as a "profit-sharing agree-
ment" or "scheme" within its definition of a security. State v. Code, 178 Minn.
492, 227 N.W. 652 (1929). This conclusion seems entirely proper even in the
absence of the word "scheme" in the definition. An unenforceable contract-for
instance one which violated the Statute of Frauds-should still qualify as a "con-
tract" or "agreement" because even if it were enforceable it would become unen-
forceable by violating a securities act. Consequently "contract" or "agreement"
in a definition of a security should not be treated as "enforceable contract." See
Seeman v. United States, 96 F.2d 732 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 620 (1938)
(forged document constituted a security).
27. H.R. Rep. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1934). (Emphasis added.)
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of a security appears to be the laying out of money with the expectation of
earning profit from the efforts of others. Indeed, the separation of owner-
ship from management and control in American industry was the most sig-
nificant impetus in the need for securities regulation 28  The ques-
tion, in essence, is whether an individual gives up sufficient control over
his money by placing it in a club to make the representation of his interest-
that is, his membership-a security. Stated differently, the question is
whether a member loses sufficient attributes of ownership by purchasing
his securities through a club rather than directly to warrant finding that
his membership is a security. The answer must depend on the method of
operation of each club.
The leading case of SEC v. W. J. Howey Co. 20 emphasized the ex-
pectation of profits ". . . solely from the efforts of the promoter or of
someone other than themselves." 3 0 Conversely, another court has said
that ". . . the term [security] has no proper application to an enterprise
which is to be conducted by the investor himself."3 1  The operation of
investment clubs will normally fall somewhere between these extremes.
The investment decisions of most clubs are made by group decision of the
members of the club. Each member will depend, to some extent, on the
skill of others for a profitable return. Thus an investment club is neither
". .. an enterprise to be conducted by the investor himself" nor is it
an enterprise where the investor expects profits ". . . solely from the
efforts of . . someone other than themselves." Of course, the extent
of control exercised by a member will vary from club to club.
The most control a club can give its members over their respective
shares is to give each member control of the club's investment policy-that
is, a voting voice in the club's purchases and sales-in direct proportion
to the investment of each member 3 2 Even if this proportionate control
is exercised by the regular attendance and voting of each member,3 how-
ever, club membership may still be a security. Membership in an invest-
ment club presupposes collective investment decisions. An individual
making his own investments in stocks or bonds relinquishes control over
the productive use (plant, inventory, salaries, etc.) of his money. As a
member of an investment club, that same individual will also relinquish
(to the club as a whole) his control as to which producer will make the
production decisions for him. This additional surrender of control to the
28. Loss, SEcURTrrIES REGULATION 7-16 (1951 with 1955 Supp.).
29. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
30. Id. at 298.
31. People v. Steele, 2 Cal. App. 2d 370, 374, 36 P2d 40, 42 (1934). See also
State v. Health, 199 N.C. 135, 153 S.E. 855 (1930) (no security created when
profit-sharing agreement contemplated buyer alone operating the enterprise).
32. The investment of each member is the present asset value of his total
contributions on the date of the vote, not the size of his contribution on that day.
See text at p. 841 infra.
33. A small survey of investment clubs in the Philadelphia area indicates that
about three-fourths of club members actively participate in the investment decisions.
Survey on file in Biddle Law Library.
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group tends toward the conclusion that membership is a security. The
member no longer has the absolute right to determine the particular en-
terprise in which he will invest and the extent or the time of that invest-
ment.
The authorities seem to agree that collective decision is a relevant factor
in finding the existence of a security. The Supreme Court in the Howey
case, for example, referred to "common enterprise" as one part of its defini-
tion of an investment contract.4 Cooperative apartment associations repre-
sent a pooling of assets where control by the membership remains roughly
proportionate to ownership. Yet the SEC has apparently considered these
interests securities because it felt it necessary to adopt a rule exempting
real estate brokers selling such interests from the broker-dealer registra-
tion requirement of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.5 Consequently,
investment club membership could be considered a security despite any
degree of proportionate control by the members.3 6
Although characteristics inherent in the operation of all investment
clubs may not conclusively establish the existence of a security, characteris-
tics peculiar to the operation of particular investment clubs may tend more
strongly toward that conclusion. For example, some clubs provide that
no profits will be distributed until the dissolution of the club. Thus
each member has only a right to future payments. One court con-
sidered this factor relevant in finding the existence of a security,37 probably
on the theory that delayed participation in profits was not a characteristic
of absolute ownership. Nor is it characteristic of an individual's own direct
investment. Automatic reinvestment of the club's profits may therefore
tend to indicate the creation of a security.
Clubs may also provide that memberships are non-transferable and
that members may not withdraw their interests until the termination of the
club, which may be a fixed date or some time to be set by the members.
In this case a member will have lost his ability to change the use of his
money-from investment to consumption, for instance. This is not only
a loss of absolute ownership of funds, but also a loss of control not extant
when a member invests directly. This additional loss of ownership at-
tributes in itself tends to make the membership a security. It also aggra-
vates any loss of ownership caused by other aspects of club operation by
increasing the length of time during which this loss occurs. This aggrava-
tion is compounded if the club's agreement should also require members
34. 328 U.S. at 299.
35. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15a2 (1949); Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 321 (1951).
But see Brothers v. lvcMahon, 351 Il1. App. 321, 115 N.E.2d 116 (1953).
36. See also Loss, SFcuaRrIEs REGULATION 318-20 (1951 with 1955 Supp.).
But see People v. Syde, 37 Cal. 2d 765, 235 P.2d 601 (1951); Austin v. Hallmark
Oil Co., 21 Cal. 2d 718, 134 P.2d 777 (1943).
Investment clubs may present substantial danger of individuals relying on the
efforts of others simply because they are often formed to gain information about
securities investment so that the uninformed may rely on those that seem informed.
37. SEC v. Timetrust, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 34 (N.D. Cal. 1939).
19581
840 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 106
to continue periodic contributions, because the amount of money involved
is continually increasing.
Although it has been judicially stated that a large number of par-
ticipants alone will not make an interest a security,38 it is probably true
that membership in a large investment club is more like a security than
membership in a small one. The larger the club the less significant is each
member's control. If the size is great enough, actual control by dynamic
minority interests becomes possible. 9 A club which may have a relatively
small number of members but places no limit on the number that may join
is more likely to be deemed the issuer of a security than one that has a
maximum limit. This is so simply because there is the possibility of the
club growing larger with each member consequently losing some of his
control over his investment. The evil of openendedness will be compounded
if admission of new members can be achieved by the approval of a small
number of members. If new members are admissible by, say, majority
vote of those present at any meeting rather than by unanimous vote of all
members, the control exercisable by a member over his investment could
be seriously weakened by new admissions without his agreement.
Another factor relevant in determining whether club membership is a
security is the manner in which investment decisions are actually made, re-
gardless of the voting provisions in the club's governing instrument. For
example if a club relies on the judgment of an individual member-perhaps
because he is active in the securities business-the members will be rely-
ing on the efforts of a third person for their profits. ° This, as has been
noted, is indicative of a security.
An investment club that permits members to own unequal fractions
of its assets, whether by purchasing other memberships or by increasing
relative monthly contributions, increases the likelihood that its memberships
are securities. A member who subsequently increases his fractional inter-
est in the club's holdings must do so by purchasing assets which were
acquired when his control was not proportionate to the interest he now
has.4 ' To this extent he has invested money in reliance on the judgment
of others.
Whether or not the club will admit new members may also bear on
the existence of a security. Just as in. the case of original members who
increase their proportionate interests in the club's assets, a new member
will be purchasing a portion of the club's existing investments whether
or not he pays in an initial sum to equalize his share with that of the old
38. People v. Syde, 37 Cal. 2d 765, 768, 235 P.2d 601, 603 (1951).
39. See text at p. 841 infra.
40. Use of committees to actually make investment decisions would be a further
indication that the membership did not represent control by the investor, but rather
reliance on the skill of others.
41. Of course, the member that reduces his proportion of ownership will have
exercised greater control than warranted by his new ownership. Frequent review
of the club's portfolio will lessen this effect. See text at p. 842 infra.
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members. Indeed, his situation tends more toward the purchase of a
security because almost all of his interest is represented by assets pur-
chased before he joined and consequently purchased without his investiga-
tion and approval. The same considerations apply where a new member
may acquire his interest through the purchase of an existing member's
share in the club's assets. Thus membership in a club that admits new
members is more like a security than membership in one that does not.
A distinction of this nature has been recognized by the courts of two states.
In Michigan and Minnesota sale of interests in syndicates, pools, and the
like have been held to be securities when sold to members of the public
other than the organizers of these enterprises, yet the interests owned by
the organizers have been held not to constitute securities.4 This
distinction may have been an effort by these courts to read a "private
offering" exemption into the acts.3 Yet the distinction has been made and
may influence the question of whether an investment club membership
is a security.
Since control of investment policy will usually vary with the assets
owned by a member, 44 a few members owning a large portion of the club's
assets will be able to control--or at least dominate-the success or failure
of a club. This forces the other members to rely on them for profits,
which is a crucial characteristic of a security. On the other hand, if each
member has the same control regardless of the amount of assets owned,
any member with a large share of the club's assets will have much control
taken from him.
Once again, the position of newly admitted members may be subject
to control by others. If they do not make large original contributions to
bring their interests to a par with those of others, their ability to influence
investment policy will be commensurately small. Thus they will have to rely
on the older, more substantial, asset holders for the success of the club.
The disadvantage attached to the small holdings of new members would be
ameliorated were it provided that a member's vote varied with the size of
the contribution he made at the time the vote was taken. But such a pro-
vision creates the same evil for members of the club holding larger shares.
To have voting control vary with anything but the value of a member's
asset contributions deprives those merhbers who .have made substantial
contributions of their ability to control the new investments. Their sub-
stantial claims are not against the previously purchased assets alone, but
42. Compare Polk v. Chandler, 276 Mich. 527, 268 N.W. 732 (1936), and Hanne-
man v. Gratz, 170 Minn. 38, 211 N.W. 961 (1927), with Freeze v. Smith, 254 Mich.
386, 236 N.W. 810 (1931), and State v. Ogden, 154 Minn. 425, 191 N.W. 916 (1923) ;
see Annot., 163 A.L.R. 1050, 1089, 1093 (1946). See also the joint adventure
exemptions now incorporated into the California and Michigan statutes. CAL. CORP.
CODE ANN. §25100(m) (Vest 1955); MicH. CoMP. LAWS §451.105(j) (Mason
1948) ; see also Polizzi v. Porcaro, 110 Cal. App. 2d 395, 242 P.2d 949 (1952).
43. See text at p. 846 in! ra.
44. A provision achieving this result is part of the recommended agreement
of the National Association of Investment Clubs.
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also against a substantial portion of the new assets. For this reason they
must be able to influence these purchases.
Frequent review of the club's portfolio will keep a member's control
commensurate with each member's present ownership. To the extent that
a member can frequently vote on whether to keep a stock or replace it with
a different one, changes in relative ownership will result in less reliance
on the efforts of others to choose the assets against which a member has
his new claim. Such a practice, of course, does not correct losses of effec-
tive control due to a disproportionate distribution of ownership of the
club's assets among its members.
Apart from any of the foregoing considerations, courts may consider
club membership a security in order to afford club members the liberal
relief of the common anti-fraud provisions of the securities acts. Protec-
tion of investors from misrepresentations and omissions not constituting
common-law fraud is -a virtually universal aim of the securities acts. The
existence of opportunities to mislead persons into investing in clubs, with-
out misstating material facts, would therefore be reason for finding the
membership securities.
These opportunities lie first in the ability of the club to misrepresent,
or fail to explain, to a person joining an operating club, the state of its
assets or the rights and obligations of its members. Assurances of profits
might be made to entice members.4 These opportunities also exist
when a member is able to transfer his membership to a third party. The
third party may be misled by an incomplete explanation of the club's
operations. To protect these persons from individuals or clubs, which in
time of adversity may feel the need for additional cash, it may be neces-
sary to find that memberships are securities.
However, the philosophy of the statute being construed may well
influence the determination of whether membership is a security. If the
statute simply requires disclosure at the time of original distribution, a court
may see no purpose in requiring registration of a club whose members have
such information. But a statute which contemplates regulation through
approval of each security may be found to encompass investment club
mcmberships.
The factual context in which the security question arises may also
influence its resolution. Thus if the question is first presented by a person
who seeks relief for allegedly having been misled it is more likely that the
membership will be held a security than if the question is presented by a
person seeking relief after a decline in the stock market solely on the ground
that the club had failed to register.
Courts, however, should remember that to hold that a membership
is not a security in one context may be to deny recovery to a member
45. It has been held that promises of financial return based upon the principle
of "dollar averaging"-a principle underlying investment clubs-were, in their
context, misleading and therefore enjoined. SEC v. Timetrust, 130 F2d 214 (9th
Cir. 1942), disposed of, 142 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1944).
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under the anti-fraud provisions of an act. A holding that membership is
not a security for registration purposes may be regarded as strong au-
thority for holding that it is not a security for the atiti-fraud provisions.46
To hold that membership of an original club member is not a security may
similarly be regarded as authority for holding that membership of a later
joining member is not a security. To hold that membership in one club
is not a security may lead to a holding that membership in a different club
is also not a security. Consequently, in order to protect those in need of
protection it may be wise to find that memberships generally are securities.
Relief may then be granted to deserving clubs through the availability of
defenses or exemptions.
B. EXEMPTIONS FOR WHICH CLUBS MAY QUALIFY
Even if an investment club membership were deemed a security within
the meaning of a particular act, the act would not necessarily become
entirely applicable. Almost every act exempts certain securities and certain
transactions from many of its provisions. The anti-fraud sections provid-
ing civil and criminal remedies for fraud as defined typically apply to other-
wise exempt securities and transactions; however, registration requirements
need not be met and civil and criminal remedies provided for non-fraudulent
transactions become inapplicable.4 T An exempt security, as distinguished
from an exempt transaction, is a security exempted because of the nature
of the issuer. The nature or the number of the persons that invest in such
a security do not effect its exemption. A typical example would be a secu-
rity issued by a charitable non-profit organization. In contrast, an ex-
empted transaction depends entirely on the character of the investors. The
issuer of the security is irrelevant. An example here would be sales by an
issuer to existing security holders.
Membership in an investment club is unlikely to fall within any of
the common security exemptions. Most of these exemptions bear no rela-
tion to an investment club. Although an investment club is often formed
for educational purposes, it will not qualify as a non-profit educational
46. Similarly, in New Jersey, which has only a simple anti-fraud securities
act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§49:1-1 to 29 (1955), if the Attorney General should exercise
his authority and seek to investigate, fraudulent activities in the operation of in-
vestment clubs, the courts would be likely to find that this investigation was
within the power conferred on the Attorney General when the statute authorized
him to investigate fraud in the sale of "securities." On the other hand, a court
might be less prone to hold a membership a security if the consequence were
criminal penalties for "wilfully" failing to register the memberships.
47. Most exemptions operate automatically-that is, without notification of ap-
proval. See, e.g., Merger Mines Corp. v. Grismer, 137 F.2d 335 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 320 U.S. 794 (1943). A notable exception to this rule is the "small
offering" exemption of the Federal Securities Act of 1933, 48 STAT. 76-7, as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77(c) (1952). See text at p. 850 infra.
The burden of subsequently proving qualification for exemption, however, is
on the person claiming it. E.g., SEC v. Sunbeam Gold Mines Co., 95 F.2d 699
(9th Cir. 1938); Commonwealth v. Freed, 106 Pa. Super. 529, 162 Atl. 679
(1932).
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association 48 since there is a strong profit motive in an investment club.
Some acts, however, may have exemptions which make a particular form
of organization desirable. North Carolina, for example, exempts from
registration the stock of any domestic corporation if no commission or other
remuneration is included in the sale price.49  A North Carolina invest-
ment club thus might find it desirable to incorporate to avoid the necessity
of registr&tion or the penalties for failing to do so. Similarly, in Penn-
sylvania there is an exemption for stock issued by a corporation if one-half
of its paid-in surplus is invested in Pennsylvania and no part of the issue
to be exempted is to pay for property outside of the state.50 This exemption
raises the question of whether a club's investments would be considered in
Pennsylvania. Since the apparent purpose of this exemption was to
encourage investment in Pennsylvania, this purpose would not be fulfilled
when stock in an out-of-state corporation is purchased by a club through a
Pennsylvania dealer and held in Pennsylvania. This exemption then would
apparently not benefit a Pennsylvania investment club unless it purchased
interests solely in Pennsylvania enterprises.
An exemption for "co-operatives" can be found in many states. These
exemptions occasionally may protect an investment club, although typically
the cooperative must be for some agricultural, marketing or consumer pur-
pose or not be conducted for profit. 1 Little'value would be had from re-
viewing here a series of other exemptions for particular securities. 2  Each
presents its own issues and call for similar ad hoc determinations.
The numerous exemptions for certain transactions, however, raise
questions worthy of discussion here. Almost any act exempts from its
registration provisions a sale of securities by an individual in an occasional
transaction. No act is intended to make a person register his securities
when he sells fifty shares of General Motors. Consequently, many
Blue Sky Laws have an exemption for "isolated sales"- which is usually
limited to sales not made by the issuer.5 4  tven if it is so limited, the
exemption would probably protect sales of a membership by one member to
a new member.55 However, it might not protect an individual from liability
for acting as a seller of a new membership because if the member were
48. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 12132, 137.3F (Smith-Hurd 1955).
49. N.C. GEN. STAT. §78-3 (1950). See also MAss. ANN. LAws c. 110A,
§3(f) (Supp. 1957) which exempts issues ofodomestic corporations up to $25,000
when the number of security holders does not exceed twenty-five.
50. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 32(f) (9) (Purdon Supp. 1957) (no commission
may be charged and the securities commission must be notified).
51. E.g., OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.02(1) (Page 1954).
52. Exemptions specifically designed for investment clubs are discussed at p.
876 infra.
53. E.g., MIN-. STAT. ANN. §80.06(1) (1946); see also MASS. ANN. LAWS
c. 110A, § 3(a) (1954), discussed in Loss & COWETT, BLUE Sxy LAW 371 (1958).
54. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 517.06 (1943).
55. Cf. Brannan, Beckham & Co. v. Ramsaur, 41 Ga. App. 166, 152 S.E. 282
(1930). Several states exempt resales of securities which have been lawfully
distributed at an earlier date. E.g., Ky. Rrv. STAT. §292.030(10) (1953). Such
a provision might also protect a member's sale of his own interest.
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treated as the seller he would probably also be treated as the issuer.5 6 Of
course, if the exemption extended to sales by the issuer, then the admission
of a single new member would be exempt.57 However, admission of two
new members in a short period of time might not be exempt because they
might constitute "repeated and successive transactions of like character." 58
To treat the organization of the club as an "isolated transaction" would
create too dangerous a precedent for the perpetration of fraud.59
The federal act contains an exemption for "transactions by any person
other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer. . "60 The sale of a club
membership will normally not involve an underwriter "I or dealer,62 but the
act contemplates that every security will have an issuer.6 Obviously, any
sale which results in payments being received by the club involves the club
and/or its members as an issuer.64 This would include either periodic
contributions or the admission of a new member. But if memberships are
transferable and a member should sell his interest to a third party, then the
transaction would seem to be exempt as not involving the issuer. However,
there is an implication in the act's definition of an issuer that the members
of the club would themselves be the issuer because section 2(4) states
".. . that in the case of an unincorporated association which provides
by its articles for limited liability for any or all of its members . . . the
. . . members thereof shall not be individually liable as issuers of any
security issued by the association. . . ." 3 This would appear to imply
that the members can be individually liable as the issuers at least when they
do not limit their liability. If the individual members are the issuer, this
latter transaction might also involve the issuer unless each member be
treated as the issuer when the club receives the proceeds but not when he
receives the proceeds himself. This distinction might be made on the theory
that the latter transaction only involves the resale of an already issued
security.
Security acts are also not intended to thwart the incorporation and
organization of small businesses by subjecting them to the time and expense
of registration. The incorporation of a small business obviously involves
the issuance of securities*6 but many Blue Sky Laws provide an exemption-
56. See text infra and at p. 855 infra.
57. See Ersted v. Hobart Howry Co., 68 S.D. 111, 299 N.W. 66 (1941).
58. See Kneeland v. Emerton, 280 Mass. 371, 183 N.E. 155 (1932); see also
Ferar v. Hall, 330 Mich. 214, 47 N.W.2d 79 (1951) ; Gales v. Weldon, 282 S.W.2d
522 (Mo. 1955).
59. Cf. Commonwealth v. Summons, 157 Pa. Super. 95, 41 A.2d 697 (1945).
60. 48 Stat. 77 (1933), 15 U.S.C. §77(d)(1) (1952).
61. 48 STAT. 75 (1933), 15 U.S.C. §77(b)(11) (1952).
62. 48 STAT. 75 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77(b) (12) (1952); see text at p. 861
in!ra.
63. Loss & CowErr, BLUE Sxy LAw 342 (1958). Only an issuer can file a
registration statement. 48 STAT. 78 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77(f) (a) (1952).
64. Isguer is defined to include ". . . every person who issues or proposes to
issue any security ... " 48 STAT. 74-5 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77(b) (4) (1952).
65. Ibid.
66. "Security" is always defined to include "any stock."
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for security sales to a small number of persons.67 About half do not restrict
sales to the time of organization.68 The number of permissible purchasers
is normally between ten and twenty-five and notice to the state commission
is often required. 69 An investment club with only seven or eight members
might find protection from registration in such an exemption. However,
even a club with such a small number oi members might lose this protec-
tion if it should subsequently admit new members since the admission of
new members would be a further sale of securities.70 Even if the maximum
number of club members did not exceed the number specified in the ex-
emption, it would still be possible for a club to lose its protection. This
could occur, for example, if the exemption provided for sales to ten or less
and the club had ten members. If one should resign and a new member
subsequently join, the club would have issued memberships-that is, sold
securities-to eleven persons. The Uniform Securities Act 71 assists a club
in this connection by permitting ten offers or sales per year. Thus as many
as ten new members might be admitted each year without registration if
every solicitation were successful. It should be noted that the act not only
permits the administrator to deny this exemption in any particular case, but
also to increase the number of offerees or purchasers.7 2
The Securities Act of 1933 contains an additional general exemption
to avoid unnecessary application of the act. Section 4(1) exempts " . .
transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering . . ." 73 from
the registration and prospectus requirements of the act. Many clubs will
undoubtedly find protection in this section. 74 Because similar provisions
in state acts 75 will probably receive the same construction as the federal act,
an understanding of the operation of the federal exemption should be suffi-
cient. This exemption by its terms applies only to transactions of issuers
which, as indicated earlier, 76 may include the individual members of a club.
Various factors have been deemed relevant in construing this exemp-
tion. One is the number of offerees.77 The section by its terms, refers to
67. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 121Y, § 137.4G (Smith-Hurd 1953). Some
states restrict this exemption to corporations. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 409.050(6)
(Vernon Supp. 1957). Other states limit the exemption to domestic corporations.
See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §§ 32(f) (10), (17) (Purdon Supp. 1957).
68. See Loss & COW=TT, BLUE SKY LAW 369-74 (1958).
69. Ibid.
70. See text at p. 853 infra.
71. § 402(b) (9).
72. Ibid. , See also the official comment thereto.
73. 48 STAT. 77 (1933), 15 U.S.C. §77(d)(1) (1952). Cf. the English dis-
tinction between "public" and "private" companies. Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12
GEo. 6, c. 38, § 28.
74. The burden of proof, however, is on the person claiming it. SEC v.
Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 126 (1953).
75. E.g., COLO., REv. STAT. ANN. c. 125, § 1-15(13), (16) (1953); see also
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §32(f)(10) (Purdon Supp. 1957).
76. See text at p. 845 supra.
77. Loss, SEculiTIEs REGULATION 396 (1951 with 1955 Supp.); Campbell v.
Degenther, 97 F. Supp. 975 (W.D. Pa. 1951).
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a public offering, not public sales, so that the number of persons solicited
rather than the number who purchase, is the relevant consideration. Pro-
fessor Loss has stated that an offer to approximately twenty-five persons is
safely assumed not to involve any public offering, ". . . regardless of any
other circumstances." 78 One of the SEC Commissioners has recently
stated, "As a rule of thumb, the Commission has considered that an offering
made to not more than twenty-five or thirty persons, who take the securities
for investment and not for distribution,7 9 is generally a private transaction
not requiring registration." 80 The cases seem to go further. In a 1951
district court case, the sale of $4,000 worth of securities to thirty-two per-
sons known to the issuer "through mutual business associates," was held
to be a private sale.8 ' The number of offerees was not made clear. A New
York court applying the federal act held that an issuer's sale of sixty-five
shares of stock without registration was not prohibited.82  The Colorado
statute indicates a similar construction. It provides that the solicitation of
more than fifty persons by any means shall be deemed an offer for sale
to the "general public." '
Another factor used in ascertaining the existence of a public offering
is the number of units offered.8 4 Thus a club with a small maximum placed
on its number of members is more likely to be exempt than one with a large
maximum. Failure to provide any maximum, despite the small number of
original members might well prove disastrous, especially if new members
are readily admissible.,, Thus in one case a voting trust agreement signed
by only eight stockholders was held to involve a public offering when it
appeared that the agreement was deemed to run to all those who should
deposit their stock in conformity with the agreement.'
It has also been stated that ". . transactions effected by direct nego-
tiation look more private than those effected through the use of the regular
78. LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION 186 n.321d (Supp. 1955) (bottom page
number).
79. It is most unlikely that an investment club member would join in order
to resell his membership.
80. Orrick, Some Observations on the Administration of the Securities .. ,
42 MINN. L. REV. 25, 33 (1957).
81. Campbell v. Degenther, 97 F. Supp. 975 (W.D. Pa. 1951).
82. Rudnick v. Bischoff, 258 App. Div. 608, 17 N.Y.S.2d 575 (1st Dep't 1940).
When the case applied the exemption to the anti-fraud provisions of the act, how-
ever, it was "clearly wrong." Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 997 n201 (1951).
83. CoLO. STAT. ANN. c. 125, §§ 1-16 (1952).
84. Opinion of SEC General Counsel, John J. Burns, Securities Act of 1933
Release No. 285 at 2 (Jan. 24, 1935). ". . . [W]here many units are offered in
small denominations, or are convertible into small denominations, there is some
indication that the issuer recognizes the possibility, if not the probability, of a
distribution of the security to the public generally.
".. I would also consider whether the same or other securities of the same
issuer are being offered at the same time." Ibid.A large number of units, even when purchased by a few persons, creates the
possibility of resale to the general public.
85. Corporation Trust Co. v. Logan, 52 F. Supp. 999 (D. Del. 1943) (caption
to case indicates but eight signers to the agreement).
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machinery of public distribution." 86 Direct negotiation will normally be
characteristic of the formation of an investment club. But a stock broker
who encourages some of his clients to form a club may prevent the club
from being eligible for this exemption since the transaction would be, in a
sense, effected through the regular machinery of public distribution. Pro-
fessor Loss has also indicated that ". . . transactions in securities where
like securities are not already traded on an exchange or in the over-the-
counter market," tend to appear private rather than public8 7
However, the most significant consideration in qualifying for the private
offering exemption is suggested by the House Report which indicates
that the provision was intended to "... exempt transactions where
there is no practical need for application [of the registration and prospectus
requirements] or where the public benefits are too remote." 88 In SEC v.
Ralston Purinau, 9 the Supreme Court said that if the offerees are "able to
fend for themselves" 90 by having ". . . access to the same kind of in-
formation which registration would disclose" 9 1 the transaction will not
involve any public offering. The essential relationship is that between the
issuer and the offerees, 92 and the essential question is whether the offerees
have the knowledge and information that registration would give them.0
At the time of organization, the members of an investment club would not
be benefited by a prospectus. Indeed, the costs of registration could well
prohibit organization of the club. 4  All of the knowledge that members
would receive from registration is contained in the charter of the club-
voting rights, contribution requirements, interests held by others, etc. This
is not like the case of a going concern where the composition of assets, the
extent of liabilites and the distribution of control may not be patently clear.95
Once organized and operating, however, an investment club could lose the
86. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 395 (1951).
87. Ibid.
88. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1933).
89. 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
90. Id. at 125.
91. Id. at 127.
92. Cf. the early Scottish case of Sleigh v. Glasgow & Transvaal Options,
[1904] Sess. Cas. 420 (Scot.), where the existence of friendship between the
promoters and forty offerees was sufficient to make the offer private.
93. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953). The test under the
English act referred to in note 73 supra is stated to be: "Is there a sufficient sub-
sisting connection between the company [issuer] or the person making the offer
and the person to whom the offer is made as friends, customers, co-adventurers, etc.,
or are the persons mere outsiders?" 80 SOL. J. 785 (1936).
94. For various estimates of registration costs see Margraf, Does Securities
Regulation Hinder Financing S-all Business, 11 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 301,
309 (1945).
95. Thus it has been held that sale of stock by a corporation to its "key em-
ployees" had to be registered because many of the employees were unfamiliar with
the management of the business. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
Even the sale of a new issue of stock to existing stockholders has been required
to register, apparently because a stockholder's information is not as great as that
of the holder of a prospectus. Merger Mines Corp. v. Grismer, 137 F.2d 335
(9th Cir. 1943).
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private offering exemption if its charter permitted it to solicit any new
members. The SEC has recognized that a private offering may become
public since it has adopted a rule that exempts transactions made while
there is no public offering but before ". . . the issuer decides to make a
public offering." 9 If a membership is a security, all memberships-.
whether belonging to charter members or to later admitted ones-are part
of the same "issue" since all memberships will normally contain the same
rights and obligations.9 7 A club that decides to engage in a new member-
ship drive may become engaged in a public offering of its memberships for
two reasons. First, its solicitations might involve a large number of offerees
and second, these offerees may not have the knowledge that a prospectus
would reveal, e.g., control of the club by a few members, make-up of the
club's portfolio and voting rights. The fact that only friends and relatives
of members were approached would not necessarily protect the club.
"[R]elationship, close as it may be, does not in itself suffice for the informa-
tion required to be possessed by all offerees. . : . [A] Iso, friendship, close
as it may be, does not suffice. If a stranger is entitled to have certain
information, certainly a friend is not to be prejudiced by not being a
stranger." 9s
The ability of offerees "to fend for themselves" will also be influenced
by the investment sophistication of the solicited membersY9 It is possible
that ". . . if a few of the offerees, although not sophisticated investors
themselves, are closely connected with other offerees who are knowledgeable
about the affairs of the issuer, the private offering exemption might still
be available." 1oo
If for any of the reasons discussed below,' 0 ' the periodic contributions
of members are themselves considered separate sales of securities, this
transaction will often come within the common exemption of sales to exist-
ing security holders.'0 2 Occasionally, however, this exemption is limited
to corporations. 10 3  The federal act exempts only exchanges of securities
with existing security holders. 10 4 Periodic contributions would not qualify
as an exchange of a pre-contribution interest for a post-contribution inter-
est because of the cash paid in. The next section of the act indicates that
96. 17 C.F.R. §230.152 (1949).
97. See Shaw v. U.S., 131 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1942) which similarly defines
"issue" for purposes of the intra-state issue exemption. But see Loss, SECURITIES
REGULATION 365 n.212 (1951).
98. Newton, Problems in General Practice Under the Federal Securities Act,
18 MONTANA L. REV. 33, 38 (1956). But see note 92 supra.
99. Orrick, Some Observations on the Administration of the Securitics Laws,
42 MINN. L. REV. 25, 33 (1957).
100. Ibid.
101. See text at p. 853 infra.
102. E.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. §48-18-22(d) (Supp. 1957).
103. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 32(f) (13) (Purdon Supp. 1957).
104. 48 STAT. 906 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (9) (1952). "[N]o commission
or other remuneration . . . for soliciting such exchange" can be paid. Ibid.
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exchange of a new security for an old cne plus cash is only exerfipt if
approved after hearing by an enumerated governmental authority.3 .
The Federal Securities Act also contains two exemptions, contained in
no other act, which may be of assistance to investment clubs which cannot
find refuge in any other exemption. One is the exemption which the Com-
mission can grant to small issues (under $300,000). ° 6 The other is an
exemption for issues made in but one state. ° 7 The small issue exemption
is not automatic. The act provides that the Commission, by rule and subject
to its conditions, may exempt "any class of securities . . . if it finds that
the enforcement of this subchapter with respect to such securities is not
necessary in the public interest and for the protection of investors by reason
of the small amount involved or the limited character of the public offer-
ing. . . . '18 Under this provision the Commission provided, during the
period 1941 to 1953, an unconditional exemption for most offerings up to
$30,000." ° 9 But since 1953 it has emphasized the prevention of fraud." 0
By complying with the rules of the Commission, a club"' can presently
avoid the Act's full registration requirements, but not the civil and criminal
liabilities of sections 12 and 17 for material misstatements or omissions.
For issues under $50,000 (and here issue would include the value of all
memberships ever sold by a club) 112 notification of the commission is re-
quired ten days before any securities can be sold."13 The ten-day period
can be accelerated. 114 Notification must be in quadruplicate I' and include
the following information: 1) name and address of the club, 2) where and
when it was organized, 3) a description of "the general type of its business,"
4) names of promotors, officers, directors and those controlling the club as
well as their interests therein, 5) the kind and amount of securities proposed
to be offered, and 6) a statement that there are no underwriters or under-
writing costs." 6 In addition, since the successive periodic contributions by
members may be securities issued by the club," 7 the club must file, semi-
annually, a Form 2-A obtained from the Commission, stating the amount
received in the preceding six months, the purposes for which these sums
have been used, and "the number of units still being offered with the price
105. 48 STAT. 906 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(10) (1952).
106. 48 STAT. 76-7 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §77c(b) (1952).
107. 48 STAT. 906 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §77c(a)(11) (Supp. 1957).
108. 48 STAT. 76-7 (1933), 15 U.S.C. §77c(b) (1952).
109. 17 C.F.R. §§230.220-24 (1949).
110. Loss, SEcuRITiS REGULATION 166 (Supp. 1955) (bottom page number).
111. A club would come within the rules since they apply to any "resident"
of the United States and "resident" includes an "organization" organized under the
laws of the United States, any state or territory or the District of Columbia. 17
C.F.R. §§ 230.251, 230.252 (1958).
112. Id. § 230.257.
113. Id. § 230.255(a).
114. Ibid.
115. Id. §230.257(a).
116: Id. § 230.257 and Form 1-A.
117. See text at p. 853 infra.
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per unit." 118 Although these periodic contributions might not involve a
"public offering" 119 and would therefore themselves be automatically
exempt from any registration, the small offering rules require the semi-
annual statement to qualify the original distribution for its protection.
20
Consequently, a club which feels it needs the protection of this exemption
should comply with this requirement. But it should be noted that no club
need attempt to qualify as a small issue, if the club can safely qualify for
some other exemption such as a private offering.
The federal act also contains an exemption for issues offered in only
one state. 121 A qualified issue may use the mails and means of interstate
commerce without registration.12 An issue will qualify, however, only if all
of the offerees are residents of the state in which the issuer resides and
does its business. Organization of a club with but one member not a resi-
dent of the club's state would destroy this exemption.'M
Even a club which qualified at its organization as intrastate might sub-
sequently lose this protection. The entire "issue" must be offered and sold
to residents of the same state.12 4  If either members' periodic contributions
or payments by new members were considered part of the original "issue,"
the admission of an out-of-state member or the movement of a member to
another state could result in destroying the exemption. What is an "issue"
for the purposes of this section? It ".. includes all the shares of com-
mon character originally though successively issued by the corporation." 1
25
The concept is apparently narrower than a "class" of securities, which would
include all securities with the same "bundle of rights." 128 "Issue" requires
both the same "class" and the same financing purposes. 2 7 Therefore, if
two sales of interests in an investment club do not contain the same rights
or resulted from different financing purposes, they are not part of the same
"issue." Applying this test to a member of an investment club who moves
out-of-state but continues to make his periodic contributions, it is apparent
118. Loss, SEcuarns REGULATION 173 & n.288h (Supp. 1955) (bottom page
number).
119. But see text at p. 849 supra and p. 852 infra where the periodic contributions
are treated as part of the same issue.
120. 17 C.F.R. §230.260 (1958).
121. 48 STAT. 906 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §77c(a)(11) (Supp. 1957).
122. Apparently Congress could have constitutionally forbade the use of all
means of interstate commerce to intrastate issues, cf. 48 STAT. 77 (1933), as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 77c (Supp. 1957), but nevertheless felt that state laws were ade-
quate for issues within one state. See Margraf, Does Securities Regulation Hinder
Financing Small Business, 11 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 301, 304 (1945).
123. Peterson Engine Co., 2 S.E.C. 893 (1937); Brooklyn Manhattan Transit
Corp., 1 S.E.C. 147 (1935) ; Note, Federal Control Over Small Issues of Securities,
70 HARv. L. REv. 1438 (1956).
124. 48 STAT. 906 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §77c(a)(11) (Supp. 1957).
125. Shaw v. United States, 131 F.2d 476, 480 (9th Cir. 1942).
126. Loss, SEculnREs REGULATION 365 & n.212 (1951); Throop & Lane, Some
Problems of Exemption Under the Securities Act of 1933, 4 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 89, 110 (1937).
127. Loss, SEcuRrnEs REGULATION 365 (1951); Securities Act Release No.
2029 (1939); Throop & Lane, supra note 126, at 110.
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that his rights continue the same (the articles of agreement are unchanged)
and the same financing purpose continues, that is, to diversify each mem-
ber's holdings and to take whatever benefit there is from making fixed
periodic payments. If it is proper to conclude that the continued periodic
payments are part of the original issue, then the transfer of one member's
residence out-of-state will destroy the intrastate exemption. The same
result would appear to follow if an out-of-state member is subsequently
admitted; however, here it is possible that the admittance of the new mem-
ber represents a new financing purpose. For instance, a club with only five
members, all residents of the same state, might feel that it could benefit by
enlarging its membership and with the increased proceeds profit by specula-
tive trading. The admission of ten new members might therefore be for
a new purpose, to wit, speculation rather than investment. And con-
sequently, if one of the ten new members was an out-of-state resident, the
intrastate exemption for the payments of the original five members made
before the non-resident was solicitated would not necessarily be destroyed:
However, contributions by the original five after the new admissions would
not be intrastate sales. Of course, sales subsequent to the new admissions
could still qualify as a private offering or for some other exemption.
C. LEGISLATION GOVERNING THE SALE OF SECURITIES
What Is a "Sale"
The remedies of the Federal Securities Act of 1933 other than for fraud
will become available if a non-exempt security is sold without- registration
and a single offer or sale of any part of an "issue" (not necessarily the part
purchased by the complaining member) is made to a resident of a state other
than that of the club 128 and the other offerees or purchasers. 29 Similarly,
state statutes regulating the sale of securities will often be applicable when-
ever a security is offered or sold within the state.i3° However, in order
for there to be a person who can impose civil liability under any of these
acts there must of course, have been a sale. A sale is normally defined to
include any ". . . disposition of a security or interest in a security for
value." 131 Four occasions may give rise to the sale of a club membership:
first, when the club is organized, since each member gives value for a
membership representing his ownership; secondly, when members-make
periodic contributions because these contributions increase a member's
absolute interest and are often, 3 2 in part, a purchase of the club's existing
pool of assets; thirdly, when a member sells his interest to a third party;
128. This, of course, assumes that the club is an entity. This may not be
true if the individual members are treated as the sellers. See text at p. 855 infra.
129. See text and note at note 123 supra.
130. CAL. CoRp. CODE ANN. § 25500 (West 1955).
131. E.g., 48 STAT. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77(b) (3) (1952); IND. ANN. STAT.
§25-831(c) (Bums 1948).
132. If a member does not increase his proportionate interest in the club he will
not be purchasing a portion of the club's existing assets but merely a portion of
the club's new assets.
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finally, admission of new members by the club may result in a sale because
new members give value for an interest and are, in part, purchasing a por-
tion of the club's accumulated assets.
Assuming that a membership interest in a club is a security, it is
apparent that whenever a new member makes his contribution there is a
sale in two senses. First, he has given value for the membership. Second,
to the extent that the membership interest represents an interest in other
securities, rather than other type of property, there has been "a disposition
of . . . an interest in a security." A sale is less clearly made, however,
when members make periodic contributions if these contributions maintain,
but do not increase, the proportionate interests of the 1 espective members.'
Yet by namintaining his proportionate interest through the giving of value,
the member has purchased something. He has maintained the same pro-
portional interest in a larger pool of assets, an interest he would have lost
if he had not contributed.1 34 His situation is analogous to that of a common
stockholder who owns one share of a corporation's one thousand outstanding
shares. If the corporation should issue a thousand additional shares and the
shareholder should purchase one of these shares he will maintain his pro-
portionate interest but undoubtedly there has been a sale of a security1 35
When the club is organized and the first contribution made, there is no
sale in one sense-no purchase is made of an interest in securities owned
by the club because the club as yet owns no securities. But there is the
giving of value in exchange for a claim against the assets of the club. It
has never been doubted that preorganization certificates were "sold" when
value was given. 136
If a security is sold in any of the above situations, it well may be a sale
in violation of one or more securities acts. 13 7 The effects of such a violation
133. If a member does increase his proportionate interest he has purchased not
only a portion of the newly contributed assets, but also a portion of the club's
existing assets beyond the portion he previously owned.
134. For example, a new investment club with ten members might collect ten
dollars from each member in the first month. Each member would then have
a one-tenth interest. If, in the second month, one member did not contribute ten
dollars, his interest would decline to one-nineteenth. By contributing he would
maintain his one-tenth interest. The difference between these two fractions is the
security for which he gives value.
There is authority for this view. In one case, thirty-two parties contracted
to speculate with oil interests. They paid in cash at the time the contract was
signed. Six months later additional sums were contributed, apparently by each
of the thirty-two. This subsequent transaction was treated as the sale of a security.
Campbell v. Degenther, 97 F. Supp. 975 (W.D. Pa. 1951). In another case, where
the plaintiff had made periodic payments to purchase a security, the court said,
". .. it must be admitted that each payment by the plaintiff amounted to a pur-
chase of an 'interest in a security for value.'" Gross v. Independence Shares Co.,
36 F. Supp. 541, 543 (E.D. Pa. 1941).
135. Even the exchange of one stock for another comes within the Securities
Act of 1933 because it was felt necessary to include an exemption for these ex-
changes. 48 STAT. 75 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (9) (1952).
136. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 300-01 (1951 with 1955 Supp.). But see
Holmberg v. Marsden, 39 Cal. 2d 592, 248 P.2d 417 (1952).
137. Aside from the federal acts, more than one state act can readily be vio-
lated. The act of any state in which any of the above-mentioned transactions occur
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are numerous. There are, of course, criminal sanctions, but these need
only concern those who would use investment clubs as a means of defraud-
ing the public. Administrators may be able to obtain injunctions against
certain activities. This is not likely to pose a problem to the average club,
although a securities commission might attempt to establish its jurisdiction
over investment clubs in this way.
The question of the applicability of civil remedies for an illegal sale of
securities could arise by way of defense to an action to enforce the terms
of a club's written agreement.' 38 A court might be quite willing to find a
violation of the securities acts here and refuse to enforce the agreement
on the theory that courts will not aid law violators but will leave them to
their own remedies. 13 9 Affirmative relief might be sought by a member
not merely in seeking to withdraw his interest when the club's agreement
provides to the contrary but also by demanding at a time of severe stock
market decline return of all of the sums he has paid to the club. Such a
litigant might find that the applicable security law (or laws) simply declares
sales in violation "unlawful" or "illegal." But courts have readily implied
voidability of transactions in violation of such statutes on the theory of a
tort action based on a statute enacted for the benefit of the plaintiff to avoid
the injury incurred.14
Under many statutes a purchaser need not rely on implied remedies.
These statutes provide that transactions in violation are not merely illegal,
but rather "void" or "voidable." Normally, such statutes provide that
"any violation" of the act-no matter how "technical"--will invalidate the
sale 141 and this would, of course, include sale without registration. Al-
though it has been suggested by way of dictum that under the federal
statute ". . . a failure to register a security [can be] . . . so remote
from the damages alleged by the plaintiffs as to be without pertinence," 142
and with the exception of similar provisions in the Ohio and Washington
acts,' 43 it has been universally held that any purchaser who takes a security
which is "void" or "voidable" because inexcusably unregistered is entitled
to tender it back and recover the consideration he paid, barring some
affirmative defense, such as a statute of limitations. This will be true even
in the absence of a provision requiring it.144
may be applicable. Loss, The Conflict of Laws and the Blue Sky Laws, 71 HARV.
L. REv. 209 (1957). Neither the doctrine of comity nor the "commerce clause"
will forbid the application of any of these state statutes. See Auslen v. Thompson,
38 Cal. App. 2d 204, 101 P.2d 136 (1940).
138. Practically speaking, dissolution of the club may be preferable to such
an action.
139. E.g., Edward v. oor, 205 Mich. 617, 172 N.W. 620 (1919).
140. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 966-68, 1043-52 (1951 with 1955 Supp.)
(collecting cases) ; Loss & CowvrTr, BLUE SKY LAW 155-60 (1958) (same).
141. E.g., MicH. STAT. ANN. § 19.760 (1937).
142. Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753, 769 (D.N.J. 1955).
143. Onio REv. CODE ANN. §1707.43 (Page 1954); WAsu. REv. CODE
§ 21.04.210 (1951).
144. Pollak v. Staunton, 210 Cal. 656, 293 Pac. 26 (1930). If fraud be present,
a purchaser has common-law remedies for deceit as well as securities-act remedies.
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But even if a member has this right lie must be able to assert it against
someone. Who is liable for a failure to register? The statutes which give
specific remedies to purchasers of unregistered securities give the relief
against, at least, "the person who . . . sells." 145 Whenever there is an
implied remedy it would appear that this would likewise have to lie against
the "seller" because the acts' prohibitions are against illegally selling a
security.146 Many statutes also provide remedies against enumerated per-
sons aside from the seller-various persons who aid in making the sale.'
4 7
The first problem is identifying the seller. The person who sells is
evidently the person who receives the value given for the security. Although
persons beside the value receiver may be considered sellers 148 in order to
effectuate the purposes of any statute in question, the seller must include
the person who receives the proceeds of the sale.1 49  In the case of an
incorporated investment club, there is reason for saying that the club, as
distinguished from the members, is the seller. To say otherwise would
remove the members' limited liability. But an unincorporated club cannot
limit the membeis' liability and therefore there is no reason, other than
procedural, 50 for saying that the club rather than the members is the
seller. The members each hold an undivided interest in the proceeds of
a sale. Consequently they receive the proceeds and should each be treated
as a person who sells.
Persons other than members may also be sellers. Those who act on
behalf of the club may themselves be sellers.' 5' If a stockbroker, for ex-
ample, received an inquiry from a customer about joining an investment
club and directed the individual to a particular club which the individual
joined, then the stockbroker could be considered a person who sold the
individual a membership-security.
152
The statutory remedies, generally speaking, are substantially more liberal and easier
to prove. See Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 812-23 (1951 with 1955 Supp.);
Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 YALE L.J. 227 (1933).
145. E.g., 68 STAT. 686 (1954), 15 U.S.C. §77(l) (1) (Supp. IV, 1957).
146. Loss & Cowper, BLUE SKY LAW 136 (1958).
147. For a general collection of the various statutory provisions see ibid;
see also Loss, SEcURITIEs REGULATION 1071 (1951 with 1955 Supp.).
148. See text and note at note 151 infra.
149. But cf., First Trust & Say. Bank v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 214
F.2d 320 (3d Cir. 1954).
150. The procedural question is who should be the defendants-the club or its
members.
151. E.g., Whittaker v. Wall, 226 F.2d 868 (8th Cir. 1955) (agent). This
was an action to impose liability for an unregistered sale. See the lower court
opinion, Wall v. Wagner, 125 F. Supp. 854 (D. Neb. 1954).
152. See Brown v. Cole, 291 S.W.2d 704 (Tex. 1956). The officers of in-
corporated clubs might find that they have unlimited liability for unlawful sales
made while they were in office. See Loss & CowET', BLUE SKY LAW 170-71
(1958); Annot., 144 A.L.R. 1356, 1363-67 (1943).
Practically speaking, it might appear that no member would attempt to recoup
the amount he had paid in at a time of stock market depression because all other
members would join him in asserting their identical claims and each would share
in proportion to his contribution, which is what the club's rules undoubtedly pro-
vide. But, as will be shown below, some members may be barred from asserting
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Defenses
The apparent ease with which a member could tender his member-
ship and recoup his contributions if the securities acts were found appli-
cable must be tempered by the number of defenses available against such
a member.1 0 For instance, there are the doctrines of waiver, ratification,
pari delicto and estoppel. The doctrines are available as defenses to a suit
brought under any act to which the defendant might be held subject. Al-
though they are here discussed as defenses to actions under acts requiring
securities to be registered, they would similarly apply to actions under
investment company or broker and dealer registration acts. They may well
provide the basis of avoiding the hardship of imposing the liabilities of these
acts on innocent investment club members.
A provision in the club's agreement that each signer waived all rights
under all securities acts would be a convenient means of avoiding civil
liability. But several statutes declare such provisions void,' 54 and the
Illinois Supreme Court has reached the same conclusion without benefit of
statute despite an argument that the parties were of roughly the same bar-
gaining power.'x  The Michigan Supreme Court has recognized the danger
of enforcing such a provision but nevertheless used a waiver as a factor
in finding estoppel. 156 Thus, a waiver provision may be of some value
to an investment club, although it does indicate recognition of the possible
applicability of the securities acts. It is said that the sale of a security
which is void because contrary to law cannot be ratified, but a voidable
their claims by the doctrines of in pari delicto, estoppel or ratification. Furthermore,
the first member to assert his claim may be able to obtain a prior lien on the
club's assets.
Any person who is held liable for an illegal sale of a membership will want to
minimize his loss, first, by obtaining the membership which has been retendered
and, second, by obtaining contribution from the club and its other members.
Contribution might be denied because of the rule against contribution among joint
tortfeasors, 18 C.J.S., Contribution § 11 (1939), and because some statutes provide
for "several" liability, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 121Y2, § 13 (Smith-Hurd 1955).
However, if a member's liability is based on his being agent for the club, the
agent will be entitled to recover from his principal. Whittaker v. Wall, 226 F2d
868 (8th Cir. 1955); REsTATEMENT, AGENCY § 438 (1933). The ownership of the
tendered membership would appear to belong to whoever paid damages to the pur-
chaser since it was only by the payment that the purchaser become divested of
interest.
153. It should be noted that one member will not be able to avoid liability
to another on the theory that he did not benefit from the sale. The fact that
an individual member does not receive the consideration paid is no defense. This
is obviously true if the refund remedy is provided in the statute. If the remedy
is implied because the sale was illegal, the failure of the defendant to benefit will
not be a defense in a suit for damages. Castle v. Acme Ice Cream Co., 101
Cal. App. 94, 281 Pac. 396 (1929). The fact that the defendant joined in the venture
and lost money is no defense. Wehrwein v. Eastman Springs Beverage Co., 238
Ill. App. 443 (1925); Brown v. Cole, 291 S.W.2d 704 (Tex. 1956).
154. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-522(e) (Supp. 1956).
155. Foreman v. Holsman, 10 II. 2d 551, 141 N.E.2d 31 (1957).
156. DePolo v. Greig, 338 Mich. 703, 708, 62 N.W.2d 441, 443 (1954).
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transaction can be.157 However, whether void or voidable, a person may be
barred from asserting some cause of action arising out of a securities act
either by his conduct and knowledge since the time of the purchase
(estoppel) or by his original participation in the illegal transaction (in pai
delicto) .15s1
It has been stated that "the buyer's mere knowledge of the violation
.. at the time of his purchase will not generally saddle him with the
status of one in pari delicto with the defendants." 159 Buyers ". . . will be
denied relief only when the record shows they are equally culpable." 1o
Thus, the California Supreme Court has refused to assist the general man-
ager of a corporation to recoup his downpayment for some of the corpora-
tion's stock solely because he was in pari delicto by reason of his position.
10 1
But where the plaintiff was not an officer or director and determined no
policy concerning reorganization but merely signed a reorganization agree-
ment, he was not in pari delicto for having failed to register and could show
the invalidity of the agreement. 162  When applied to an investment club,
these cases suggest that the club's first president is likely to be treated
in pari delicto because of his responsibility for registration arising out of
his office. Indeed it is quite possible that any of the original dfficers will be
deemed in pari delicto merely because of their office.163 Similarly, all of
the original members of a club organized without officers-for instance, a
157. Reno v. American Ice Mach. Co., 72 Cal. App. 409, 237 Pac. 784
(1925). See also Loss & Cowr, BLUE SKY LAW 167 n.27 (1958). The cases
seem to treat ratification as part of estoppel and, therefore, it Will not be discussed
separately.
158. A court's willingness to accept either of these defenses may depend
partly on whether or not the remedy the member is seeking is spelled out in the
statute. If the remedy is specified without mention of such defenses the court may
feel compelled to grant relief. Cf. Wehrwein v. Eastman Springs Beverage Co.,
238 Ill. App. 443 (1925). A court may also be influenced by the void-voidable
distinction, being more ready to accept these defenses where the sale is merely
voidable. But see Loss & Cowm=, BLUE SKY LAW 167 n.27 (1958). Neverthe-
less, the cases which have so far arisen have not emphasized these considerations so
that the defenses may be discussed without reference to the provisions of the
statutes involved.
159. Loss & Cowmrr, BLUE SKY LAW 166-67 (1958).
160. Randall v. California Land Buyers Syndicate, 217 Cal. 594, 598, 20 P2d
331, 332 (1933); see also Veenstra v. Associated Broadcasting Co., 321 Mich. 679,
33 N.W.2d 115 (1948).
161. Wells v. Comstock, 46 Cal. 2d 528, 297 P.2d 961. (1956); see also First
Nat'l Bank v. Thompson, 212 Cal. 388, 298 Pac. 808 (1931) (director denied
affirmative relief).
162. Veenstra v. Associated Broadcasting Co., 321 Mich. 679, 33 N.W.2d
115 (1948); see also Corporation Trust Co. v. Logan, 52 F. Supp. 999 (D. Del.
1943) (signers of voting trust agreement permitted to rescind).
163. See Moore v. Manufacturer's Sales Co., 335 Mich. 606, 56 N.W.2d 397
(1953), where a person who purchased a portion of a closed corporation (six or
seven stockholders) but signed his own stock certificate when he became secretary-
treasurer was held in pari delicto; see also Wells v. Comstock, 46 Cal. 2d 528,
297 P.2d 961 (1956); Schrier v. B & B Oil Co., 311 Mich. 118, 18 N.W.2d 392
(1945).
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partnership--may be treated in pari delicto.'6 But this would not appear
desirable unless all had participated actively in the club's organization. 165
However, a member not found in pari delicto may be found estopped
by his subsequent conduct. Estoppel will not be established against a mem-
ber simply because he fails to act until the value of his investment declines. 160
Nor will a member's periodic contributions alone estop him.167 A member's
continued participation in the club's investment and consequent knowledge
of its holdings presents a different question. Although a person's activities
at the time of the sale cannot be ignored as a factor in finding estoppel, the
cases seem to emphasize two factors. The first is the length of time the
plaintiff remained in the enterprise.' 6 8 The second is the extent to which he
participated in, and controlled, its operation. Thus, a vice president and
director has been held estopped by his activity., 9 But when it appeared
that the real control of the enterprise was not in the hands of its manager-
purchaser, he was not estopped.' 70
The basic, but usually unarticulated, consideration seems to be an
attempt by the courts to discriminate between those for whose benefit the
securities acts were enacted and those for whom they were not. This is
true whether the issue be estoppel or pari delicto. Thus, recovery has been
granted to one who assisted in the sale of a corporation's stock and acted as
advertising director apparently because his position did not afford him the
protection of the act.1 7  And estoppel and pari delicto were found where
the purchaser had an opportunity to examine the corporation's operations
and actively participated in its operations. 72 As one court said, the plain-
tiff was not at the time of such transaction one of the "original organizers
of the association but one of the public for the protection of whom the
164. Cf. Holmberg v. Marsden, 39 Cal. 2d 592, 248 P2d 417 (1952).
165. See text and note at note 160 supra; cf. Reilly v. Clyne, 27 Ariz. 432, 234
Pac. 35 (1925), where the buyer became a trustee of the Massachusetts trust subse-
quent to his purchase and was held not in pari delicto. The only case under the
federal acts discussing the in pari delicto doctrine is Rosenberg v. Hano, 121 F.2d
818 (3d Cir. 1941).
166. Bunge v. Kirchhoff, 251 Ill. App. 119 (1928); see also Loss, SEcuRTIEs
REGULATION 973 (1951 with 1955 Supp.); Loss & CowErr, BLUE SKY LAW
167 (1958).
167. See Reno v. American Ice Mach. Co., 72 Cal. App. 409, 237 Pac. 784
(1925) (weekly payments).
168. See, e.g., Tawney v. Blankenship, 150 Kan. 41, 90 P.2d 1111 (1939);
Grabendike v. Adix, 335 Mich. 128, 55 N.W2d 761 (1952). Contra, Doherty v.
Bartlett, 81 F.2d 920 (1st Cir. 1936). This consideration may be based on the
likelihood of rights of innocent third parties intervening. See Mitchell v. Grass
Valley Gold Mines Co., 206 Cal. 609, 275 Pac. 418 (1929).
169. DePolo v. Greig, 338 Mich. 703, 62 N.W.2d 441 (1954) (alternative
holding); Schrier v. B & B Oil Co., 311 Mich. 118, 18 N.W.2d 392 (1945)
(same).
170. Reno v. American Ice Mach. Co., 72 Cal. App. 409, 237 Pac. 784
(1925); see Wells v. Comstock, 46 Cal. 2d 528, 297 P.2d 961 (1956).
171. United Bank & Trust Co. v. Joyner, 40 Ariz. 229, 11 P.2d 829 (1932).
172. Moore v. Manufacturer's Sales Co., 335 Mich. 606, 56 N.W.2d 397
(1953).
THE IMPACT OF SECURITIES LEGISLATION
Blue Sky Laws were enacted." 173 Such a test requires a comparison of the
knowledge and protection that a purchaser would have received if there
had been compliance with the act-with the purchaser's actual knowledge
of the club's operations and his consequent ability to protect himself.
Recovery of a member's periodic payments by way of rescission might
also be denied for a failure to properly tender back one's membership.
Statutes which provide for recovery of the original consideration usually
require tender 174 and in any event tender will be required for rescission.175
However, in an action for damages as an implied remedy from violation of
a criminal statute enacted for plaintiff's benefit, tender may not be neces-
sary.'76 A written offer of resignation from the club would appear to be
sufficient tender of a member's interest. However, if the club's written
agreement has been substantially amended or the member has previously
withdrawn part of his interest, he may have difficulty meeting the require-
ment that he tender tl] equivalent of what he purchased.
177
Death of a member could prevent his estate from recovering under the
securities acts if his cause of action were held not to survive. Similarly,
a member might be absolved from liability under these acts if actions against
him did not survive his death, but it has been held that securities act actions
survive the death of either buyer ' 78 or seller.179
Several members of a club might wish to assign their actions to one
person to reduce the costs of litigation. Although the question of assign-
ability usually receives the same answer as the question of survivability the
cases are split on the issue of assignability of securities act actions.180
Consequently, to avoid the risk of this defense, claiming members might
do better to rely on a class suit, if possible.
Statutes of limitation may present a serious problem to any investment
club member seeking recovery under a securities act. If a plaintiff should
173. Reilly v. Clyne, 27 Ariz. 432, 445, 234 Pac. 35, 40 (1925). The protection
of those-who-need-protection test is in accord with the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of the private offering provision in the federal act. SEC v. Ralston Purina
Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953); see also Remar v. Clayton Securities Corp., 81 F. Supp.
1014 (D. Mass. 1949), where it was held that a margin stock purchaser Who pur-
chased in excess of the margin limitation could recover from his stock broker
despite his own participation because the statute was, in part, intended to protect
the customer from his own tendency to spread himself "too thin."
174. E.g., TFx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33 (Vernon Supp. 1957).
175. Moore v. Stella, 52 Cal. App. 2d 766, 127 P.2d 300 (1942).
176. Drees v. Minnesota Petroleum Co., 189 Minn. 608, 250 N.W. 563 (1933).
177. See Wisconsin Mutual Plate Glass Ins. Co. v. Guarantee Bonds Co., 218
Wis. 197, 260 N.W. 484 (1935).
178. Estate of Leedom, 225 Wis. 148, 273 N.W. 471 (1937) (senzble).
179. Auslen v. Thompson, 38 Cal. App. 2d 204 (1940). Survivability is provided
in both ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 121Y2, § 13E (Smith-Iurd 1955) and UNIFoRm SEcu-
RITIEs Acr §410(d).
180. Mayer v. Rankin, 91 Utah 193, 63 P2d 611 (1936) (assignable); Wogahn
v. Stevens, 236 Wis. 122, 294 N.W. 503 (1940) (Federal Securities Act of 1933
not assignable). "[Tjhe question is certainly not beyond argument." Loss &
CowETT, BLUE Sxy" LAW 179 (1958).
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seek recovery on a tort theory for damages resulting from the violation of a
criminal statute enacted for his benefit, the applicable statute of limitations
would appear to be that generally applicable to tort actions. Since a mem-
ber of an investment club seeking tort damages on this theory will be
seeking damages arising from payments made over a period of time, a court
will have to make a choice as to when the statute began to run. It could
treat the beginning time for all of the payments as the date of the first pay-
ment, because that is the time of the invasion of the plaintiff's rights. It
could treat the separate payments as separate causes of action and measure
the period for each payment. Or it could find that the statute did not begin
to run until the final payment was made. 81 If a member's action were
based on some remedy provided in the securities act, every statute but
California's 182 provides some specific period of limitation. The most com-
mon provision is a two year limitation, running from the date of the illegal
sale or contract of sale.'8 Such a provision raises the question of when
the sale occurred. Although it has been suggested that a "sale" may occur
each time a payment is made,184 it should be remembered that repose of the
defendant is of central importance in a statute of limitation18 and the
statute should therefore be deemed to run from the date he is most likely
to consider a sale as having been made, to wit, the date the-plaintiff joined
the club. A countervailing consideration is that the evidence necessary
for a securities act claim is likely to be tangible evidence and consequently
a rapid closing of the period is not necessary.
D. LEGISLATION GOVERNING THOSE IN THE SECURITIEs BusINEss
Statutes requiring the registration of brokers, dealers, agents and
salesmen raise four distinct questions for investment clubs. First, do any
of these statutes require the club itself to register because it "sells" its own
memberships? Second, must any of the members or officers register if they
should sell memberships issued by the club? Third, must the club register
because it buys and sells securities on the open market for the benefit of
its members? Finally, must a member of the club appointed to make its
open market transactions register because of his activity? Each act, of
course, requires individual detailed examination to resolve these questions.
Yet a few should be examined here in order to suggest the nature of the
issues raised.
181. See Developments in the Law--S-tatutes of Limitation, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177,
1205-07 (1950), for a discussion of these and other theories.
182. CAL. COMP. CODE ANN. § 26100 (West 1955).
183. E.g., MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 110A, § 18 (1954). Some statutes begin to run
when the plaintiff would have discovered the violation in the exercise of reasonable
care. E.g., TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33 (Vernon Supp. 1957).
184. See text at p. 853 supra.
185. See Developments in the Law--Statutes of Limitation, 63 HARV. L. REV.
1177, 1185 (1950).
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Federal Regulation of Brokers and Dealers
Federal regulation of brokers and dealers is contained in the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.186 This act, in contrast to the Securities Act of
1933, is intended to regulate post-distribution trading in securities rather
than their original issuance.'8 7 Section 15 (a) denies the use of the mails or
any means of interstate commerce to a broker or dealer whose business is not
exclusively intrastate in order "to effect any transaction in or to induce
the purchase or sale of" any non-exempt security otherwise than on a
national exchange unless the broker or dealer is duly registered. 8 This
registration is intended to cleanse from the quasi-fiduciary positions of
broker and dealer those unqualified for such trust.' 89 A broker is defined
as "any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities
for the account of others. . . ." 10 A dealer, on the other hand, is "...
any person engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for his
own account, through a broker or otherwise, but does not include . . .
any person in so far as he buys or sells securities for his own account, either
individually or in some fiduciary capacity, but not as part of a regular
business." 191
The sale of a club membership, whether it be by the club or by an
individual member, will probably not come within either definition. If a
purchaser-member should become such by paying his consideration to an
existing member, with the existing member arranging for a membership
in the new member's name, then the old member may have effected a trans-
action for the account of another, i.e., the account of the new member.' 92
But in order to become a "broker," the existing member would have to
be in the business of effecting such transactions and the single sale of his
own membership would not meet this requirement. 93 If the purchaser-
member pays his consideration directly to the club, the club itself could
conceivably be a "dealer" in its own memberships.' 9 4 However, it would
186. 48 STAT. 881, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1952), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A.
§78 (Supp. 1957).
187. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 84 (1951).
188. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 895, as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§78(o) (a) (1952).
189. The grounds for denying or revoking registration are: (a) willful mis-
statement in application, (b) injunction or criminal conviction arising out of the
purchase or sale of any security, or (c) wilful violation of the Securities Act or the
Securities Exchange Act. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 49 STAT. 1377, 15
U.S.C. § 78(o) (b) (1952). For the means used to uncover those unfit to be brokers
or dealers, see Loss & Cow=rT, BLUE SKY LAW 84 n.67 (1958).
190. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 881, 15 U.S.C. §78c(a)(4)
(1952).
191. Id. at 883, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (5).
192. The fact that the old member was an officer of the club would not necessarily
make the sale that of the club. Rather the officer might be treated as a dealer in the
club's memberships. See Conley v. State, 50 Ga. App. 401, 178 S.E. 314 (1935).
193. See Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 720 (1951).
194. An open-end investment company which issues and redeems its securities
has been considered a dealer in its own securities. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION
721 (1951).
19581
862 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 106
have to buy and sell such securities for its own account as part of its
business. 195 A club which permitted members to withdraw at any time,
possibly subject to a small penalty, and subsequently admitted new members,
would be purchasing its .own securities when it redeemed and would be
selling them when it admitted new members. But the question would
remain whether the club was engaged in this "business." The club is not
organized for dealing in its memberships, a factor deemed determinative
in holding an insurance company not to be a dealer in its own stock, and
hence, it did not have to register on this account.' 98
Every investment club will, in some manner, make purchases and sales
of securities on the open market for the benefit of its members. These
transactions might be made in the name of the club or in the name of an
individual member who acts for the benefit of all members. 197 Such
activities would not bring the club within the concept of a "broker," how-
ever, because the transactions are not made "for the account of others,"
i.e., the members individually. Although the club will keep records in-
dicating the ownership interest of each member, there will not be transac-
tions for an account of each member in the trade sense. 9 8 But the definition
of a "dealer" suggests that one who buys and sells securities in a fiduciary
capacity can be a dealer so long as he is engaged in "the business of" buying
and selling.'99 The word "business" does not require that the activities
constitute the primary business of the person in question.s° ° Nevertheless,
it would seem that a club should not be characterized as a "dealer," since
it conforms more closely to the concept of a "trader," that is, one who trades
in securities for his own account but not as part of a regular business.
Likewise, it would seem that a member of a club, appointed as its
"agent" to purchase and sell the club's securities in his own name, is a
"trader" not a "dealer." While both a trader and a dealer make their profits
from the purchase and sale of securities for their own account, the dealer
creates a market for the securities in which he deals by having a regular
clientele and by performing various services for investors. The trader, on
the other hand, usually deals through members of securities exchanges
rather than with the public and does not attempt to create a market.2° ' In-
195. See definition quoted at p. 861 mipra.
196. Commercial Life Ins. Co. v. Wright, 64 Ariz. 129, 166 P2d 943 (1946);
cf. First Nat'l Say. Foundation v. Samp, 274 Wis. 118, 80 N.W.2d 249 (1956).
197. The club's stock might be held in the club name or in a "street name"
for the benefit of the club.
198. An individual member effecting the club's purchases and sales as agent
might be considered a broker in the securities belonging to the club. However, to
be a broker his activities must be a "business." This would seem to require some
means of compensation and the existence of more than one client. See Loss,
SECURITIEs REGULATIO 720 (1951).
199. See definition quoted at p. 861 supra. Professor Loss has indicated that the
SEC could require trust companies that invest trust money in securities to register
as dealers. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 721-22 (1951).
200. Id. at 720.
201. Id. at 723. A person who merely brings parties together to conclude their
own sale does not place himself in the position of a person "in the business of" nego-
tiating sales. McKenna v. Edwards, 19 Cal. App. 2d 327, 65 P.2d 810 (1937).
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vestment club portfolio transactions are usually made through members of
an exchange without any attempt on the part of the club to create a market.
Such activity should not constitute the club or its "agent" a dealer within the
act. But should the club make it a practice, for example, to purchase stock
in local unlisted corporations and then to seek out buyers from among the
public, dealer status may result.
Even if the Federal Securities Exchange Act were applicable, failure
to register as a broker or dealer should not cause an investment club or
any of its members much difficulty. The SEC is not likely to attempt to use
this particular act as a means of regulating investment clubs 2 0 2  Civil lia-
bilities should be difficult to impose. Failure of a club to register as a dealer
in the securities purchased for the club, if required, would render "void"
any contract made by the club in violation of section 15 (a) .o Thus, either
a purchaser from, or a seller to, the club could rescind or collect damages
as implied by this provision. However, for practical reasons these remedies
would rarely be invoked for purchases or sales made by the club through
a national exchange,20 4 since the other party to the transaction would be
unlikely to know of the club. Nevertheless, if the club or its agent should
purchase unlisted securities directly from an individual-for instance stock
in a local manufacturing concern-then the seller may be able to obtain
rescission. Similarly, a purchaser might rescind, if the club made a direct
private sale?05 A member of the club, acting as its agent, might be sub-
jected to rescission or damages in the same manner.206
State Regulation of Brokers and Dealers
In contrast to the federal regulatioi of brokers and dealers which
complements regulation of securities at their issuance, there are some state
acts which rely solely on registration of those who deal in securities for
202. The one SEC Annual Report which has discussed regulation of investment
clubs did not mention registration of the club or any club member under the Securities
Exchange Act. 22 SEC ANN. RE-'. 191 (1956). Nor did a letter from the SEC
General Counsel discuss this possibility. Letter from Thomas Meeker to the University
of Pennsylvania Law Review, June 3, 1957, on file in Biddle Law Library.
203. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 903, 15 U.S.C. § 78 cc(b) (1953);
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
204. The prohibition of section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 STAT.
896, 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1952), does not apply to transactions "on a national securities ex-
change." This exception, however, will not prevent the club or an individual member
from being subject to the act simply because the securities the club buys are listed on
such an exchange. The transaction that could make such a person subject to the act
is the one between that person and the members of the club. This transaction is not
"on a national securities exchange." This interpretation is consistent with the appar-
ent purpose of the exception, to wit, to exempt transactions where purchasers are
sufficiently protected by the regulation and self-regulation of the exchanges themselves.
The mere listing of the security on the exchange will not afford this protection.
205. See Setchell v. Moore, 89 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1937), based on the Kansas
statute.
206. See Flournoy v. Gallagher, 189 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) where
one of two participants in an oil lease enterprise was found to be a dealer because he
had sold oil leases in other transactions; see also Dursum v. Benedict, 209 Mich. 115,
176 N.W. 459 (1920).
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the protection of the investing public. In Pennsylvania, for instance, only
securities sold by a dealer may be required to be registered. 20 7 The dealer
must also be registered,20 8 however, and a dealer is so defined as to include
an issuer.20 9 If the club is an issuer of its membership-securities then it
must register its memberships as securities and itself as a dealer.
There may be more reason for applying this type of registration
statute to investment clubs than the federal dealer-broker registration pro-
visions. If neither the club nor any of its members are held to be dealers
or salesmen, then the state will receive no information about any inherent
dangers in the organization of a particular club, or about persons who might
use their membership in a club to take advantage of its members. For
instance, if the club were a dealer within the act, the club would have to
file the names of all "principals, partners, officers . . . or managing
agents." 2 10  With such information the commission can communicate with
the SEC to determine if any of these persons has been charged with viola-
tion of any federal or state securities statutes in prior criminal or other
proceedings 2 n Since the securities sold by the dealer-club would be its
own memberships, there would have to be filed with the commission a state-
ment of the purpose of its formation, the use of the proceeds of the sale of
memberships and the rights of members2 12 Stch information would permit
the commission to discover aspects of the organization of any club that
tended to endanger its members, such as non-participation in investment de-
cisions. If the commission finds a dealer not to be of good repute, his plan
of business to be "unfair, unjust or inequitable" or to be of "insufficient
financial responsibility," it may refuse a registration 213 or subsequently re-
voke one already issued 2 1 4  In this way the commission might remove a
club's license as a dealer and purge that club from the ranks of those which
present no public danger.
In light of this potential usefulness of registration, the Pennsylvania
definition of "dealer" may be examined. The club might be considered a
dealer in its own securities. Any "person" may be a dealer 215 and "person"
includes a "company" 216 which, in turn, includes a "corporation," a "part-
207. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 44(a) (Purdon Supp. 1957).
208. Id. § 3.3.
209. Id. § 32(f). Exemptions which would normally appear in a statute regulating
the sale of securities as exempt securities and exempt transactions consequently be-
come exemptions from the definition of a dealer. Id. § 32(f) (1)-(17).
210. Id. § 36. The Commission can also require evidence of their "good repute."
Ibid.
211. For a description of this procedure and the extent of its use, see Loss &
COWETT, BLUE Sxy LAW 84 n.67 (1958) and 22 SEC ANN. REP. 205 (1956).
212. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 43c(3), (4), (5) (Purdon Supp. 1957). Presumably
many club memberships would be "securities" of "like character" to a "certificate of
beneficial interest." Id. § 44(4). See text at p. 835 supra.
213. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 44 (Purdon Supp. 1957).
214. Id. §45.
215. Id. §32(f).
216. Id. § 32(c).
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nership" or an "unincorporated organization." 217 A dealer is a person
"who engages in Pennsylvania, either for all or part of his time, directly
or through an officer, director, employe, or agent (such officer, director,
employe or agent not being registered hereunder as a dealer), in selling
securities issued by such person." 218 If the club sells 219 its memberships
and these are deemed "securities," 220 then a failure of the club (or an agent
through whom it sells) to register will result in a sale by an unregistered
"dealer." There is an exemption from the dealer definition for "isolated
transactions in which securities are sold by the owner thereof. . " .221
But such an exemption will be of no value to a club with more than a few
members,2 2 especially if each member contribution is treated as a separate
sale.2 2 3 Sale of a security by an unregistered non-exempt dealer is a mis-
demeanor.' 4  Violation of this criminal act may give a purchaser a civil
remedy against the club-dealer-seller,225 if the purchaser can show that
he is one of the class intended to be protected by the act. Because of this
contingent liability, the club may be wise to file the small amount of informa-
tion necessary to register itself and its membership securities, and to pay
the respective sixty dollar 2 2 6 and ten dollar fees.227
Although the statute's definition of a dealer includes persons selling
securities issued by another person,228 a member of a club inducing a third
party to join the club will probably be protected from registration as a
dealer because of a judicial superstructure that has beeft imposed on the
statute. It has been held that one who sells stock of a corporation solely
for the benefit of the corporation is not a dealer.2 2 9  Since a club member
attempting to bring in a new member will be acting for the club (unless
he is attempting to dispose of his own interest), the member, even if an
officerm 0 will not need to register. Furthermore, a person acting on behalf
of the club cannot have his failure to register asserted by another member
217. Id. § 32(e).
218. Id. §32(f). The definition excludes "salesmen." However, a "salesman"
must be employed or authorized by a "dealer," id. § 32(g), so that the club could not
be excepted as a "salesman."
219. See text at p. 852 supra.
220. See note 212 supra. See also text at p. 835 supra.
221. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 32(f) (3) (Purdon Supp. 1957). Apparently an in-
vestment club could be the "owner" of its membership. 'Vhile strictly speaking a cor-
poration may not be the 'owner' of its own unissued capital stock, its relation thereto
is certainly very closely related to ownership." Commonwealth v. Pastor, 289 Pa.
22, 25, 136 Atl. 862, 863 (1927).
222. Commonwealth v. Summons, 157 Pa. Super. 95, 41 A.2d 697 (1945).
223. See text at p. 853 supra.
224. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 52 (Purdon Supp. 1957).
225. In the context of this registration statute it may be necessary to recognize
the club as an entity.
226. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 57(b) (Purdon Supp. 1957). Unfortunately for
investment clubs, this is an annual fee. Id. § 40.
227. Id. § 57(a).
228. Id. § 32(f).
229. Commonwealth v. Harrison, 137 Pa. Super. 279, 8 A.2d 733 (1939).
230. Ibid.
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of the club if that member had the duty to see that the agent was regis-
tered.23 This duty could extend to each member of the club if each par-
ticipated in operating the club.
There is also judicial indication in Pennsylvania that one must sell
securities as part of a business to be a dealer. 32 This requirement must be
tempered by indications that an attempt to profit from a transaction is
adequate to constitute one a dealer 2 although an isolated profit transac-
tion will still be exempt.234 Furthermore, it will be of no value to the club
itself because any attempt to raise money by a corporation, even though
the corporation does not profit from raising the money, is a security saleY2
5
Consequently, investment clubs which profit not from issuing security-
memberships but from their investment of the proceeds, may still be deemed
dealers. Indeed, any judicial requirement that the issuer profit or attempt
to profit from the sale of the security itself would negate the purpose of
including within the definition of a "dealer" one who sells securities issued
by himself. Such a requirement would exempt all issues of capital stock
because the issuer does not profit from their sale but from the use of the
proceeds.2
6
Either the club, if it purchases and sells its stock investments in its
own name or through a "street account," or a member of the club, if pur-
chases are made in his name, might be considered a person "selling securities
issued by another person" 23 and consequently a "dealer" requiring a Penn-
sylvania license. Exemption from the act under the isolated transaction
exception 2s would be difficult to establish if more than a few sales had
been made.29  The club or the transacting agent would be especially
susceptible to the dealer classification because of the authorization to carry
out an unlimited transaction on order of the members.240 If the securities
are held either by the club or an agent rather than in a "street account,"
there may be particular need to register the club or agent as a dealer to help
insure his trustworthiness. 241 This susceptibility to abuse has been con-
sidered an important factor in finding the existence of a dealer under a
different act where the person in question was to receive payments with
231. See Lovering v. Duplex Power Car Co., 204 Mich. 658, 171 N.W. 374 (1919).
232. Commonwealth v. Fernau, 175 Pa. Super. 570, 106 A.2d 624 (1954).
233. Commonwealth v. Mason, 381 Pa. 309, 112 A.2d 174 (1955); see also Com-
monwealth v. Harrison, 137 Pa. Super. 279, 8 A.2d 733 (1939).
234. May v. Rice, 118 F. Supp. 331 (S.D. Cal. 1954) (Pa. act) ; see also Com-
monwealth v. Summons, 157 Pa. Super. 95, 41 A.2d 697 (1945).
235. Petition of Mut. Reserve Adm'rs, 47 Dauphin County 274 (Pa. C.P. 1939);
see also Commonwealth v. Pastor, 289 Pa. 22, 136 At. 862 (1927).
236. See Commercial Life Ins. Co. v. Wright, 64 Ariz. 129, 166 P.2d 943 (1946).
237. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §32(f) (Purdon Supp. 1957).
238. Id. § 32(f) (3).
239. Commonwealth v. Summons, 157 Pa. Super. 95, 41 A.2d 697 (1945) (twenty-
three sales in two and one-half years). See text at p. 844 supra.
240. See Setchell v. Moore, 89 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1937) (Kansas act).
241. For instance, an officer of the club or its appointed "agent" might liquidate
the club's highly liquid assets and disappear.
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which he was to obtain and hold savings and loan accounts (which were
"securities") for the benefit of the purchaser.2 42
E. LEGISLATION GOVERNING INVESTMENT COMPANIES
Legislation regulating the sale of beneficial interests in investment
companies, commonly known as mutual funds, may present some problems
to investment clubs.23 The companies that these statutes are intended
to regulate are those whose principal business is investing and trading in
securities and who issu6 certificates representing beneficial interests therein.
But the statutes are also drawn with great breadth to prevent avoidance
and by that breadth may be applicable to investment clubs.
2 44
These acts, it must be noted, supplement those statutes which require
the registration of securities to be issued.245 The requirements of these
other statutes must still be met.246 Thus, a factor to be considered in de-
termining the applicability of the various investment company provisions
to investment clubs is the adequacy of the securities registration statutes.
Phrased differently, part of the problem is in ascertaining which type of
statute is better fitted to investment clubs.
State Investment Company Legislation
Some statutes regulating investment companies are, by their terms,
not applicable to investment clubs. For example, New Mexico requires
shares in Investment Funds, Investment Companies and Investment Trusts,
known as Investment Fund Shares, to be specially registered.2  Club
242. First Nat'l Say. Foundation, Inc. v. Samp, 274 Wis. 118, 80 N.W.2d 249
(1956). The court left open the question whether the Foundation or its manager or
both were the "dealers." Ibid. It might appear anomalous that a member of the club
should be able to assert some remedy against the club or its transacting "agent." Yet
it has been held that one of two members to an agreement to purchase and sell oil
leases was barred from recovering his interest because he acted as a "dealer" in these
securities for the other member without obtaining a license. Flournoy v. Gallagher,
189 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945). The right of a club member to withdrav
and recover his payments made because an unregistered dealer sold him his interest
would be no more surprising. If he is barred by no recognized defense, see text at
pp. 856-60 supra, he should recover.
243. Frequently, regulation of investment companies is not achieved by a special
statute, but is encompassed in a section of the securities regulation act. See, e.g.,
MASS. ANN LAws c. 110A, §§ 11A-E (1954).
244. In addition to the Federal Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 STAT. 789,
15 U.S.C. §§80a(1)-(52) (1952), nine state acts have been discovered. CoLo. Ray.
STAT. ANN. c. 125, art. 3 (1953), as amended, Colo. Laws 1957, c. 243, at 745; ILL.
ANN. STAT. c. 1211/2, §7 (Smith-Hurd 1955); MAss. ANN. LAws c. 110A,
3§ l1A-E (1954); NEv. Comp. LAWS §970.32a (1952); N.H. Rav. LAWS c. 421,
§2 (1942); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§48-18-25 (Supp. 1957), 48-16-14 to 21 (1953);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, §§ 781-92 (1939), as amended (Purdon Supp. 1957); TENN.
CODE ANN. tit. 48, §§ 1620-22 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1957); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§§3273(32)-(41) (Michie 1955).
245. This is not true in Nevada which has no act regulating the sale of securities.
246. Under the federal act, not only must registration be met, but also the intra-
state and small offering exemptions are denied to investment companies. See text
at p. 871 infra.
247. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-18-25 (Supp. 1957). The statute regulating securi-
ties specifically exempts investment club memberships (subject to certain restrictions)
from its registration provisions. Id. § 21H. This exemption may reflect a legislative
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memberships would not constitute such shares, however, unless the club
were organized as a corporation or a trust, for no interest can be an Invest-
ment Fund Share unless it is in a trust or corporation.2 48  The definti.on
also states that a share must be in a company holding its portfolio in a bank
having a surplus of at least $1,000,000.249 This, most clubs will not do.
Although the draftsman may have intended this depository requisite as a
means of controlling investment companies, its inclusion in the definition
section excludes interests in companies lacking such an arrangement.
To be compared with the New Mexico statute are those that appear
to apply to investment clubs and whose application would not impose an
undue burden on the clubs. For example, Massachusetts requires periodic
payment plan certificates to be approved by the Commissioner.250 In addi-
tion, clear indication must be made to each purchaser of any sales load 11
as well as". . . a complete description of the terms, conditions, privileges,
duties and responsibilities of the holder . . . and . . the . . . is-
suer. . " 252 Such requirements are not excessive for a club since
submission of its articles of agreement to the Commissioner and delivery
of a copy to each member is all that would be required. Membership in a
club probably falls within the statute, since it includes ". . . any certificate,
investment contract . . . or other security providing for a series of
periodic payments by the holder . . . and representing an undivided inter-
est in . . . a . . . fund of securities purchased or to be purchased
wholly or partly with the proceeds of such payments .... "253
In contrast to the Massachusetts statute are statutes whose definitions
appear to apply to investment clubs but whose application would make the.
existence of the clubs impossible. Thus, Pennsylvania requires investment
companies to post United States or Pennsylvania obligations of $100,000
with the commission before a license can be issued.
254 The statute would
require licensing of any corporation, individual firm, partnership or asso-
understanding that club memberships which are exempt from registration as a security
should also be exempt from Investment Fund Share registration and control. On
the other hand, a club membership that did come within the securities registration
exemption might still be considered an Investment Fund Share, if within the latter
definition.
248. Id. §25(1).
249. Ibid.
250. MASS. ANN. LAWS c. IIOA, § 11 (1954).
251. Id. § lIB(). Any entrance fees or dues for purposes other than investment
would presumably be part of a "sales load."
252. Id. 11 ll(2).
253. Id. § 1lA(A). This, of course, assumes that club membership is an
investment contract . . . or other security. .. ."
The purchaser of any such interest, whether registered or not, has the right to
rescind within thirty days after the first payment and before the second payment.
Id. § lC. But a sale without registration will entitle a purchaser to tender back his
interest at any time together with any dividends and recover all consideration he had
paid. Commissioner of Banks v. Chase Securities Corp., 298 Mass. 285, 10 N.E.2d
472 (1937); Kneeland v. Emerton, 280 Mass. 371, 183 N.E. 155 (1932). But cf.
Doherty v. McAuliffe, 74 F2d 800 (1st Cir. 1935) (Mass. act).
254. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 784 (Purdon Supp. 1957).
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ciation engaged ". . . in the business . . . of receiving single payments,
regular installment payments, or contributions to be held or used in any plan
of accumulation or investment. . " 2 55 Typical investment clubs may
not come within this statute for several reasons. First, they may not be
"in the business . . . of receiving . . . contributions" since their at-
tempt to profit comes not from "receiving . . . contributions" but from
investing the proceeds, because they pay no salaries, and because no profit
is made for persons other than the purchaser-members.2 56 Secondly, clubs
may not be within the act because the severity of its provisions reflects no
legislative intention to require compliance by an organization as informal
as the average investment club. For instance, the statute requires the
$100,000 security mentioned earlier, a $100 license fee and $25 per year
for renewals. 57  On the other hand, it may be that the legislature has in-
dicated an unwillingness to let small businesses invest funds for others.
Similar to the Pennsylvania statute is the Illinois statute requiring the
separate registration of both Face Amount Certificate Contracts25 and
Investment Fund Shares.259 The definition of an Investment Fund Share
states that it does not include securities "issued by persons not within the
intent of this paragraph as the Secretary of State may designate... ., 260
The regulations provide that an issuer whose securities are owned by less
than one hundred beneficial owners is not within the meaning of the sec-
tion.261 However, the legislature has failed to provide a similar exception
from the definition of Face Amount Security Certificates, which is the same
as that contained in the Massachusetts act discussed above. 2 However, it
is not necessary to reach the same conclusion concerning club memberships
as was reached under the Massachusetts statute. In contrast to that act,
not only would little information be gained by requiring registration of
club memberships as face amount certificates, but also the requirements im-
posed by the act would virtually preclude the existence of investment dubs.
Only if the memberships must be registered as securities can they be con-
sidered face amount certificates.2 63 If they are registered as securities, the
255. Id. §§ 781-82 (1939). (Emphasis added.)
256. The average investment club does not deduct anything from member con-
tributions before making investments. Consequently there is no source of profit other
than from club investments.
257. Id. § 785.
258. ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 121%, § 6 (Smith-Hurd 1955).
259. Id. § 7.
260. Id. § 2L.
261. Illinois Securities Law, General Rules and Regulations, rule 143(b) (3)
(1955).
262. ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 1212, § 2K (Smith-Hurd 1955) includes in its defi-
nition of a Face Amount Security Certificate the federal definition of a Periodic Pay-
ment Plan Certificate which is the same as the MAassachusetts act definition. See
text at p. 868 supra.
263. Compare ILL. A\N-. STAT. c. 121Y2, § 2A (Smith-Hurd 1955) with id. § 2K.
The Secretary of State has stated that investment club memberships are within the
Illinois act, apparently regardless of the club's organization. Illinois Secretary of
State, Mfemorandum on Investment Clubs (undated), on file in Biddle Law Library.
However, if a club enlisted no more than fifteen members in any one year it would
1958]
870 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 106
Commission will receive copies of club by-laws, 264 certified financial state-
ments,26 5 and names of officers 266 and owners of ten per cent or greater
beneficial interests.267  The club would have to pay a registration fee of
$100 for this registration,268 but if the memberships are also face amount
certificates, the club would have to supply no additional useful informa-
tion to the Commissioner,
26 9 yet would be faced with an added $400 fee 270
as well as the requirement of a $100,000 security deposit with the commis-
sion.271 This appears unnecessary when it is recognized that the thrust of
the face amount security certificate registration is to assure available assets
to meet fixed obligations, i.e., certificates with face amount values.272  On
the other hand, investment fund share registration, from which a club with
under one hundred members is exempt,273 aims at assuring that there are
and will be, underlying securities available in which purchasers can share.27 4
This latter aim would be more in accord with the protection needed by the
members of an investment club. The exemption of the clubs from the more
suited provision is no reason for including them within the less suited
provision, particularly when the consequences of such a decision are
considered.
The Federal Investment Company Act
The Federal Investment Company Act of 1940,275 like some state acts,
would bar any investment club to which it were applied because to be
registered an investment company must have a net worth of at least
$1 30 ,00.2
6 The act requires every company within its purview to register
under the Securities Act of 1933. This registration cannot be exempted
be exempt from all registration. ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 121/, §4G (Smith-Hurd 1955).
A notice of sale must be filed within thirty days along with a $2.00 fee. Ibid. Periodic
contributions by members would be exempt as sales to existing security holders.
Id. § 4B; Illinois Secretary of State, supra.
264. ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 121Y, § 5C(1) (Smith-Hurd 1955).
265. Id. §5C(1) (j).
266. Id. §5C(1)(g).
267. Id. § 5C(1)(h).
268. Id. §§ 5B(2)(h), 5D.
269. Compare id. § 6A with id. § 5C. In Massachusetts, the commission would
receive additional information as to the "duties and responsibilities . . . of the . . .
issuer. . . " as well as deductions from contributions. MAss. ANN. LAws c. 110A,
§ 11B (1954).
270. ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 1213/2, §§ 6A(7), 6B (Smith-Hurd 1955). Massachusetts
charges no additional registration fee.
271. Id. § 6E. The requirement of depositing $100.000 of securities with the state
can be removed- to the extent of 90% of the issuer's contract liability to persons within
the state. Id. § 6E. Since a club has no contract liability to its members, it might need
to make no deposit.
272. Id. § 6E.
273. See text at p. 869 supra.
274. ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 121 2, § 7D (Smith-Hurd 1955).
275. 54 STAT. 789, 15 U.S.C. §§80a-1 to 80a-52 (1952).
276. Id. at 811, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-14a.
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under the intrastate exemption 277 or the small offering-ufiter $300,000-
exemption.27 8  Any investment company which uses the mails or other
means of interstate commerce must register under both acts.279 A company
registered under the Investment Company Act must provide equal voting
rights, 2 0 semi-annual reports, 28 ' safe custody for its portfolio, 282 a precise
statement of its investment policies which cannot be changed without a
majority vote of all the owners 283 and must comply with SEC-established
uniform accounting.284  It may be forbidden from making short-sales,
285
and, if it promises to redeem its shares, it cannot postpone redemption more
than seven days.28 6  There are apparently civil 287 as well as criminal
2
1
8
penalties for violations. As desirable as these requirements may appear for
investment clubs, the $100,000 net asset requirement would destroy the
clubs to protect their members.
The above description may assist in resolving the questions of whether
a club is an investment company under this act and, if it is, whether it is
exempt. Before any person 2 9 can be considered an investment company,
it must be .an issuer of securities.2 9° If an investment club does issue
securities, it will be an investment company if it "is or holds itself out as
being engaged primarily, or proposes to engage primarily, in the business
of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities." 291 The term "business"
has been discussed earlier 2 92  But in this context it may have a different
application to investment clubs. In the earlier context, the question was
whether the club was in the business of selling or issuing securities. Thus,
the focus was on the club memberships as the securities in question. Here,
however, the question is whether the issuer engages in the business of
investing in securities-the securities being the stocks and bonds that it
277. Id. at 826, 15 U.S.C. §80a-24(d).
278. 17 C.F.R. § 230.252(b)4 (1958).
279. Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 STAT. 826, 15 U.S.C. §80a-24(d)
(1952) ; id. at 804. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8(b)4.
280. 54 STAT. 821 (1940); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(i) (1952).
281. Id. at 236-37, 15 U.S.C. §80a-29(d); 17 C.F.R. §230.70(d)1, 2 (1949).
282. 54 STAT. 816 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §80a-17(f) (1952); 17 C.F.R. §270.17(f)2
(1949).
283. 54 STAT. 811 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §80c-13 (1952).
284. Id. at 838, 15 U.S.C. §§80a-30(c), (d).
285. Id. at 801, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12a(3) ; Loss, SECURiTIES REGULATION 676 n.142
(1951).
286. 54 STAT. 824 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22e (1952).
287. Id. at 844, i5 U.S.C. § 80a-43 refers to the jurisdiction of federal courts to
hear legal and equitable actions to enforce liabilities. Section 80a-32 requires notifi-
cation of the Commission of the settlement of all civil actions. Cf. SEC v. Fiscal
Fund, 48 F. Supp. 712 (D. Del. 1943).
288. 54 STAT. 846 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §§80a-48, 49 (1952).
289. The term "person" includes any "company." Id. at 794, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(27).
"Company" includes any corporation, association or "organized group of persons."
Id. at 791, 15 U.S.C. §80a-2(8).
290. Id. at 793, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(21), 3a.
291. Id. at 797, 15 U.S.C. §80a-3a(1). Sections 80a-3a(2),(3) are inapplicable
to investment clubs.
292. See text at p. 862 supra.
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purchases with the proceeds from the sale of its own securities. 293 Thus,
the business involved is not the issuance of club memberships but the
purchase and sale of securities on the open market. Although an investment
club may not be in the business of selling its memberships because it does
not try to profit from this operation,294 it may very well be in the business
of "investing, reinvesting, and trading in securities" because it does try
to profit from this operation. Indeed, the Senate Report accompanying the
Investment Company Act described one investment scheme subject to its
provisions in terms that could equally apply to an investment club.m 5
Congress recognized the broad sweep of its definition of an investment
company by providing a list of specific exceptions from the definition.
It also recognized this sweep by permitting the SEC to exempt persons
" .**not within the intent of the proposed legislation." 297 The act
therefore encompasses all organizations which might be subject to the
abuses which the act is intended to prevent. These abuses came from
managers acting for their own benefit rather than that of the beneficial
owners. Some investment clubs could be subject to these abuses. The
fact that most clubs will not does not mean that the act does not apply to
them. It encompasses all in order to protect the few.
298
Even if a club issues securities and is in the business of investing,
reinvesting or trading in securities, it will not be considered an investment
company if its ". . . outstanding securities . . . are beneficially owned
by not more than one hundred persons and . . . is not making, and does
293. Cf. 54 STAT. 797 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §80a-3(a)(2) (1952), which defines
an investment company as any issuer which engages ". . . in the business of issuing
face-amount certificates of the installment type." (Emphasis added.)
294. See text and note at note 256 sup ra.
295. S. REP. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 8 (1940).
296. 54 STAT. 800-01 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §§80a-6(a), (b) (1952).
297. S. REP. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 13 (1940); 54 STAT. 802 (1940),
15 U.S.C. §80a-6(c) (1952). It might be argued that the act's requirement of a
$100,000 net worth for registration of an organization as an investment company
indicates that Congress did not intend the act to apply to investment clubs. The
answer is twofold. First, the $100,000 requirement was intended to prevent the
"irresponsible formation of investment companies," not to exempt small companies
from the operation of the act. S. R.r'. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 13-14 (1940).
Second, the provision permitting the SEC to exempt persons not within the intent
of the act also gives the SEC power to exempt persons from individual provisions
of the act. 54 STAT. 802 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-6(c) (1952). This would indicate
that Congress realized that there would be investment companies whose operation
would be in the public interest but who would be unable to meet certain registration
requirements, including the $100,000 net worth requirement. Individual organizations
have been exempted from this requirement. See, e.g., American Research and De-
velopment Corp., 23 S.E.C. 481 (1946).
298. If an investment club were an investment company it would be a "Manage-
ment Company." 54 STAT. 802 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §4(3) (1952). If the club permits
its members to withdraw approximately their respective asset values at any time, the
club would be an "open-end company." Id. at 800, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5 (a) (1). If the
club limited itself to investing no more than five per cent of its assets in any one
security, it would be a "diversified company." Id. at 800, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5 (b) (1).
It then could not invest over five per cent of its assets in one security without approval
of a majority of all of its members. Id. at 811, 15 U.S.C § 80a-13. Since club mem-
bership implies a "series of periodic payments" it would be a "periodic payment plan
certificate." Id. at 794, 15 U.S.C. §80a-2(26). To comply with the act, the first
payment would have to be at least $20.00 and subsequent payments at least $10.00.
Id. at 829, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-27(a) (5).
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not presently propose to make a public offering of its securities." 2 99 Since
this exception is joined by the word "and," it is apparent that a club must
neither have one hundred members nor make a public offering to be exempt.
Most clubs, of course, will not have one hundred members. But some may
make a public offering.30° The phrase "public offering" may not mean
the same thing here as it does in the Securities Act of 1933.301 The focus
of the 1933 act is to provide investors with honest information at the time
they purchase °2 The Investment Company Act attempts to protect pur-
chasers from managers during the company's operations.30 This would
suggest that the "public" in the "public offering" exemption of the latter
act is a group who, during their period of ownership rather than at the
time of their purchase, will be "unable to fend for themselves." Persons
that join a club, although in need of registration at the time they join
because they are purchasing assets collected by others and mainly in the
control of others, do not need subsequent protection if they gain knowledge
and control thereafter simply by continuing as members. Thus there would
appear to be no public offering for purposes of the Investment Company
Act unless there are so many members or the club's structure is such that
an individual is unable to protect his interest in the club's operation.1 °
Certainly the average club of fifteen or twenty members should be able to
hold meetings that will enable everyone to participate in the operations and
decisions of the club. Such clubs would not need the protection of the
Investment Company Act and thus would probably be exempt from regis-
tration under it. However, if an investment-club is an investment company
under the federal act and is not exempt from its operation, then it will be
subject to civil and criminal sanctions for non-registration.3 0 5
F. PROPOSALS FOR CONTROLLING INVESTMENT CLUBS
Administrative Interpretation of Existing Securities Legislation
Those responsible for administering the securities acts, both state and
federal, can deal with the problems raised by investment clubs in several
ways.
Those administrators that operate under statutes which give them no
special authority to exempt particular securities or sales or classes of secu-
299. Id. at 798, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c) (1).
300. For instance, a club composed of the employees of a large company may
invite new members by posting notices to solicit co-workers to join. Even indis-
criminate word-of-mouth invitations to co-workers might constitute a public offering
since in both cases the number of offerees will be large.
301. See text at p. 846 supra.
302. Loss, SEcuRrTiEs REGULATION 83 (1951).
303. Id. at 94, 96-97.
304. This conclusion presupposes that the word "offering" in the phrase "public
offering" does not foreclose examination of persons other than offerees. Under the
Securities Act of 1933 where dissemination of information to the investing public is
attempted, focusing on the offerees is justified. However under the Investment Com-
pany Act which attempts to protect ownership interests, it appears sound to make the
owners themselves of central importance.
305. See notes 287-88 supra.
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rities or sales have the inherent power to give their interpretation, either
formally or informally, of the acts they administer. Such an interpretation,
if it indicates a club need not register, can foreclose criminal liability (if there
be such a danger) by removing "wilfulness" from the violation. Even as
to civil liability, such interpretation may be given some weight by the
court. 8o
Some statutes specifically authorize their administrators to exempt cer-
tain persons or transactions from their operation. For instance, the Massa-
chusetts act says that ". .. the commission may, in accordance with such
rules, regulations and upon such conditions and limitations as it may
prescribe, exempt other sales and types of sales from the provisions of this
chapter [1 10A]." 307 Thus, the commission has authority to exempt the
sale of club memberships under whatever conditions it deems appropriate.
Similarly the Securities Act of 1933 gives the SEC authority "to make
.. such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions of this title, including rules and regulations . . . defining
. . technical . . . terms used in this title." 808 Presumably, a rule
indicating that membership in a club with certain characteristics was not
a "security" would be within this power. So also might be a ruling on what
constituted a public offering of club membership. Good faith compliance
with such a rule or regulation would prevent imposition of any criminal
liability even if that rule or regulation should subsequently prove invalid
for any reasonaosa More specific powers of exemption are granted in the
Investment Company Act of 1940. Section 6(c) provides:
"The Commission, by rules and regulations upon its own motion,
or by order upon application, may conditionally or unconditionally ex-
empt any person, security, or transaction, or any class or classes of
persons, securities, or transactions, from any provision or provisions
of this title or of any rule or regulation thereunder, if and to the extent
that such exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public interest
and consistent with the protection of investors and the purposes fairly
intended by the policy and provisions of this title.'"y 
8 9
Legislative Proposals
In the exercise of these specific grants of power, administrators will
be attempting to balance the benefits to be achieved from registration and
306. Interpretation may be avoided by some administrators because they feel
that although club memberships are non-exempt securities, the dangers created by non-
registration are more than offset by the paperwork involved in registering a large
number of clubs. This attitude is evident in a substantial number of letters received
from securities administrators in connection with this note. However a failure to
require clubs to register is in effect interpreting the act in question to exclude all
investment clubs. Without registration, it becomes more difficult for the admin-
istrators to see if the clubs are developing into organizations where dangers indicate
a need for regulation or prohibition.
307. MAss. ANN. LAws c. l0A, §4(i) (Supp. 1957).
308. 48 STAT. 85 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77(s) (a) (1952).
308a. See note 349 infra.
309. 54 STAT. 802 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §80a-6(c) (1952).
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the dangers from non-registration, on the one hand, against the time and
cost inconvenience and deterrent effect that registration would have on
investment clubs. 3 10 The problem of administrators issuing rules exempting
clubs under specified conditions is the same problem faced by legislators
considering amendments to their respective acts affecting investment clubs.
The conclusions reached by any administrator or legislator will be, of course,
influenced by the philosophy of the act under which he is operating. Under
the Securities Act of 1933, it may be felt sufficient if each member of a
club has a copy of his club's agreement, so long as that agreement contains
a minimum of information. Those states which have a more paternalistic
philosophy might deem it wise to refuse registration to any club which has
no restrictions against speculative investments. Speaking generally, how-
ever, the purposes of any statutory or regulatory exemptions should be the
same: ". . . to make sure that investment clubs operate within an area
in which regulation is pot justified, and to provide a reasonable amount of
scrutiny or regulation if they stray beyond." 311 In effect, the attempt should
not be so much to regulate what are commonly considered investment
clubs-friendly organizations for mutual education in securities investment
-but to assure that these clubs do not become something else; that they
do not become organizations in which investors lose control of their money,
organizations which could be used as tools of manipulators.
In considering how to regulate investment clubs, several approaches
might be considered. Requiring tl:e registration of clubs could make those
registered subject.to a series of substantive provisions dictating what clubs
may and may not do. For instance, the manner in which custody of the
club's portfolio is held could be stipulated, or salaries to club officers might
be prohibited. Violations of such terms could be made subject to the same
penalties as those for failing to register, or there could be special sanctions
such as providing for the return o~f prohibited salaries. W 2  In contrast, an
approach based on the philosophy that sufficient protection for club members
can be incorporated into the club's written agreement might be attempted.3 13
An act or regulation operating under this philosophy might require clubs
to file their written agreement and members' names, together with later
filing of amendments and names of new members. This could result in
automatic exemption if the club met minimum fixed standards (such as a
maximum on membership) and the provisions of the club's agreement were
found to fully protect its members. But exemption, and even registration,
310. The additional burden of supervising investment clubs may also influence
the thinking of already under-staffed administrators.
311. NATIONAL AssocIATioN OF SECURITIES ADMINISTRATORs, REPORT OF INVEST-
MENT CLUB COMMITTEER, 39TH PROCEEDINGS NASA 105 (1956) (hereinafter cited as
NASA).
312. See text at p. 880 infra.
313. The uniform system for regulation of investment companies proceeds on the
premise ". . . that the essential requirements for the sound operation of investmerit
companies can properly be incorporated in the governing instruments of the companies
in such a manner that they cannot be removed except by shareholder approval, and
that their very presence will afford ample protection except when the management
is wholly dishonest." Loss & CoWETT, BLUE SKY LAW 69 n.17 (1958).
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could be denied if any member of a club was found to have a history which
did not warrant the trust of a club, or exemption could be made contingent
on notification of all members of the club of a member's history.
It might be desirable to avoid multiple qualification and regulation of
clubs. Some system of federal-state and state-state cooperation could result
in coordinated regulation. Thus, if the SEC federally defined an investment
club and set minimum standards for exemption and approval by the Com-
mission, many states might be willing to permit clubs to operate within their
jurisdiction upon filing proof of their federal qualifications. This would
keep costs and complexities of regulation to a minimum, especially for a
club with members in more than one state.
Two states have passed amendments exempting investment clubs from
their acts, which may prove to be guides to further legislation.3 14 An
314. "Section 4 [requiring registration of securities] shall not apply to . . .
"H. Securities issued by an investment club, provided that the following conditions
are present:
"(1) That the membership is limited to not more than twenty-five (25) mem-
bers and provided that a husband and wife rhay be counted as one (1) member.
"(2) Periodic contributions generally are equal.
"(3) If a licensed dealer or investment adviser or employee of such dealer or
investment adviser is an organizer or member this relationship is fully disclosed to
the commissioner.
"(4) The management of the funds of the club is not in the hands of a licensed
dealer or investment adviser or employee of such dealer or investment adviser.
"(5) Securities invested in by the club are not bought on margin nor is any
money borrowed or the assets pledged.
"(6) Unanimous consent of the members is required for any major investment
policy change.
"(7) No member receives any fee or remuneration for services in the operation
of the club, except for bookkeeping or clerical services.
"(8) The books of the club are kept open to the inspection of members at all
time.
"(9) Memberships in the club are nontransferable.
"(10) The monthly payment by each member is not in excess of fifty dollars
($50.00) per month.
"(11) The club has filed with the commissioner such information as he may
require to determine whether or not the registration of such securities is exempt
from registration under this aet.
"(12) The commissioner has advised such club that its securities are exempt
from registration." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-18-21 (Supp. 1957).
"Subject to section 189.11 [prohibiting fraudulent sales] the following trans-
actions may be consummated without registration of the security . . .
"(21) The sale by an investment club of beneficial interests, not exempt under
sub. (1) (b) [exemption for domestic pools and associations with less than fifteen
members], for the purpose of investing and reinvesting such proceeds in securities,
if the total membership at any one time is limited to 25, the monthly payments by
each member do not 6xceed $25, and all members continue to retain equal interests
in the funds, and provided that:
"(a) Such investment club shall file with the department such information, state-
ments, copies of papers and instruments as the department may require in order to
be in a position to determine whether or not registration of such securities . . . is
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors; and
"(b) The department has advised such investment club that the proposed sale
of the securities issued by it constitute exempt transactions under this section." Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 189.07 (West 1957).
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attempt will be made here to suggest the range of provisions that might be
included in a regulation or statute rather than attempting to suggest a
statute which would fit within the framework of each jurisdiction's present
legislation. It is not advocated that all the suggestions presented appear
in the same statute; some may be mutually exclusive. Indeed, other pro-
visions may be needed.
1. As a guide to individuals and the courts, a general definition of an
investment club might be attempted. Neither of the acts does this. A pos-
sible definition is: "An organization or association of individuals who
periodically contribute sums of money to invest and reinvest in securities
which are held in a pool beneficially owned by these individuals in relative
proportion to their contributions, no individual having a claim for a fixed
sum."
2. Some provision should be made for the filing of a document
listing names of all members including those joining subsequent to organ-
ization; a signed copy of the club's governing agreement including all
subsequent amendments; information sufficient to determine voting rights,
rights to withdraw and all other information necessary to determine whether
the club qualifies for exemption. Additional power over filing requirements
should be given to the administrator.
Qualification for exemption should be contingent on notification of
approval from the administrator. This would give him an opportunity to
examine the club's agreement for equitable voting provisions, to determine
if any of its members were unqualified for membership and, generally, to
determine if the club qualified for exemption.
3. Once granted, this exemption should extend to all provisions of the
applicable securities acts except those provisions dealing with fraud, mis-
statement or omission3 1 5 Thus, a club could not misrepresent its portfolio
to a prospective new member unless it were willing to face not only common
law liability for fraud but also the commonly more stringent statutory
prohibitions.
4. Size of the club should be limited. New Mexico and Wisconsin
have chosen twenty-five as the maximum number of members 3 16 although
the National Association of Securities Administrators recommended
twenty. 17 The number chosen should be sufficiently small to prevent
the transfer of investment decisions from the entire membership to a
minority or a committee. A club over twenty in size may be subject to this
danger.
5. A limit on the size of a member's periodic contributions may be
desirable. New Mexico and Wisconsin have imposed monthly limits of
315. This exemption might be in addition to others available. See the Wisconsin
provision at note 314 supra.
316. See note 314 supra.
317. NASA at 105.
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$50 and $25 respectively.3 1 8 The purpose of such a limitation, apparently,
is to restrict the ability of clubs to become sizable business ventures and to
restrict the temptation of one member to make personal use of the club's
assets. However, a club will attain a large portfolio of assets by merely
existing for a period of years and therefore these dangers may return.
This situation might be met by setting a maximum on the assets of a club
entitled to exemption: full registration of a club when and if it reached
a liquidation value of $50,000, for instance, would not be unduly burden-
some. Registration at that point might provide needed protection by estab-
lishing, for example, standards for custody of the club's portfolio.
6. A requirement of relatively equal contribution by members has
considerable merit. It tends to prohibit one member from dominating the
affairs of the club through his ownership. It also forbids a member from
becoming inactive, leaving in the club sums he had previously contributed
and permitting those that continue to contribute to dominate the club's in-
vestment decisions. A person who is compelled to contribute every month
is not likely to let others determine the use of that sum. Consequently, the
New Mexico exemption provides that periodic contributions must "gen-
erally" be equal and the Wisconsin exemption is conditioned on all mem-
bers retaining "equal interests." 319 Some indication of the meaning of
"equal" or "generally equal" could be included. For instance, a club in
which no member had an interest greater than twice the size of any other
member's interest could be considered one which had "generally -equal"
ownership. Such a definition would permit clubs to have some flexibility
in allowing members occasionally to pass a contribution if short of funds at
the time.
An alternative to an equal contribution requirement would be a pro-
hibition against any member owning more than a specified percentage of a
club. This could be fifteen, twenty or possibly twenty-five per cent.
Reliance on a fixed percentage might well be too inflexible, however. A
twenty per cent limit in a club of six or seven members might be too
stringent while in a club of twenty members it might prove no protection
at all.
A second alternative might be a provision giving all members equal
voting power. However this would give one who frequently contributed
more than the average sum less control than his contributions warranted.
Conversely, one who contributed less than the average would gain exces-
sive control in relation to his interest.
7. It may be desirable to require some minimum percentage of votes
to make investment decisions. Most clubs will require, at a minimum, a
majority vote of those voting. But in order to protect minority interests
and the interests of those not present at a meeting from control by a
minority, some absolute minimum number of votes to make an investment
318. See note 314 supra.
319. Ibid.
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decision may be desirable. Thus, a requirement of at least one-third of all
votes, whether present or not, may be in order.
In addition, voting control over investments should be made propor-
tionate to the total ownership interest of each member, without regard to
his contribution in the particular month. A member's ownership claim is
an undivided interest in all of the club's assets which includes the assets
purchased during a month in which he does not contribute. By not con-
tributing in that month a member reduces his proportionate ownership of
the club's increased assets, but he does not destroy his interest in the new
assets purchased. When equal contributions are not required, it becomes
necessary to constantly readjust voting rights to keep them proportionate
to ownership.
3 20
8. Restrictions on use of investment club assets may be important in
deterring the potential dangers .to investors in these clubs. Consequently,
the following restrictiofis might be considered: (a) Limitations on the types
of things in which the club can invest may be appropriate. Clubs, if they
are to remain exempt, might be barred from purchasing assets other than
securities. This seems to be required under the Wisconsin Act.3 2 1  It
would prevent the club from purchasing real estate and race horses 
8 22
and tends to keep clubs out of "business" and in the area for which they
were originally intended, that is, education in securities investment.32
(b) Prohibitions against margin purchases may be included to help
avoid liability for members beyond their contributions. This has been done
in New Mexico where pledging of the club's assets and borrowing money
is also prohibited
3 24
(c) A prohibition against large investment in any one enterprise may
remove the temptation of a club member or other person to use the club's
assets for his own advantage. It also insures diversification of assets.
Thus, clubs might be forbidden, if they are to remain exempt, from invest-
320. The complexity of this readjustment is one reason for requiring the ad-
ministrator's approval of a club's provision for voting rights. See text at p. 877 supra.
321. The exemption says "for the purpose of investing and reinvesting in securi-
ties." See note 314 supra.
322. One club has owned a racehorse. See TRIGGER, How TO RUN A SUCCESSFUL
INVESTMENT CLUB 5 (1958).
323. Even security purchases may not always be proper. If a club promises to
redeem memberships at liquidation value on request, it should be limited to purchasing
those securities for which there is a ready market in case many members desire to
withdraw at one time. Thus, clubs to remain exempt might be limited to purchases
of securities traded on specified national exchanges. Clubs could conceivably be used
as devices to permit the public distribution of securities otherwise barred from public
sale. Sale of these securities to one or two clubs could legally be effected under an
exemption for isolated transactions even though the securities could not qualify for
the registration necessary to offer them to the public generally. Memberships could
then be sold in a club which purchased such securities. It might therefore be con-
sidered proper to forbid clubs to purchase securities not themselves qualified for sale
to the public under the act in question. The sanction might be punishment of the
seller rather than the club. Thus, the club might recover what it had paid rather
than losing its registration exemption.
324. See note 314 supra.'
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ing more than five per cent of their assets or $2,000, whichever is greater,
3 2 5
in any one security or business.m
9. Restrictions on the payment of salaries to members, the custody of
assets and the availability of records may also be in order. First, payment
of any fees to members other than for out-of-pocket expenses and for
clerical, legal or accounting services, raises the likelihood that clubs might be
abused by persons whose financial best interests did not lie in increasing
the club's assets. Second, club assets should be protected from a member
who may use them for his own benefit if, for instance, he became financially
embarrassed. Thus, a club which did not keep its securities with a licensed
stockbroker might be required to bond the member that did have custody
of its portfolio. Third, the availability of records permits members to
check on those they trust, tending to prevent gross dishonesty. Violation
of any of these three provisions should permit an innocent member to
withdraw and obtain either the contributions he made or the present market
value of his interest, whichever is greater3
7
10. Certain persons should not be permitted to be members of invest-
ment clubs. Those against whom criminal or civil liability arising out of a
securities act has been imposed in recent years could be automatically barred.
Because of the danger of dominating a club, those in the business of selling
securities, whether licensed or not,328 might also be barred. One reason,
however, for not barring this latter group is that their investment knowledge
may be of value to a club. On the other hand, since clubs are often formed
by unsophisticated investors attempting to gain investment knowledge,
naive overdependence on the advice of a securities seller may result.
11. If a club issues memberships without qualifying for exemption,
each member not barred from recovery by estoppel, statute of limitations,
or some other doctrine, might be permitted to recover the consideration he
originally paid, with interest. In the case of a club which qualified for
exemption by receiving the requisite approval but which loses its exemp-
tion by, for example, making unpermitted investments, admitting ineligible
individuals or failing to keep proper custody of its investments, the sanc-
tions should not be as severe as for initial failure to qualify. Indeed, the
sanction for failure to abide by a given requirement should be aimed, as far
as practical, at remedying the violation. A given act might, therefore,
have a series of sanctions, each to be applied to a particular type of viola-
tion. Thus, if the club's books were not made available to some members,
325. The reason for these alternatives is that during the club's early life, it will
have most of its assets in but a few securities. The dollar limitation alternative
removes the possibility of unavoidable violation at that time.
326. Cf. Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 STAT. 800, 811, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-
5(b) (1), 13(a) (3),(4) (1952). The sanction for violation might be to permit the
club to void the transaction at its option, although this would make others deal with
the club at their peril.
327. See the discussion of sanctions infra.
328. The New Mexico provision seems to permit those who are sufficiently un-
scrupulous so as not to have been licensed to be club members. See note 314 supra.
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those not given access after a reasonable time might be entitled to with-
draw the consideration they had paid with interest or their present liquida-
tion value whichever was greater. On the other hand, if salaries were
paid to a member, others need not be given the power to withdraw. Re-
turn of the salaries would be more appropriate. Sanctions which are
overly severe should be avoided so that remedies are not granted to per-
sons not deserving them. Abuse of the acts can be as serious as abuse of
the clubs.
G. THE ROLE OF THE INVESTMENT CLUB ATTORNEY
Drafting the Agreement
The lawyer who is approached by individuals for advice on how
to organize an investment club can do much to avoid incurring liabilities
for the members under the various securities acts. But in drafting the
club's agreement; the lawyer should not overemphasize the importance of
the securities acts. Since it may be unlikely that any individual club will
be subjected to administrative or civil litigation for violation of these acts,
it is more important for the draftsman to assure that the agreement will
achieve the club's smooth functioning: he should seek to avoid disagree-
ments between members by providing for their respective interests under
the most remote circumstances. Nevertheless, the securities acts should
not be ignored. The draftsman, first, should attempt, as best he can, to
avoid making club membership a security. If this is achieved, all of the
securities acts are avoided. The approach should be to prevent disassocia-
tion of a member's ownership from his control. 329 More specifically, in-
vestment decisions should be kept, as far as possible, in the hands of all
of the members. A provision requiring a majority (or even two-thirds)
of all votes that could have been cast, regardless of the number present
and voting, may be included. A prohibition against proxy votes would also
reduce the danger of relying on the investment skills of others.- 0  Fines
for non-attendance at business meetings would indicate an intention to
have full participation by all investors.
The size of the club should be limited to fifteen or twenty persons.
A larger club may operate under some disadvantages, aside from running
afoul of the securities acts. For example, some members may lose interest
if they find it difficult to ask questions and in other ways participate. The
limited size has a twofold advantage for securities act purposes. First, the
likelihood of creating a security is decreasedV3' Second, the likelihood of
329. Although the form of the club's organization, that is, whether it be labeled
a partnership, joint venture, etc., is not significant in determining the existence of a
security, see text at p. 836 supra, the fact that a partnership rather than a corporation
form is chosen may indicate an intention to keep as much control in the hands of
each member as possible.
330. If proxies are permitted they should be in writing and their validity limited
to one meeting.
331. See text at p. 840 supra.
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qualifying for some exemption is increased. A smaller club is less likely to
make a public offering and if it did not make a public offering, it would not
be subject to either federal act. A small club may also qualify for one of
the exemptions for offers or sales to a limited number of persons.P 2 And
if a specific investment club exemption from securities acts should become
available, it is likely to be restricted to small clubsYP
3
Proportionate relationship between ownership and control over invest-
ment policy should be maintained. This will decrease the likelihood that
club membership is a security. Each member's vote with respect to invest-
ment decisions-whether they be to buy or sell-should be determined by
the extent of his ownership, not the extent of his contribution at any par-
ticular time. Thus, a member whose contributions during the life of the
club represent eleven per cent of its worth, should be given eleven per cent
of the vote regardless of the size (or non-existence) of his contribution
at the meeting during which the vote is taken.
Another means of maintaining control by the owners is the require-
ment of frequent review of the club's portfolio. Control is not only exercised
in deciding what to buy but also in deciding when and what to sell. Again,
this review should be by all members rather than by their delegates.
There should be a carefully drafted procedure for the admission of new
members. Since admission of new members may destroy any private
offering exemption, the procedure should be such that new members are
made fully aware of the club's assets and operations prior to joining. The
aim should be to remove them from the class of persons unable to fend for
themselves without the benefit of registration. Thus, attendance at several
meetings, disclosure of the club's assets and delivery of the club's agreement
would all appear wise.
The members of an investment club may well desire the right to with-
draw at any time. The purpose would be to achieve the same liquidity that
is available when securities are purchased by an individual investor. This
can be achieved by providing for the club to buy out a member at the
liquidation value of his interest (less commissions and possibly a penalty)
whenever the member should request. 334 Or the club might give each
member a transferable membership interest which he could sell to a third
party, but the club would reserve the prior right to purchase the interest
at either the offered price or liquidation value. Under either system the
individual's control over his investment is increased because if he differs
with the club's investment policy or feels that market prices are high he
can withdraw. To the extent this control is increased, the less likely is
membership to be a security.
332. See text at p. 845 supra. The draftsman should, of course, choose a limitation
which would qualify for any available exemption.
333. See the limitations in the New Mexico and Wisconsin provisions quoted in
note 314 supra.
334. Withdrawal of a portion of an interest might also be permitted Either
provision, however, may increase the club's need for assets which can be readily
liquidated. Consequently, some restriction on the extent of the club's investment in
other types of assets may be in order.
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Every club agreement should specify the property in which the club can
invest. Any investment that requires continuing management and super-
vision should be avoided, since an organization that runs such an enterprise
is more likely to delegate authority to conduct the business to a few members
as managers. This separation of management from ownership is the basis
of the need for securities regulation. Thus, a club should refrain from
buying real estate, for example. Even real estate mortgages may require
delegated management if foreclosure should be necessary. The purchase
of stock in a small local business may be dangerous if the stockholders are
expected to run the business. And on this account a provision against own-
ing more than a small percentage of a business may be wise. To further
reduce the need for registration, a restriction on concentration of the club's
investments might be included. If the club contemplates redeeming mem-
berships on request, it should also limit itself to purchasing securities for
which there is a ready market.
The club's agreement should contain some provisions on the size of
periodic contributions. Small contributions may be helpful in that judges,
administrators, and legislators may see less need for securities regulation
where much of the temptation for fraud is removed and the extent of
injury is limited. Closely related to the size of the contributions is the
question of whether contributions of each member should be equal. The
fact that both of the existing securities act exemptions for investment clubs
contemplate equal contributions may be sufficient reason for the clubs to do
the same, since further exemptions may follow the same pattern.3 -5 Equal
contributions also help assure each member's control over his investment.
A requirement of equal contributions, however, in that it obligates a mem-
ber to continue making monthly payments, either indefinitely if the club
has no fixed life, or for a number of years, may be unpalatable to the
members.P 0 As an alternative to equal contributions, a provision might be
included forbidding any one member's interest from being more than twice
the size of any other member's interest. This would avoid the problem
of each member having to contribute when he may not wish or be able to.3sT
Its limitation is that continual failure by some members to invest may make
it impossible for other members to invest. Accordingly, a provision would
have to be added for terminating inactive memberships.
An additional alternative is a provision limiting a member's interest
to a specified percentage of the club's assets. For instance, a club with
ten members might limit one member's ownership to twenty per cent, the
335. The Investment Club Committee of the National Association of Securities
Administrators has suggested that exemptions be conditioned on contributions remain-
ing generally equal. NASA at 105 (1956).
336. Equal ownership also raises a problem should the club desire to admit new
members. In order to achieve equality of ownership, a new member would have to
make a lump sum contribution equal to what other members had contributed over a
period of time.
337. It would not, however, avoid the problem of the large contribution by addi-
tional members.
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percentage decreasing in the case of a larger club. This would tend to avoid
individual domination of the club.
The Federal Securities Act of 1933 contains two clauses which may
warrant recognition in a club's governing instrument. One states that the
members of an unincorporated association shall not be individually liable
as issuers of any security issued by the association if its articles so pro-
vide.3 8 Thus, it may be worthwhile to include a provision purporting to
limit liability regardless of the form the organization of the club takes.
The other clause is the exemption for offers within one state. 39  A club
being organized with members from but one state might declare any person
from another state ineligible for membership and declare the club at an
end if any member should become a resident of another state.340  Further-
more, to avoid offers being made to non-residents, the governing agreement
could specifically provide that members are not authorized to offer mem-
berships to non-residents.
3 41
Measures Supplemental to Drafting The Agreement
A lawyer's advice to an investment club need not cease with drafting
its governing agreement. There is much else he can do to protect the mem-
bers from violating the applicable securities acts. For one thing, registra-
tion itself might be considered. A club which appears to be exempt from,
the federal acts because not making any public offering might be less clearly
exempt from state legislation. If the costs of state registration are not too
high when compared with the contingent liabilities from non-registration
and the costs of future litigation even if there be no liability, state registra-
tion would be desirable. In the two states where there are investment
club exemptions it would be decidedly unwise not to file and achieve exemp-
tion. In these states the acts are likely to be found applicable to invest-
ment clubs on the theory that the legislature had so found when it saw fit
to pass the amendments. Where there are no such exemptions, registration
may cost as little as $10 34 although $50 would be average.3 4 3 There is a
danger, however, that voluntary registration will be considered a relevant
factor by a court in concluding that club membership is a security.
3 44
The club might also attempt to get from the applicable authority
a ruling that club membership is not a security or is exempt from the
338. 48 STAT. 75, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(4) (1952).
339. Id. at 76, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(11).
340. The' periodic contributions by members might be considered part of the
original issue. See text at p. 853 supra.
341. This provision may be of little significance, however, because of the possi-
bility of apparent authority.
342. See Margraf, Does Securities Regulation Hinder the Financing of Small
Business, 11 LAw & CON=hMP. PROB. 301, 311 (1945).
343. Ibid. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 57 (Purdon Supp. 1957).
344. Where there has been registration and a subsequent claim that the interest
registered was not a security one court has considered registration relevant and one
has not SEC v. Timetrust, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 34 (N.D. Cal. 1939) (relevant) ; Lewis
v. Creasey Corp., 198 Ky. 409, 248 S.W. 1046 (1923) (irrelevant).
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particular act involved. For instance, in Virginia the club could
obtain, for a $25 fee, an opinion from the state commissioner on
the applicability of the state's act.34' This opinion would be "conclusive
* * in any court in which the matter may come for adjudica-
tion . . ." 346 If the determination were adverse to the club it could
either appeal or register. 34 7  Under the federal acts, a group of clubs, or
the National Association of Investment Clubs, may be able to induce the
SEC to issue rules and regulations concerning investment clubs. 3 48 Any
good faith compliance with such rules or regulation would bar liability
imposed by these acts. 349 An informal ruling by state or federal adminis-
trators would be insufficient to avoid liability aS0 but it may be of some
assistance in showing good faith3 * and may also influence a court as an
administrative interpretation.3 52 Of course, counsel may feel it safer
not to ask administrative advice to avoid drawing attention to the club.
A club which appears protected from the Securities Act of 1933 be-
cause it does not make a public offering need not search for other exemptive
provisions. However, a club which makes a public offering because it
solicits members from a large unsophisticated group may desire to protect
itself by the federal small offering-under $300,000-provisions. 5
An additional procedure for protecting clubs and their members from
civil liabilities can be found in the statutes of twenty-two states. These
statutes typically provide that a seller who offers to rescind by refunding
the purchase price together with interest cannot be held liable for an un-
lawful sale if the offer is not accepted within thirty days.35 This type of
provision, applied to investment clubs, raises the problem of continuous
sales--each contribution by a member may be a separate sale. ' It might
be dangerous for a club to offer to return all of a member's contributions
each time he contributes. Yet it may be possible for a club to take ad-
vantage of this type of provision by giving a member, each time he makes a
345. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-525 (Supp. 1956) ; see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-18-
18(h) (Supp. 1957).
346. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-525 (Supp. 1956).
347. Ibid.
348. See text at p. 874 supra. .
349. Securities Act of 1933, 48 STAT. 85, 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (1952); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 901, 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (1952) ; Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940, 54 STAT. 841, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-37(c) (1952). These provisions,
however, do not bar the possibility of implied remedies.
350. Peterson Engine Co., 2 S.E.C. 893, 902 (1937) ; Boss v. Silent Drama Syndi-
cate, 82 Cal. App. 109, 255 Pac. 225 (1927) ; see also SEC v. Torr, 22 F. Supp. 602
(S.D.N.Y. 1938). The Uniform Securities Act would protect persons who comply
with any "rule, form or order." UNIFORM SECURITIES Acr § 412(e).
351. SEC v. Torr, 22 F. Supp. 602 (S.D.N.Y. 1938); cf. Pickford v. Bayly
Bros., Inc., 12 Cal. 2d 501, 86 P.2d 102 (1939).
352. The SEC itself will not take action against persons who follow staff opin-
ions. Loss, SECUrriTEs REGULATION 1122 (1951 with 1955 Supp.).
353. Here it is assumed that the club is not within the Investment Company Act
because if it is, this small offering exemption is not available. See text at p. 871 supra.
354. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 121I%, § 13C (Smith-Hurd 1955). See Loss &
CowETr, BLUE SKY LAW 140-42 (1958) for a discussion of the acts.
355. See text at p. 583 supra.
19581
886 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 106
periodic contribution, a receipt for the amount involved and offering, for
the necessary number of days, as part of this receipt to refund the sum
contributed together with interest. In this way the club could incur no
liabilities for any of its "sales."
II. INVESTMENT CLUB RELATIONS WITH THIRD PARTIES
The investment club is a relatively new form of organization and as
such the courts have yet to be afforded the opportunity to consider the legal
problems raised by their activities.35" Although most investment clubs may
be described as unincorporated associations organized for profitMs it does
not follow that the rules of law adopted for such organizations should be
mechanically applied to investment clubs. Investment clubs, possessing
as they do characteristics distinct from those of other recognized entities,
may warrant application by the courts of a separate body of rules. This
possibility should be borne in mind by the reader in exploring the problems
raised in this section of the Symposium. The section will be principally
devoted to an examination of the functions and organization of investment
clubs in an effort to determine the rights and obligations of the investment
club and its members to third persons with whom the club comes into
contact.
A. EXTENT OF LIABILITY OF THE CLUB AND ITS MEMBERS
In Contract
The common law, which in this area has still not been replaced by stat-
utes in some states, viewed the unincorporated association not as an entity
but rather as a mere collection of individuals.a 8s In a state which follows
the common-law approach, the club itself cannot be held liable on a con-
tract even though entered into by an authorized agent. Instead, the creditor
is permitted to hold the signing agent liable,5 9 even where the creditor dealt
with and extended credit to the association as an entity.3 60 The rule is
stated to be that if an agent acts on behalf of a principal which has no
legal existence and thus cannot be sued, the agent is himself personally
bound on the contract.3 61 This view with regard to agent's responsibility
356. Research has failed to uncover a single case involving an investment club.
357. The National Association of Investment Clubs has recently drawn up a new
model agreement to be used by investment clubs. This agreement purports to make
any investment club using it a partnership. Since an investment club has many of
the factual attributes of a partnership, this agreement by the members will in all
probability lead the courts to treat it as any other partnership. However, the typical
club now in operation does not follow this proposed form. In fact many clubs' by-laws
explicitly state that no partnership is intended or exists.
358. See text at notes 397-99 infra.
359. Chicago Grain Trimmers Ass'n v. Murphy, 389 Ill. 102, 58 N.E2d 906
(1945); Haldeman v. Addison, 221 Iowa 218, 265 N.W. 358 (1936).
360. Lewis v. Tilton, 64 Iowa 220, 19 N.W. 911 (1884). Contra, Haldeman v.
Addison, sup-ra note 5.
361. Haldeman v. Addison, 221 Iowa 218, 265 N.W. 358 (1936).
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seems at first blush difficult to rationalize. It does not appear that the
liability of the agent is based on any breach of warranty by him3 6 2 nor can
liability be supported on the ground that the parties intended the agent to
be bound.363 The result can be explained, however, on the theory that the
common-law courts, recognizing the difficulties entailed in requiring the
creditor to sue a large group of individuals, permitted him instead to sue
the individual signing the contract; presumably the agent is then allowed
to seek exoneration from those members of the group who authorized his
acts
6 4
In those states which permit an unincorporated association to be sued
in the group name with execution on the organization's assets, there
would appear to be little doubt that the investment club is itself liable on
the contracts entered into by its duly authorized agents. This is an applica-
tion of the accepted doctrine that the principal remains liable for the acts
of his authorized agents: no novel features are presented merely because the
problem arises in an investment club setting.
The more difficult problem is a determination of the liability of in-
dividual members for the actions of an agent of the club, a question of
vicarious liability. The older cases dealing with unincorporated associa-
tions developed the doctrine that if the association was organized for profit,
its members were individually liable for the debts of the organization con-
tracted within the scope of its business.3 66 On the other hand if the organ-
ization was not organized for profit, the courts refused to impose liability
where nothing more than mere membership or participation was shown; 3 6 7
if it were shown, however, that the member sought to be charged either
participated in the activity causing the debt, or else authorized such activity,
liability followed.368
Under a strict application of this doctrine a member of an investment
club would in most instances be held liable for the debts of the club. The
profit, non-profit dichotomy is amply supported by policy considerations. If
362. Such a result could probably be reached by analogy from those cases which
hold an agent liable on a breach of warranty theory where the agent misrepresents
the extent of his authority. MEciEm, AGENCY § 325 (4th ed. 1952) and cases cited
therein.
363. McHam, op. cit. supra note 362, § 328.
364. No case could be found involving the precise issue of such an agent seeking
exoneration but it is submitted that the agent should have such exoneration. For it
is generally agreed that a club member who is forced to pay more than his share of
a club debt is entitled to reimbursement from the club or its members. Azzolina v.
Order of Sons of Italy, 119 Conn. 181, 179 Atl. 201 (1935).
365. See text at notes 400-13 inlra.
366. Stone v. Guth, 232 Mo. App. 217, 102 S.W.2d 738 (1937) ; Blair v. Southern
Clay Mfg. Co., 173 Tenn. 571, 121 S.W2d 570 (1938).
367. Feldman v. North British & Mercantile Ins. Co., 137 F.2d 266 (4th Cir.
1943) ; Bloom v. Vauclain, 329 Pa. 460, 198 Atl. 78 (1938).
368. Stone v. Guth, 232 Mo. App. 217, 102 S.W.2d 738 (1937). This distinction
was not as determinative as it appears. In some cases the courts held a member of
a non-profit club on a theory of implied authorization, i.e., if a person joins an organi-
zation he has impliedly authorized the officers and agents of the group to carry on the
usual business of the organization. Security-First Nat'l Bank v. Cooper, 62 Cal.
App. 2d 653, 145 P.2d 722 (1943) ; Barry v. Covich, 332 Mass. 338, 124 N.E.2d 921
(1955).
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individuals join an organization which is operated for the purpose of pro-
ducing a financial return for its members, it is only just to require them to
bear the charges which its operations entail. Likewise it seems sensible
to hold that membership and participation in a social or educational group
is not a sufficient basis upon which to charge an individual with vicarious
liability for the organization's debts. A contrary result would serve only
to deter individuals from participating in the activities of organizations per-
forming a socially desirable function.
An application of the profit, non-profit distinction to the investment club
fails to produce a clear answer. On the one hand, it is clear that the invest-
ment club is organized for the profit of its members and perhaps the domi-
nant motive in joining such a group is the expectation of financial return.
Moreover, an examination of investment clubs reveals that the management
of these groups are not centralized, but rather that each member has an ef-
fective voice in the management of the organization. It can be premised that
the members are co-owners and co-operators of the club. The combination
of profit taking and co-ownership afford sufficient bases for individual
liability on the theory that he who owns, directs and profits from an enter-
prise should bear the risks of that enterprise.369
However, the imposition of individual liability may well prove a serious
deterrent to the growth of investment clubs 370 and if in fact it can be shown
that these clubs are performing a useful and desirable function, arguably
this deterrent should not be applied. One of the stated purposes of the
investment club is the education of its members in the operations of the
securities market and in the principles of sound investment in an effort to
produce a'more informed and intelligent investor.3 71 Moreover, the invest-
ment club furnishes a vehicle whereby persons who might not otherwise
invest in securities may be encouraged to bring capital into the market.
The investment club serves to increase the number of individuals hold-
ing equity securities, thereby broadening the ownership of American in-
dustry. Sound reasons exist for the encouragement of investment 3 72 clubs
and, as a consequence, preclusion of individual liability may be advisable.
A substantial number of clubs, while contemplating some profit taking,
are predominately social or educational groups.373 Vith regard to these
369. These two elements are sufficient to base a finding of a partnership relation
and thus are enough bases for a determination of individual liability. See, e.g.,
Schuster v. Largman, 308 Pa. 520, 162 Atl. 305 (1932) ; Northampton Brewery Corp.
v. Lande, 138 Pa. Super. 235, 10 A.2d 583 (1939). See City of Wheeling v. Chester,
134 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1943) (construing the Uniform Partnership Act).
370. The most obvious method of avoiding individual liability is incorporation.
But incorporation is not feasible for most investment clubs due to the costs and the
tax consequences. See p. 911 infra.
371. Virtually all investment club by-laws studied contained a statement concern-
ing the educational purpose of the club.
372. At least one reason for doubting the social utility of investment- clubs exists.
By putting equity securities into the hands of groups of people rather than in the hands
of single individuals, the investment clubs may be further separating corporate owner-
ship from control.
373. Many investment clubs studied are mere adjuncts of long established social
groups and the buying and selling of securities forms a relatively small part of the
groups' activities.
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clubs an even stronger argument exists against the imposition of individual
liability. Where the facts substantially support a showing that the club was
organized for other than profit-making purposes an attorney by careful
drafting of the by-laws and discreet counseling as to the extent and nature
of the club's activities might possibly be able to convince a court that while
the club is to some extent a profit-making organization, it is in substance a
social or educational group and should be treated as such.
In the final analysis whether individual liability is to be imposed on the
members of an investment club tends to resolve itself into a judicial resolu-
tion of the basic policy conflict between the desirability of charging
those who stand to gain from the operations of the club and the likelihood
of discouraging the growth of these organizations if liability is imposed.
Probably in balance the scales tip toward imposition of individual liability.37 4
The deterrent effect of this conclusion will depend to a great degree upon
the probability of the members becoming liable and the extent of that lia-
bility. In the area of contract liability, there is scant possibility that an
individual will be called upon to bear any substantial liability incurred by
the club. Aside from the buying and selling of securities, an investment
club's contracts are generally limited to the purchase of such relatively
small items as stationery, investment services and perhaps the rental of a
room for the meeting. It is improbable that expenses of this nature will
result in frequent or substantial liability.375
With regard to the buying and selling of securities, it is conceivable
that some major liabilities could occur. The buying agent of the club
might possibly purchase securities on margin, despite the generally present
express prohibition of such activities in the club by-laws; or he might con-
tract to buy securities or make other investments not authorized by the
club. For purposes of determining vicarious liability it is immaterial
whether the agent had actual authority to make the particular purchases.
If the transactions were regular on their face and of a kind regularly per-
formed by the buying agent, considerations of apparent authority will con-
trol questions of liability.37 6 After appointing a buying agent and per-
mitting him to act for the club, the members could probably be charged
by a third party who acted reasonably in relying upon the agent's ap-
parent authority to bind the club.3 7 7  However, these risks can be sub-
stantially minimized. An investment club regularly deals with the same
broker, and a precise written understanding as to the authority of the
374. Of course if the club adopts the model form of agreement, see note 357 supra,
or any other form of by-laws which make it clear that the group considers itself a
partnership, a court will hive no difficulty in holding that the club is a partnership,
O'Donnell v. McLouglin, 386 Pa. 187, 125 A.2d 370 (1956), and thus all partners
(members) are individually liable for the debts of the club contracted within the
scope of the club's business. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Acr § 9.
375. It must be remembered that individual liability will not become crucial unless
the debt is larger than the group assets of the club. The member is entitled to reim-
bursement from the assets of the group if he has been made to pay a club debt.
Azzolina v. Order of Sons of Italy, 119 Conn. 181, 179 Atl. 201 (1935).
376. MECHEM, op. cit. supra note 362, §§ 93, 94
377. Id. §§ 93, 94, 95.
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buying agent which includes a requirement that the broker receive a
written authorization from the club before undertaking the purchase or
sale of any security held by the club would prevent possible liabilities from
arising. It may be concluded that in the area of contract liability, although
unlimited liability of the individual members is indicated, the nature and
extent of the risk involved is not such as should deter formation and opera-
tion of investment clubs if the clubs proceed in a careful manner as out-
lined above.
In Tort
In those states which permit suits against an unincorporated associa-
tion as an entity with execution on the group's assets, there would seem to
be no doubt that such an association is liable for the torts of its agents
committed within the scope of their employment.3 78 Again, this liability
is merely an example of the usual vicarious liability of the principal for
the torts of his agent. Questions with regard to the scope of the agent's
authority3 79 or whether the actor was in fact the agent of the defendant
association at the time of the tortious conduct,3 80 which are often dispositive
in cases of this nature, will be governed by the existing laws of vicarious
liability in operation in the jurisdiction in which the action arises.
In determining questions involving the vicarious liability of individual
members of a particular association, the common-law cases applied essen-
tially the same principles to issues of tort liability that were determinative
of contract liability, viz., the liability of individual members was made to
depend upon whether or not the club was organized for profit.3 8 1 The
question of vicarious liability of individual investment clubs for torts com-
mitted by the agents of the club is susceptible to the same analysis applied
in the contract area.58 Thus, individual members of virtually all invest-
ment clubs should be held liable for the torts of the club's agents committed
within the scope of the club's business.
The sole area in which any substantial possibility of significant tort
liability exists would appear to be that of the purchase and sale of secu-
rities.38a In this area the club's activities may give rise to actions based
378. Ketcher v. Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, 115 F. Supp. 802 (E.D. Ark.
1953) ; Thomas v. Dunne, 131 Colo. 20, 279 P.2d 427 (1955); Weese v. Stoddard,
63 N.M. 20, 312 P.2d 545 (1956).
379. Thomas v. Dunne, supra note 378.
380. Weese v. Stoddard, 63 N.M. 20, 312 P.2d 545 (1956).
381. Cox v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 126 F.2d 254 (6th Cir. 1942).
382. Perhaps there is even more reason for individual liability in the tort area.
For a creditor could reasonably be denied recovery against an individual member if
it could be shown that the creditor dealt solely with the association and not the member
sought to be charged. However, in the area of tort liability no such estoppel or inten-
tion can be established and it is difficult to deny recovery to an innocent third party
from the assets of one who profits from the activity causing the tortious conduct.
383. It is hardly conceivable that any investment club agent could commit an
intentional tort within the ambit of his club duties. Moreover the clubs generally have
no servants or employees whose physical actions could result in a negligence suit.
RELATIONS WITH THIRD PARTIES
on fraud or misrepresentation. 384 However, if the investment club deals
regularly with the same registered broker and trades solely in listed secu-
rities, the possibility is diminished: torts based on fraud or misrepresenta-
tion are not likely to arise in this context where the club deals with an
experienced and fully informed party concerning a commodity which has a
readily ascertainable value.38 5 If the buying agent or the club's broker
should deal with an uninformed party or trade in unlisted securities or other
types of property, there is, of course, greater opportunity for tortious
conduct 3 86 And since the members have authorized the buying agent or
the broker to' act for them in the trading of securities and have placed
the agent in a position where he is able to induce reliance by a third party,
liability would probably attach to the individual members.
8
8
7
B. POWER OF ONE MEMBER To BIND THE CLUB OR OTHER MEMBERS
In the last section the extent of the liability of club members for con-
tracts entered into and torts committed by agents of the club was considered.
In this section the authority of a member to bind the club and its members
will be discussed. In a situation where the member is in fact an agent
of the group because of actual or apparent authority given him by the other
members, he has the power to bind the club and its members to a contract.388
However, in the case of one who is merely a member of the club and who
has no actual or apparent authority to act for the group apart from his
status as a member, the problem is a more difficult one. The questic
resolves itself into a determination of the authority which the courts will
imply from the fact of membership in the club.
The law in the area of implied mutual agency is fairly clear.s 9 In
cases of partnerships, each and every .partner is said to have the power to
bind the other partners.&39 Conversely, courts will not imply a mutual
agency for members of an incorporated association.3 9' By a process of
characterization, the courts could reach a result with regard to the au-
thority of an investment club member by analogizing the club's operations
384. See also the securities regulation discussion in Part I.
385. It is difficult to conceive of an investment club agent defrauding a broker's
representative who has all the information-gathering sources of the broker's office
at his disposal. Moreover, most transactions will typically consist of the agent
merely giving a buy-or-sell-at-market-order to the broker.
386. Some clubs studied have purchased real estate, some operate a small business,
while one has bought a racehorse. It requires little imagination to conclude that those
clubs which engage in such a range of business activity are more likely to find them-
selves involved in a situation which entails a substantial risk of liability. .
387. MEcHnm, op. cit. supra note 362, §§ 129, 139 and cases cited therein.
388. See Note, Unincorporated Associations: Legal Liabilities of Agents and
Members, 42 DIcK. L. RLv. 154 (1938).
389. By implied mutual agency is meant the determination as a matter of law
that every associate has the authority to bind the members by his acts within the scope
of the enterprise.
390. UNIFORn PARTNERsHIP Acr §9; Real Estate-Land Title and Trust Co. v.
Stout, 117 N.J. Eq. 37, 175 Atl. 128 (Ct. Err. & App. 1934); Jamestown Banking
Co. v. Conneaut Dock & Dredge Co., 339 Pa. 26, 14 A.2d 325 (1940).
391. Martin v. Curran, 303 N.Y. 276, 101 N.E.2d 683 (1951) ; McCabe v. Good-
fellow, 133 N. Y. 89, 30 N.E. 728 (1892-).
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to that of a partnership or an unincorporated association. However,
such a mechanical application of the doctrines applied by the courts to
other entities ignores the fact that an investment club is a distinct type of
organization and one which perhaps warrants treatment of a kind dif-
ferent from that developed by the courts in other areas.
The doctrine of implied mutual agency can be traced to two factors:
the intention of the parties and the court's evaluation of a third party's
impressions as to the probable authority of a member to bind the other
members of the organization, based on an examination of the size and nature
of the organization in question.3 2  When one views the normal business
partnership it is not difficult to conclude that there should be a mutual
agency implied for all partners. Initially, it probably is the intention of
the partners that each should have full authority to run the business. In
addition, the mere fact that a few individuals are engaged in a general
business enterprise suggests that all of them will be active in the operation
of the enterprise. On the other hand an unincorporated association is com-
posed of many individuals, most of whom generally have no intention of
allowing every member to bind the group. It is usually run by a group of
officers, the members having only an indirect role in management of the
group's activities. Third parties usually look to the officers of the associa-
tion rather than to its members when dealing with the group.
It is fairly clear that the members of an investment club do not intend
that every member shall have the power to enter into contracts for the
purchase and sale of securities thereby binding the club and its members.
However, the management of investment clubs is generally not centralized.
All members participate as a rule in the decisions to buy or sell club assets
and other matters of club policy. To a third party, this may suggest that
all members may bind the- club. However, unless the club were one of
those that regularly invests in property other than securities, this reliance
would only be reasonable if the transaction involved were a security trans-
action.393 Even reliance in the case of a security transaction would be un-
reasonable if the third party is a broker, because the brokerage profession
as a whole is well informed as to the nature and operation of investment
clubs. As a rule, therefore, the courts should seldom find occasion to adopt
the principle of implied mutual agency in the investment club field, but
rather than establishing a categorical rule a flexible approach should be
followed permitting investigation into the subject of reasonability of reliance
in each dase as it arises.
The Authority of Club Officers To Bind the Club and Its Members
An analogous problem is posed with regard to the authority of the
club's officers to bind the club and its members. In the case of a corporation,
392. CRANE, PARTNERSHIPS § 49 (2d ed. 1952).
393. It is difficult to conclude that in the typical investment club, a third party
could reasonably rely on a member's authority to act as a general agent of the
club in view of the organization of the club and the intention of the members.
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the courts have generally held that the president of the corporation is a
general agent of the company with regard to the transaction of ordinary
business.3 Such a finding is frequently supported by resort to principles
of apparent authority and estoppel.395 It is subject to some question
whether these factors exist in the investment club setting or at least to the
degree that they operate with regard to other established entities. Parties
who regularly deal with investment clubs such as brokers should be and are
generally familiar with the fact that the president of the club is not by virtue
of his office given authority to operate the club. In fact, his principal duty
is presiding over meetings. It is hardly conceivable, therefore, that a situa-
tion would arise wherein a broker versed in the general operations of an
investment club will be able to support a claim on .the grounds that he
believed that the president had authority to bind the club.a
In the case of a third party who is generally unfamiliar with the opera-
tions of an investment club, policy reasons dictate that the president be
deemed the general agent of the club and its members. It is not entirely
unreasonable for a third person to assume that the president of a club is
empowered to bind the group; particularly is this true where the club
is large enough to warrant some centralization of management. Con-
siderations of a similar nature would appear to apply with only" slightly
diminished force in determining the power of officers other than the
president to bind the club and its members. However, the outcome of a
particular case regardless of the officer involved, should depend on its ul-
timate facts. The intent of the members as evidenced by the by-laws and
the operations of the club coupled -with the existence of apparent au-
thority of the officer to bind the club, and the reasonableness of the third
party's reliance will prove determinative.
C. POWER OF THE ENTITY To SUE OR BE SUED
The investment club usually adopts a name which it uses for many
purposes; for example, contracts and correspondence are often signed in
the group name and any registration which is necessary is made in the name
of the club. For its day-to-day activities it is clear that the investment club
operates as a separate and distinct entity from its members. However,
only certain types of organizations have an existence apart from their mem-
bers for purposes of suing or being sued.3 97 All other groups, in the
absence of special legislation, are merely collections of individuals with no
394. Shircliff v. Dixie Drive-In Theatre, 7 Ilil. App. 2d 370, 129 N.E.2d 346
(1955); Snyder Realty Co. v. National Newark & Essex Banking Co., 14 N.J.
146, 101 A.2d 544 (1953); Marron v. Wood, 55 N.M. 367, 233 P.2d 1051 (1951).
395. Freeport Journal-Standard Publishing Co. v. Frederic W. Ziv Co., 345
Ill. App. 337, 103 N.E.2d 153 (1952); Gabriel v. Auf Der Heide-Aragona, Inc.,
14 N.J. Super. 558, 82 A.2d 644 (App. Div. 1951).
396. As a matter of practice, many brokers insist on written authorization
before dealing with any alleged agent of an investment club.
397. In re United Automobile Workers, CIO v. Aircooled Motors, Inc., 284 App.
Div. 835, 132 N.Y.S.2d 411 (4th Dep't 1954).
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greater rights than the sum total of the rights of their members.398 This
general legal principle found expression in the common-law doctrine that an
unincorporated association could not maintain an action in its associated
name; instead it must sue or be sued in the names of all members as parties
plaintiff or defendant. 39
Such a procedure made actions by or against an association cumber-
some. Problems of service, venue and execution connected with suing a
large group of individuals, while not insurmountable, are certainly for-
midable ones for the attorney involved, and thus an action by or against a
club would present a number of difficult problems in a state retaining the
common-law rules.
Modem codes of civil procedure, however, have generally relaxed the
harsh common-law rules by providing in some instances for the treatment
of unincorporated associations and partnerships as entities for procedural
purposes. Under the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, for ex-
ample, the manner in which an investment club may sue or be sued will
depend on whether the club is deemed an "association" or a "partnership."
A partnership is defined in Pennsylvania as "An association of two or more
persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit." 401 Rule 2151 defines
an association as, "An unincorporated association conducting any business
or engaging in any activity of any nature whether for profit or otherwise
under a common name. . ,, .40 Although the two definitions would
appear to overlap, the rules explicitly provide that the categories are
mutually exclusive. It becomes necessary, therefore, to attempt to cate-
gorize the investment club for this purpose. The Pennsylvania courts have
held that the indispensable elements of a partnership are co-ownership. of a
business and a sharing of its profits. Both of these factors are present in the
usual investment club operation.403 That the members did or did not intend
to become partners is immaterial. The intention of the associates, while
determinative of the question of the existence of a partnership in actions
between partners themselves, will not prevent partnership liability to third
parties where the outward manifestations indicate that the organization is in
fact a partnership.
40 4
398. WARREN, CORPORATE ADVANTAGES WITHOUT INCORPORATION 258, 549
(1929).
399. In re United Automobile Workers, CIO v. Aircooled Motors, Inc., 284 App.
Div. 835, 132 N.Y.S.2d 411 (4th Dep't 1954). However, equity provided some relief
from this harsh rule by permitting associations to sue or be sued by a bill alleging
that the action is brought by or against named members of the group as fairly repre-
sentative of the association. Maria Konopnicka Soc'y of the Holy Trinity Polish
Roman Catholic Church v. Maria Konopnicka Soc'y, 331 Mass. 565, 120 N.E.2d 769
(1954).
400. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that except in cases involving
an association's or a partnership's substantive rights under the United States
Constitution or laws, that such a group's capacity to sue or be sued is determined
by the law of the state in which the district court is located. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b).
401. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 11 (Purdon 1930). See UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP
ACT § 6.
402. PA. R. Civ. P. 2131.
403. See text at notes 368, 369 supra.
404. Kingsley Clothing Mfg. Co., v. Jacobs, 344 Pa. 551, 26 A.2d 315 (1942).
RELATIONS WITH THIRD PARTIES
For pleading purposes an investment club would appear to be a part-
nership in Pennsylvania. 40 5 The result of this categorization is that an
investment club in Pennsylvania must prosecute its actions in the name of
all its members trading as the "X Investment Club." 4o A third party
seeking to bring an action against an investment club hay caption his com-
plaint in either of two ways. He may either sue the club in its associated
name or he may sue one or more of the members as individuals trading
under the club name.
40 7
In California, section 388 of the Code of Civil Procedure states, "When
two or more persons, [are] associated in any business . . . under a
common name . . . the associates may be sued by such common
name . .. .408 For purposes of this section it becomes necessary to
determine whether the members of an investment club are "associated in
business." The California courts have not restricted their interpretation of
this phrase to public commercial activities but rather have tended to con-
strue the phrase to include virtually any enterprise or activity which ehgages
people's attention.4  Since the members of an investment club are asso-
ciated in the buying and selling of securities for a profit, it is fairly certain
that they are associated in business within the meaning of the code. Hence
in California an action may be brought against an investment club in the
club name. However, where the entity or its members are themselves
bringing the suit, the California courts have limited section 388 to associated
defendants and have held that associated plaintiffs must follow the common-
law rule, i.e., the action must be brought in the names of all of the members
of the association or in the names of a few members indicating that the suit
is for the benefit of all.410
In the commercially important state of New York, the rights of aft
investment club to sue or be sued in its associated name are governed by
the General Associations Law, which provides that, "An action . . . may
be maintained, by the president or treasurer of an unincorporated associa-
tion to recover . . . upon any cause of action, for or upon which all the
associates may maintain such an action . . . by reason of their interest
405. At least as regards actions by or against third parties. If the action is
between the members and the club, a statement of intention not to be partners may
be binding and thus the club would become an association. Here again, an agree-
ment to form a partnership will probably be binding. See note 357 supra.
406. PA. R. Civ. P. 2127 provides that the complaint shall be captioned as:
"A, B, and C trading as X & Co."
407. PA. R. Cxv. P. 2128.
408. This statute has been interpreted as not merely permitting suit against
the associates in the common name but as making the association an entity for
purposes of suit and execution. Juneau Spruce Corp. v. International Longshoremen's
Union, 119 Cal. App. 2d 144, 259 P.2d 23 (1953).
409. The following cases are typical of the groups permitted to. be sued under
the act. Jardine v. Superior Court, 213 Cal. 301, 2 P.2d 756 (1931) (Los Angeles
Stock Exchange); Herald v. Glendale Lodge No. 1289, 46 Cal. App. 325, 189 Pac.
329 (1920) (Fraternal and Social Lodge) ; Camm v. Justice's Court, 35 Cal. App. 293,
170 Pac. 409 (1917) (Good Roads Club).
410. Lord v. Lund, 37 Cal. 2d 760, 235 P.2d 607 (1951); Case v. Kadota
Fig Ass'n of Producers, 35 Cal. 2d 596, 220 P.2d 912 (1950).
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or ownership therein, either jointly or in common." 4 11 In addition, the
statute provides that an action against an unincorporated association may be
brought in the name of its president or treasurer.412 The New York courts
have defined an unincorporated association to include organizations com-
posed of persons united without a charter for the prosecution of some
common enterprise.413 In New York for purposes of pleading it would
appear that an investment club is an unincorporated association and, there-
fore, that actions either by or against the club must be instituted in the
name of the president or treasurer of the club.
Enforcement of Judgments
In connection with the problems considered above, substantial questions
are created with regard to the enforcement of judgments in an action in
which an investment club is involved. Of course this question could not
arise at common law where a suit by or against such an organization was
unavailable.41 4 In a state applying the common law a judgment may be
neither for nor against an investment club. In those states, however, a
creditor could reach the joint assets of the investment club indirectly. He
may bring an action in equity against all of the associates or against a few
of them as representatives of the group and after obtaining a final decree
he may petition the court for an order compelling the club treasurer to
satisfy the claim out of the assets of the association.
41
5
In those states which have modified the common law to permit actions
by or against unincorporated associations,416 slightly different problems are
posed. In the event of a judgment against the investment club, a question
arises initially as to the property to be used to satisfy the judgment. Sec-
ondly, in the event of a judgment in favor of the club there are questions
with regard to the rights of the individual members to the proceeds.
In Pennsylvania any judgment in favor of the club will be jointly
owned by all members of the investment club.417 Each member may compel
any other member to account for the proceeds of any execution.418  Cor-
respondingly, if the judgment is against the investment club in its asso-
ciated name, the judgment will only support execution against the assets
of the club.419 A creditor desiring to secure execution on the individual
property of the club members must name them in his complaint.42
° More-
411. N.Y. GEN. Ass'Ns LAW § 12.
412. N.Y. GEN. Ass'Ns LAW § 13.
413. Meinhart v. Contresta, 194 N.Y. Supp. 593 (Sup. Ct. 1922).
414. See text at notes 397-99 supra.
415. Maisch v. Order of America, 223 Pa. 199, 72 At. 528 (1909).
416. See text at notes 400-12 supra.
417. All partners have a joint interest in partnership property. Commissioner
v. Shapiro, 125 F.2d 532 (6th Cir. 1942).
418. Lyon v. MacQuarrie, 46 Cal. App. 2d 119, 115 P.2d 594 (1941).
419. PA. R. Civ. P. 2132(a).
420. PA. R. Civ. P. 2132(b).
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over, he must secure personal service on the individual member or else
afford him due notice of the pendency of the action.42'
In California, where the common law is in effect with regards to asso-
ciated plaintiffs, since an organization may not sue in its own name, the
question of a favorable judgment will not arise.4 However, if the judg-
ment is against the investment club, the statute provides that execution
may properly lie only against the joint property of the club and the in-
dividual assets of the members who have actually been served.423
In New York, a judgment awarded to the president or treasurer of an
unincorporated association pursuant to an action brought under the Gen-
eral Associations Law will be recorded in the name of the officer prosecut-
ing the action.424 However, he holds such judgment subject to the power
of the members to secure an accounting for any proceeds recovered
thereon. 5  If the judgment is against the president or treasurer in his
representative capacity, the sheriff is not permitted to execute on the private
property of the defending officer and such a judgment may be satisfied only
out of the property of the association.426
III. THE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE
MEMBERS INTER SE
Investment clubs present numerous problems relating to the rights
and obligations of the members among themselves. Many of these may be
circumvented by careful drafting of the creative instrument setting forth
the agreement of the parties and the mode of operation.42 Others such as
restrictions on the alienation of a member's interest 42s and indemnification
for liabilities incurred by virtue of the unauthorized conduct of a mem-
ber 49 pose no novel features and are amenable to disposition in accordance
with accepted legal principles. This section of the Symposium will be
421. PA. R. Crv. P. 2132(c).
422. See text at notes 409-10 supra.
423. CAL. Cirv. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 388 (West 1954) ; Deeney v. Hotel Union, 57
Cal. App. 2d 1023, 134 P.2d 328 (1943).
424. See text at note 411 supra.
425. Since he receives the judgment in his representative capacity, it is of course
not his personal asset. Ziegler v. Von Sebo, 271 App. Div. 604, 66 N.Y.S.2d 900
(3d Dep't 1946).
426. N.Y. GEr. Ass'Ns LAW § 15.
427. E.g., how the shares of a member who withdraws will be valued; the pro-
cedure for electing officers and conducting meetings; and the criteria for expulsion
or other disciplinary action.
428. Delectus personae is a normal incident of both partnerships, see CRANE,
PARTNERSHIPS 34 (2d ed. 1952), and voluntary non-profit associations, see id. at
546. Restrictions upon the transfer of corporate shares are even permitted within
certain limitations. See BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS §§ 336-38 (rev. ed. 1946);
STEVENS, CORPORATIONS § 129 (2d ed. 1949).
429. See MECHEM, AGENCY § 532 (4th ed. 1952); RESTATEMENT, AGENCY
§ 401, comments c, d (1933).
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restricted to a treatment of some of the more difficult and perhaps peculiar
problems created by investment clubs.4 0
A. PURCHASE AND SALE OF SECURITIES
Decisions to purchase or sell securities arrived at by vote of the club
membership 41 at the scheduled meetings are thereafter implemented by a
designated member or members. 432 Due to the volatility of the stock market
the situation confronting the agent when he places an order with the club
broker may vary from that prevailing at the time "buy" or "sell" action
was decided upon by the club. This possibility is diminished if the agent
discharges his -duties at the earliest opportunity following the vote. 43
But the activities of an investment club ordinarily do not constitute the
primary interest of its members and it is not unlikely that the appointed
agent may on occasion delay somewhat in placing_ the club order rather
than diligently acting upon it at his earliest opportunity. Such conduct
should not necessarily be characterized as negligent in view of the often
casual nature of club activities.
Liability of an Agent to the Club for Losses From Causes Not
Characterized as Negligence
In the case of a change in circumstances the agent is faced with a
difficult decision. Assuming he has no immediate recourse to the club
membership-and he seldom will have 4 -- several courses of action may
be open, each of which may give rise to a loss and hence may pose the issue
of the agent's liability. The agent may comply with his instructions even
though he believes this will be detrimental to the club fortunes. If there has
been no delay so great as to be held to be negligent such action would
involve no liability for ensuing loss. In the alternative he may adopt a
course of action contrary to his instructions, or he may decline to act,
preferring to refer the matter to the club. Whether one or both of these
alternatives are available will depend upon the character of his instructions.
430. The matter of proper plaintiff and defendant in suits between thie club
and the members or between the members themselves is not considered. This
omission is not meant to reflect upon the importance of the subject. Another section
of this Symposium deals with the issues involved in suits between a club and
third parties, see p. 893 supra. Although the topics are distinguishable, they present
a number of common problems, and a discussion of one will to a limited extent
indicate the avenues one must follow in resolving problems that arise in connection
with the other.
431. The vote is conducted according to the by-laws of the particular club,
and may require unanimity, a majority, or some third alternative.
432. It is customary for one or two agents to be appointed.
433. It is not thereby eliminated, however, for even an overnight change is not
unknown on the market. In addition, should meetings be held on a weekend several
days may elapse. In such a case a substantial change in market conditions becomes
even more -realistic.
434. Normally, the only way the views of the membership could be ascertained
would be by virtue of a special meeting.
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In the case of an order to buy "at the market" the agent may buy or not,
but the possibility of purchasing at a price other than that stipulated by
the club does not exist. Such a possibility does exist should buy or sell
action at a specified price or price-range be decided upon by the club, for
the agent might buy or sell at a different price. Only the case of an
agent acting in a positive fashion but contrary to instructions will be
examined.
Although an agent is ordinarily liable for any loss resulting from ac-
tions that are contrary to instructions, 86 an exception to this rule has re-
ceived judicial recognition in a number of cases, frequently characterized
as "agencies of necessity." 43 7 These involve the development of unforeseen
circumstances which render compliance with instructions impossible or
detrimental to the principal's interests in a situation where consultation with
the principal is impractical. 438 The leading American case is Greenleaf v.
Moody.439  During the Civil War goods in the possession of agents were
seized by the military authorities who offered payment in the form of
certificates of indebtedness worth something less than face value. Had the
agents refused such certificates, the principal's only alternative would have
been to seek redress from the federal government. Although not authorized
to do so, the agents accepted the certificates and immediately discounted
them. In an action brought by the principal to recover for the loss suffered
the court held that in view of the speculative value of the alternative remedy
the agents were justified in acting contrary to their instructions. 4 0  In
Tetley & Co. v. British Trade Corp.441 an agent acted contrary to his
instructions by removing his principal's goods to a distant city when the
threat of riots and invasion endangered them. The emergency was held
to justify the removal and additionally to subject the owner to liability for
transportation costs. 4 2 The freedom from liability recognized by these
435. Positive action contrary to instructions is to be distinguished from non-
action.
436. MECHEM, op. cit. supra note 429, § 515. Good faith is no defense. Id.
§ 516. However, if an agent has utilized his discretion in similar situations in the
past without objection by the principal he may possess an implied authority to
continue to do so. See Id. §§ 54-55; 1 U. Cm. L. RFv. 337, 338 (1933).
437. See Williston, Agency of Necessity, 22 CAN. B. REv. 492 (1944); Note,
25 COLuTm. L. Rzv. 464 (1925). See also Treitel, Agency of Necessity, 3 U. WESTaIN
Ausm. ANN. L. REV. 1 (1954). Many of these cases involve actions that are not
contrary to instructions but rather beyond their purview. See, e.g., Terre Haute
& Indianapolis R. R. v. McMurray, 98 Ind. 358 (1884); Sibley v. City Serv. Transit
Co., 2 N.J. 458, 66 A.2d 864 (1949). These may be susceptible to an incidental
authority analysis. See MECHEM, op. cit. supra note 429, §§ 44-46.
438. MECHEM, op. cit. supra note 429, § 518; RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 47 (1932).
The lack of recent cases posing the issue is probably attributable to the ease of modern
communication. In most instances the agent has ready access to his principal.
The investment club differs in that the agent is faced with the more difficult task
of communicating with many principals.
439. 95 Mass. (13 Allen) 363 (1866).
440. Id. at 368-69.
441. 10 Lloyd's List L.R. 678 (K.B. 1922).
442. Ibid. Cf. Perez v. Miranda, 7 Mart. (n.s.) 493, 494-95 (La. 1829).
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cases is not unlimited. The agent must act reasonably 443 and in good
faith.444 The cases further indicate that the extent of the loss which appears
imminent unless the agent acts must be great. Thus, where there was a
danger of total or nearly total loss due to the unforeseen circumstances the
courts have been prone to find "necessity"; 45 but where the loss threatened
was less serious an opposite conclusion has resulted.
4 4 6
There are apparently no reported cases in which an agent for the
purchase or sale of stock has invoked the necessity doctrine in defense
of his actions. The few instances in which it has been pleaded have
involved non-action by a stockbroker." 7 The rationale of the necessity
doctrine would seem to be that the protection of the principal's interests
in unforeseen circumstances necessitates relieving the agent of liability
for action contrary to his instructions." 8 Although this rationale would
be equally applicable in the market context, the nature of the stock market
would appear to make the necessity rule inapposite. In the normal agency
situation the principal has no cause to believe that the factual context in
which the agent will act will be materially altered from that existing at the
time instructions are given. The directions are not given in contemplation
of disruptive supervening events, and arguably would be different had
the principal foreseen the possibility of their occurrence. 449 Conversely, it
is reasonable to assume that one engaging in a stock market transaction is
cognizant of the fact that the market is characterized not by stability but
rather by extreme variability engendered by the changing political, economic,
and psychological climate; and that his orders are determined in light of
443. See Forrestier v. Boardman, 9 Fed. Cas. 459, No. 4945 (C.C. Mass. 1839);
Williams v. Shackelford, 16 Ala. 318, 321 (1849); Greenleaf v. Moody, 95 Mass.
(13 Allen), 363, 368 (1866); Tetley & Co. v. British Trade Corp., 10 Lloyd's List
L.R. 678, 680 (K.B. 1922).
444. Forrestier v. Boardman, supra note 443; Greenleaf v. Moody, supra note
443; Prager v. Blatspiel, Stamp, and Heacock Ltd., [1924] 1 K.B. 566, 572-73.
445. See Greenleaf v. Moody, 95 Mass. (13 Allen) 363 (1866); Tetley & Co.
v. British Trade Corp., 10 Lloyd's List L.R. 678 (K.B. 1922). See also Forrestier
v. Boardman, 9 Fed. Cas. 459, No. 4945 (C.C. Mass. 1839).
446. Prager v. Blatspiel, Stamp and Heacock Ltd., [1924] 1 K.B. 566. Cf.
Courcier v. Ritter, 6 Fed. Cas. 644, No. 3282 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825).
447. An early Virginia case upheld a necessity plea, Bernard v. Maury & Co.,
61 Va. (20 Gratt) 434, 438 (1871), while a later Canadian case impliedly rejected
an identical contention, Smith v. Forbes, 32 Upp. Can. C.P.R. 571, 576-77, 579
(1882). But see Wilson, C. J., concurring in Smith v. Forbes, supra at 582-83.
The cases dealing with the question of brokers' discretion support the approach of
the Canadian court See, e.g., Galigher v. Jones, 129 U.S. 193, 198 (1889) ;
Gifford v. Eastman, 251 Mass. 520, 524, 146 N.E. 773, 774 (1925); Sparling v.
Wade, 210 App. Div. 774, 777, 206 N.Y. Supp. 379, 381-82 (1st Dep't 1924);
Hope v. Lawrence, 50 Barb. 258, 265 (N.Y. Supp. Ct. 1867) ; Bertram, Armstrong,
& Co. v. Godfray, 1 Knapp 381, 383, 12 Eng. Rep. 364, 365 (P.C. 1830). Although
non-action may be a more conservative departure from instructions than- is positive
action, it would seem to pose no distinctive features. The analysis offered would
appear applicable in either case.
448. See Forrestier v. Boardman, 9 Fed. Cas. 459, No. 4945 (C.C. Mass.
1839); Prager v. Blatspiel, Stamp, and Heacock Ltd., [1924] 1 K.B. 566, 568-71.
Cf. MECHEM, AGENCY § 46 (4th ed. 1952).
449. See note 448 upra.
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this knowledge. This argument casts doubt upon the probability of estab-
lishing that an emergency situation had arisen, for changed circumstances
sufficient to constitute emergencies in other fields may be merely normal
in the market. Furthermore, the "extent of loss" test mentioned previ-
ously 450 should in many cases prove decisive. An agent charged with the
purchase or sale of stock will not often be in a position to maintain that
he thought changed conditions posed a threat of total or extreme loss.41
The conclusion follows that an agent of an investment club should be held
liable for loss occasioned by his actions contrary to instructions. This
conclusion is reiftforced by the fact that a basic premise of the club move-
ment is that the entire membership should determine investment policy.
Since changing circumstances are a recurrent event on the market, absolv-
ing the club's agent from liability for departures from his instructions might
encourage exercise of a substantial part of the policy-making function by
one or a few members.4 2
Other Potential Sources of Liability of the Agent to the Club
There remain for consideration both a negligent performance by the
investment club's agent such as purchasing the wrong securities or buying
or selling at the wrong price; and a failure to act at all where the alleged
justification of "necessity" is not involved. A failure to perform a promise
supported by consideration will, of course, entail contractual liability.
Where the promise is gratuitous, thereby excluding a contractual action, '
resort to tort principles is the only alternative. Since most club agents serve
without compensation, the efficacy of this alternative may be crucial. The
courts have traditionally been loath to recognize affirmative duties to act; 4
and in accord with this it has been uniformly held that failure to perform a
gratuitous piomise will not result in tort liability,4"  for a mere promise will
not create a duty to act independently of contract.45 The fact that the
450. See text and notes at notes 445-46 supra.
451. This is particularly true of an investment club agent who will not ordinarily
possess the specialized knowledge of a broker.
452. Prompt disavowal of an agent's failure to comply with instructions is
recommended. Failure to do so may lead a court to conclude that the membership
has ratified the agent's conduct thereby defeating recovery for any loss suffered by
virtue of his actions. See, e.g., Hope v. Lawrence, 50 Barb. 258 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1867); Smith v. Forbes, 32 Upp. Can. C.P.R. 571 (1882).
453. In jurisdictions accepting the doctrine of promissory estoppel, an action
for breach of contract will lie. See Woodruff v. Heavey, 4 Pa. D. & C.2d 21
(C.P. 1954); RESTATEMENT, CoNTRAcrs §90 (1932).
454. See PRossER, ToRTs §§38, 81 (2d ed. 1955); McNiece & Thornton,
Affirmative Duties in Tort, 58 YALE L.J. 1272 (1949).
455. See, e.g., Miller v. Bennett, 237 Mo. App. 1285, 172 S.W.2d 960 (1943);
Tomko v. Sharp, 87 N.J.L. 385, 94 Atl. 793 (1915); Thorne v. Deas, 4 Johns. R.
84 (N.Y. 1809); Houston Milling Co. v. Carlock, 183 S.W.2d 1013 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1944). On the subject)of gratuitous undertakings, see generally Arterburn,
Liability for Breach of Gratuitous Promises, 22 ILL. L. REv. 161 (1927) ; Gregory,
Gratuitous Undertakings and the Duty of Care, 1 DE PAUL L. REV. 30 (1951);
McNiece & Thornton, supra note 454; Seavey, Reliance Upon Gratuitous Promises
or Other Conduct, 64 HARV. L. REv. 913 (1951); Shattuck, Gratuitous Promises-
A New Writ?, 35 MIcH. L. REv. 908 (1937).
456. See note 455 supra. It seems that there will be no tort liability even
though the promise is contractual. See, e.g., Randolph's Adm'r v. Snyder, 139
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promise is made by an agent is immaterial.457 The rule however, is subject
to the qualification that if the promisor begins performance he will be liable
in tort for any subsequent negligence.4 8 The cases indicate that a failure to
continue a performance once begun will be equated with negligence. In
Carr v. Maine Cent. R.R.,459 defendant had mistakenly overcharged the
plaintiff. In order to secure a rebate the assent of the Interstate Commerce
Commission was necessary. Plaintiff completed the required papers and
gave them to defendant who promised to forward them to the Commission;
however, he neglected to do so within the allotted time. The court held that
since the acceptance of the papers instituted performance defendant was
liable for thereafter failing to act.460
From the present state of the law as outlined above it is clear that
should the investment club agent execute the club orders in a negligent man-
ner such as selling club shares at the wrong price he will be liable in tort.4 61
The question of liability for non-performance is forcefully presented by the
status of many club agents who serve without compensation. Although
prevailing law would on its face seem to preclude liability,462 the internal
structure of investment clubs may nevertheless furnish cause for according
them variant treatment.
Ky. 159, 129 S.W. 562 (1910); Samuel v. Novak, 99 Md. 558, 567-68, 58 Atl.
19, 20 (1904); Tuttle v. George H. Gilbert Mfg. Co., 145 Mass. 169, 13 N.E.
465 (1887); Hart v. Ludwig, 347 Mich. 559, 79 N.W.2d 895 (1956); Spero v.
Levy, 43 Misc. 24, 86 N.Y. Supp. 869 (Sup. Ct., App. T. 1904). This doctrine is
based upon the idea that a tort duty must exist apart from the contract. A con-
tractual action lies to protect the interests of particular individuals who have mu-
tually consented for a consideration to some arrangement. A tort duty has its
source in a broader public policy to protect people from various types of harm.
Since reliance upon a promise is not generally recognized to fall within our concepts
of public policy, the presence of a contract will not vary the result. See 27 So.
CALIF. L. REv. 216 (1954). In accord with this theory there would. apparently be
no liability for a complete failure to act by even a compensated agent. Cf. Brawn
v. Lyford, 103 Me. 362, 365, 69 Atl. 544, 545 (1907).
457. See Miller v. Bennett, 237 Mo. App. 1285, 172 S.W.2d 960 (1943);
Thorne v. Deas, 4 Johns. R. 84 (N.Y. 1809). The Restatement has taken a contra
position, see RESTATEMENT, AGENCy § 378 (1933), although there are no decisions
to support it.
458. See Carr v. Maine Cent. R.R., 78 N.H. 502, 102 Atl. 532 (1917); Barile
v. Wright, 256 N.Y. 1, 5, 175 N.E. 351, 352 (1931); Elsee v. Gatward, 5 T.R.
143, 101 Eng. Rep. 82 (K.B. 1793).
459. 78 N.H. 502, 102 At. 532 (1917).
460. Ibid. See also Kirby v. Brown, Wheelock, Harris, Vought & Co., 229
App. Div. 155, 241 N.Y. Supp. 255 (1st Dep't 1930), rev'd on other grounds, 255
N.Y. 274, 174 N.E. 652 (1931); 30 COLUtm. L. REV. 1061, 44 HARv. L. REv. 121
(1930). A later New Hampshire case casts doubt upon Carr as authority for
recovery in tort. Buskey v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 N.H. 522, 525, 23
A.2d 367, 369 (1941). The court in Buskey, supra, stated that the tort grounds
expounded in Carr were "erroneous," and proceeded to justify the result on con-
tractual grounds. However, a reading of Carr makes it abundantly clear that no
contract existed. Although, plaintiff refrained from T'orwarding the papers himself,
this "detriment" was obviously not bargained for.
461. If the gratuitous agent is liable, a fortiori, so also would be the agent
who is compensated.
462. The investment club agent may or may not expressly promise to place the
club orders with the broker. A promise may be made either at the time the agent
is appointed or when the club decides upon a particular order. The absence of a
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In order to demonstrate this proposition an understanding of the
process by which the agent is selected and the club's relation with the broker
through whom it deals must first be established. The agent is selected by
the membership at a club meeting; and thereafter an agreement signed by
the entire membership authorizing the agent to act on their behalf is made
with the broker. The appointment of a new agent will require a duplica-
tion of the process.
In most instances of gratuitous promises, the risk of harm resulting
from non-performance is at least partially attributable to the promisee.
There is no compulsion upon him to rely upon performance by the promisor,
for rather than employ someone to perform the task he could well discharge
it himself. Since the investment club is a group activity it differs in that
necessity demands employment of an agent to effectuate group decisions
though it need be no specific individual. Furthermore, once a member
assumes the duties the club is effectively prevented from transferring reliance
to another. Such action would require a meeting for the designation of a
new agent and another agreement with the broker. The feasibility of adopt-
ing such a procedure during the time between the determination of club
policy and its expected discharge by the agent is highly dubious. In Carr
the circumstances were somewhat analogous. After the papers had been
delivered to defendant, plaintiff was to some extent prevented from attend-
ing to the matter himself.46 Once again this is at variance with the normal
case in which the freedom of personal action by the promisee is not so
restricted. These elements emphasize the reasonableness and indeed the
necessity of reliance by the club upon performance by the club agent. In
other contexts the reliance of the promisee may well be reasonable, but it is
rarely if ever necessary. This distinction may indicate that the interests
of the investment club should be granted greater protection than has yet
been afforded reliance upon gratuitous promises. If such is the conclusion
any harshness it may entail from the viewpoint of the agent could be miti-
gated by the rule that one who gratuitously undertakes to perform a given
task is liable only for gross negligence, 484 and by giving weight to the casual
promise should not be material. When a suit is instituted upon an unperformed
promise the significance of the promise lies in its tendency to cause reliance by the
promisee. It is this reliance interest that constitutes the heart of the complaint.
The plaintiff is alleging that he was induced to rely upon the performance of
defendant's promise and was injured by the subsequent failure to perform. In the
investment club situation the reliance interest is the same whether it is engendered
by the agent's promise or his assumption of the agency status. If anything, a
promise presents a more cogent argument for reliance, and failure to grant relief
in such instances is particularly pertinent to our problem. However, an attempt
will be made to suggest a rationale based upon the peculiarities of the reliance interest
of investment clubs that may justify a different result.
463. The degree to which independent action by plaintiff was precluded is not
indicated in the case. It seems reasonably safe to say that such action was at least
made more difficult than in the ordinary situation where the promisee is as free to
act after the promise as he was before.
464. See Beale, Gratuitous Undertakings, 5 HARV. L. REv. 222 (1891); Seavey,
Reliance Upon Gratuitous Promises or Other Conduct, 64 HARv. L. REv. 913, 927
n.57 (1951).
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nature of the obligation when determining whether the agent exercised
proper care.
While the foregoing analysis would apply to non-performance which
is either negligent or, as is less likely, intentional, the latter offers additional
grounds for liability that should be adverted to briefly. If at the time of
receiving a club order the agent has the intention of not performing, it would
constitute a misrepresentation as to his state of mind, and an action of deceit
might lie. 46 Should the intent not to perform develop subsequent to the
receipt of the order, the continuing representation may then become fraudu-
lent, giving rise to an action.46 6  Moreover, it could be argued that inten-
tional non-performance is a breach of the agent's duty of loyalty to his
principal. 467 Although the agent may not be benefiting himself or some
third party by not performing, his actions nonetheless evidence either an
indifference to his principal's interests or a positive attempt to harm them.
Neither is consistent with the fiduciary capacity bestowed upon the agent.
In attempting to cope with these problems the investment club is not
relegated to the uncertainties of litigation. Several prophylactic measures
are available. Provision could be made to compensate the agent, thereby
establishing the basis for a contractual action. The amount proferred
should not be material since the courts do not ordinarly evaluate the ade-
quacy of consideration in an action for breach. The club could also initiate
the policy of appointing two agents, acting jointly, rather than one. A
failure to perform should then prove less probable, for the action of each
agent will be a check upon that of the other.
B. EXERCISE OF VOTING AND OTHER RIGHTS IN SHARES PURCHASED
BY THE CLUB
Shares purchased with the assets of investment clubs will in most cases
confer voting and other rights in the issuing corporation. Club members
will, of course, have an interest in the way these rights are exercised. But
the possession of voting rights by investment clubs may have broader social
ramifications. 468 Participation in investment clubs is not inconsiderable and
465. See Globe Steel Abrasive Co. v. National Metal Abrasive Co., 101 F.2d
489 (6th Cir. 1939); PROSsER, TORTS 481, 563-65 (2d ed. 1955); PROSSER,
SELECTED Topics IN THE LAW OF TORTS 400-02 (1954); Seavey, Reliance Upon
Gratuitous Promises or Other Conduct, 64 HARv. L. REV. 913, 923 (1951).
466. See Seavey, supra note 465, at 926.
467. This duty attaches even in the case of a gratuitous agent. See, e.g., Ward
v. Andrews, 44 Cal. App. 390, 392-93, 186 Pac. 605, 606 (1919); Allen v. Adams,
16 Del. Ch. 77, 82-83, 140 Atl. 694, 697 (Ch. 1928); Ripka v. Gwinn, 14 Del. Ch.
101, 111, 122 Atl. 137, 141 (Ch. 1923).
468. Probably the most common right other than voting that may attend the
purchase of stock will be a pre-emptive right to subscribe to subsequent issues of
stock. While this right will be significant to the club members it has not the
extensive implications of voting. If the right is not exercised the club's share of
control is, of course, diluted; but it does not result in a portion of the corporate
control lying dormant. Furthermore, the decision to exercise pre-emptive rights
would seem to be no different than any other club decision regarding the purchase
of securities.
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is constantly increasing; it is estimated that there are over 100,000 members
throughout the country.46 9 In addition, there is reason to believe that many
clubs may have interests in the same corporations, 470 and that they fre-
quently invest in small, young enterprises. The voting power represented
by these holdings could accordingly be a significant element in the direction
of some corporations. Because of this the question of how these rights will
be exercised takes on an added dimension.471 Although the by-laws of the
various clubs normally contain provisions governing the determination of
investment policies, the question of voting the shares held by the club has
been conspicuously overlooked 4 72
Individuals form an investment club with the intent that its operation
shall be determined by a series of group decisions. Decisions as to the choice
of securities to be purchased, the length of time they will be held, and the
manner of utilizing any dividends received or profits derived from their
sale are to be made by the entire membership. Whether the members also
contemplate voting the shares held by the club is questionable. However,
it would be clearly consistent with their mode of operation to conclude
that had they considered the question they would have intended that such
decisions also be made by the group.473
Unanimity vs. Decision by Majority Vote
In many and perhaps most instances the club's holdings will be regis-
tered in the "street name" of the brokerage firm with which they deal.
Although the firm as shareholder of record will be entitled to vote the
shares, the club members remain the equitable owners and as such are en-
titled to direct the manner in which the recordholder shall vote.474 Here
a group decision would determine the directions to be given the record-
holder.
469. See Business Week, Nov. 5, 1955, p. 41. The National Association of
Investment Clubs estimates that there are now over 120,000 members. Interview
with Thomas E. O'Hara, Chairman of the Board of Trustees, March 1958.
470. In 1956 the National Association of Investment Clubs conducted a survey
of the portfolios of 219 out of 1700 member clubs. The stock of one corporation
was held by 22% of the clubs; while shares in eleven other corporations were
held by at least 10% of the clubs. Letter from Thomas E. O'Hara, Chairman of the
Board of Trustees, to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, March 28,
1958, on file in Biddle Law Library.
471. The issue may be framed in a variety of ways. A proceeding may he
instituted to determine the validity of a corporate election, see it re Giant Portland
Cement Co., 26 Del. Ch. 32, 21 A.2d 697 (Ch. 1941), or stockholders may seek
to enjoin corporate action which they maintain had not been properly approved,
see Sellers v. Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co., 25 Del. Ch. 268, 17 A.2d 831 (Ch.
1941), or an injunction may be sought against voting the stock. Cf. Tunis v.
Hestonville, M. & F. Pass. R.R., 149 Pa. 70, 24 Atl. 88 (1892).
472. None of the by-laws examined contained a provision relating to the
exercise of voting rights or other rights.
473. Were it incorporated, the club, as an entity apart from the members,
would own the shares and be entitled to vote them. STEVENIS, CORPORATIONS 529 (2d
ed. 1949). The question would then be for the management to decide.
474. See Note, 99 U. PA. L. REv. 999-1000 (1951).
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Although the cases are not numerous, there is authority for the
proposition that the decision of joint holders with regard to the manner
in which stock will be voted must be a unanimous one.4 75 This result ap-
pears undesirable as applied to investment clubs, for the existence of a
dissenting voice would nullify the voting power. It is not difficult to imagine
dissatisfaction developing over such a result, particularly if it is a recurrent
one, culminating in the resignation of members. Should such withdrawals
be sufficiently numerous a dissolution by consent could well be effected.
Even though the remaining members were to desire to continue, the neces-
sity of liquidating the club assets in order to recompense the departing
members might so deplete the club portfolio as to work a dissolution for all
practical purposes.478 The broader implications of this negation of voting
power must also be considered. As mentioned above, the size and character
of investment club holdings may constitute them an important element in the
control of some corporations. 477 To the extent that a lack of unanimity
might be prevalent in many clubs, exercise of the voting rights of a sub-
stantial block of stock might be suspended with accompanying loss of direc-
tion over corporate affairs. Admittedly this possibility rests upon a con-
geries of assumptions, and its force is accordingly decreased. However,
what vitality remains supports the assertion that unanimity is an inapposite
standard.
Fortunately, an examination of the cases thought to support the re-
quirement of unanimity suggests several distinctions. The cases have
been mainly concerned with executors,478 trustees,47 9 and tenants by the
entireties.48° The peculiarities of these relationships would appear to
dictate the need for unanimity independently of the fact that shares of stock
are involved. Thus the rule in the case of executors and trustees, for ex-
ample, is that they must act jointly in all matters requiring the exercise of
475. See In re Giant Portland Cement Co., 26 Del. Ch. 32, 46, 21 A.2d 697, 704
(Ch. 1941); Sellers v. Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co., 25 Del. Ch. 268, 279-80, 17
A.2d 831, 836 (Ch. 1941); Tunis v. Hestonville, M. & F. Pass. R.R., 149 Pa. 70,
85, 24 AtI. 88, 90 (1892). The cases are collected in Annot., 134 A.L.R. 989
(1941). See also, BAiiLANTINE, CoRPORATiONS 400 (rev. ed. 1946). At least one
state has attempted to deal with the question legislatively. A Pennsylvania statute
provides that stock held jointly shall be voted as designated in the agreement
under which the shares are held. If the agreement specifies no method the will of
the majority of the holders shall be decisive. In the event the holders are equally
divided in opinion, the vote is divided among them. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-507
(Purdon Supp. 1957). This would presumably determine the issue in Pennsylvania.
476. The desirability of avoiding acrimonious relations in what is in many re-
spects a social organization must also be considered. If these social relationships
are to prosper friction must be kept at a minimum.
477. See text and notes at notes 469-71 supra.
478. Sellers v. Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co., 25 Del. Ch. 268, 17 A,2d 831
(Ch. 1941); Tunis v. Hestonville, M. & F. Pass. ILRR, 149 Pa. 70, 24 At. 88
(1892).
479. People ex tel. Courtney v. Botts, 376 Ill. 476, 34 N.E.2d 403 (1941);
Patterson v. Henrietta Mills, 219 N.C. 7, 10, 12 S.E.2d 686, 688 (1941) (dictum).
480. See In re Giant Portland Cement Co., 26 Del. Ch. 32, 21 A2d 697 (Ch.
1941).
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discretion,4 8 1 including the voting of stock.48 2  Support for the theory that
the need for unanimity is peculiar to certain relationships is found in the
language of the cases,483 and in addition in the fact that an agreement under
which the stock is held which designates the manner of determining voting
will be enforced,48 4 thereby indicating that altering the relationship will
change the result.
The nature of the relationship between the holders is suggestive of
another distinction. The probability that a negation of the voting power
may constitute a danger to the continued existence of the relationship is
not as serious as in the instant problem. Regardless of whether the shares
are voted the trust or estate remains and must be administered; and the
destruction of many marriages engendered by disputes over the exercise
of voting rights is a distinctly unrealistic conjecture.
Since unanimity is not essential, should the members incorporate a
provision in the club by-laws governing the exercise of rights in shares, it
seems clear that it would be upheld.48 5  By virtue of this expedient the
member can protect their interests in whatever way they consider de-
sirable.
Majority Rule vs. Proportional Division of Voting Power
However, assuming that no provision is controlling, two alternatives
to a rule of unanimity must be considered: majority rule and the propor-
tional division of voting power between majority and minority groups.
488
Neither of these is free from difficulties. Proportional voting would result
in fractional shares being held by the several groups in some instances.
The only known case dealing with this issue held that voting fractional
shares violated a state statute providing for one vote for each share.
48 T
Although the enactment of a subsequent statute may have reversed this deci-
sion 4 8 8 it is not without significance should the issue arise in other juris-
481. See, e.g., In re Ehret, 70 Misc. 576, 579, 127 N.Y. Supp. 934; 937 (Sup.
Ct. 1911) (executors); In re Juilliard's Will, 171 Misc. 661, 663, 13 N.Y.S.2d
315, 317 (Surr. Ct. 1939) (trustees).
482. The conceptual view of a tenancy &y the entireties as constituting but one
person would also require unanimity. See In re Giant Portland Cement Co.,
26 Del. CI. 32, 45-46, 21 A.2d 697, 703-04 (Ch. 1941).
483. See In re Giant Portland Cement Co., supra note 482; Sellers v. Joseph
Bancroft & Sons Co., 25 Del. Ch. 268, 278-79, 17 A.2d 831, 835-36 (Ch. 1941).
484. See Laffert's Estate, 2 Pa. Dist. 215, aff'd by an equally divided court,
154 Pa. 430, 26 Atl. 388 (1893).
485. Cf. ibid.
486. Since the shares are often registered in the "street name" this would require
the broker to give two or more proxies if he should elect to vote the shares by
proxy. Such a procedure is not objectionable. See ARANOW & EINHORN, PROXY
CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 388-90 (1957).
487. Commonwealth ex rel. Cartwright v. Cartwright, 350 Pa. 638, 40 A.2d
30 (1944), 93 U. PA. L. REv. 321 (1945).
488. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-507 (Purdon Supp. 1957) provides in part
that where joint holders are equally divided upon the question of voting, the vote
shall be equally divided among them. Since such a division will in some instances
inevitably result in fractional shares it could be argued that the legislature has
impliedly authorized voting them.
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dictions. Nevertheless, this problem is not of great importance since a ban
against voting fractional shares would cause the club to lose its vote in
but one share of stock.
489
-Perhaps the most immediate problem attendant upon majority rule
concerns the construction of the word "majority," i.e., whether it denotes
interest or numbers.4 90 Although the matter is not completely free from
doubt, the more reasonable approach is dearly in terms of interest. 491 The
problem is largely obviated in many clubs by a mandatory equality of
interest of member contributions; others delimit voting criteria in the
by-laws.
492
The primary judgment between majority rule and proportional voting
must be made in terms of the consistency of these devices with the nature
of the club relationship. This may be illustrated by a hypothetical situation
involving a corporation in which the club has an interest and in which
an insurgent group advocating policies contrary to those favored by the
existing management seeks to wrest control. Assume that a majority of
club members support the incumbents while a minority prefer the chal-
lengers. If the minority are allowed to vote a portion of the shares the effect
will be to advance policies which the majority of the members believe detri-
mental to the corporation and therefore prejudicial to the value of the club
interest in such corporation. Should the opinion of the majority prove
correct the harm engendered by the minority policies, if they prevail, will
not be limited to the minority but will extend to the interests of all mem-
bers. Rule by the majority is vulnerable to somewhat the same criticism;
if the majority proves wrong the entire membership will suffer. However,
majority rule is more nearly in accord with the purpose and nature of the
association. People band together in associations, both business and other-
wise for the purpose of uniting their efforts and resources in pursuit of
certain objectives. In the investment club one of these objectives consists
of profit-making through investment in corporate bodies. This unification
489. If the club holds only a few shares in a given corporation the loss of voting
rights in even one share may be of importance to the members.
490. See Note, 29 CoLum. L. Rav. 66, 70 (1929).
491. Ibid. See also BAU.ANTINE, CORPORArIONS 396 (rev. ed. 1946).
492. The possibility of an evenly divided vote must also be considered. If
the members should fail to resolve the difference of opinion they would be unable
to vote the shares. The consequences of such inaction can best be demonstrated
by a factual illustration. An investment club holds twenty of one hundred shares
outstanding in corporation Y. Under the corporation's articles or the state statute
mergers must be approved by % of the outstanding shares. If the club's voting
power is not exercised sixty of the remaining eighty shares must be in favor
of the merger if it is to be accomplished. If the divergent groups within the
club were allowed to vote 2 of the shares only fifty additional votes are necessary
to authorize the merger. The gravity of the danger is impossible to calculate;
for it will depend upon the number of shares not voted and the manner in which
the remaining shares are cast. The threat of an evenly divided vote should not be a
serious one in other than very small clubs, for as the number of members increases
the probability should correspondingly decrease. Moreover, even though majority
rule should be adopted it would not be anomalous to permit proportional voting
where the club is evenly divided in opinion. Cf. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §2852-
507 (Purdon Supp. 1957).
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBERS
becomes meaningless if various groups are to be permitted to follow inde-
pendent and possibly mutually inconsistent policies. If divergent policies
are contemplated, either absence of association or the formation of several
associations is indicated. If the rational basis of the mutual undertaking
is to be effectuated, the association-in this case an investment club-must
act in a unified manner. The method best calculated to achieve this unity
of action is majority rule.49 3
C. THE INTERNAL OPERATION OF THE CLUB
In many respects an investment club is analogous to a volun-
tary non-profit association. Often, the principal purpose in forming a club
may be social as opposed to profit-making. More particularly are they
similar in their internal operations. In an organization of comparatively
small size in which the members are well known to one another, disputes
concerning the mode of operation will probably occur only infrequently and
will be resolved within the club. However, disputes may occasionally
arise that cannot be settled without resort by a complaining member to the
courts. An expelled member of an investment club may sue for a declara-
tion that his expulsion was improper and for a decree restoring him to
membership; or a member may seek to enjoin club action which he main-
tains is not in accordance with the by-laws; or a former official may seek
restoration to an office of which he alleges he has been improperly deprived.
Much has been written dealing with the merits of these controversies and
the basis of judicial jurisdiction over them in the context of voluntary non-
profit associations. 49 4  In view of the similarities of operation it seems
reasonable to assume that many of the rules developed with regard to
such associations would also be applicable to investment clubs once the
desirability of judicial intervention is conceded.
However, this concession may be too great; a more fundamental juris-
prudential question of the propriety of judicial interference in the affairs
of investment clubs exists. 49 5 This question is not framed to include all
club activities. Some obviously are subject to judicial intervention such
as the agency and voting issues previously discussed. But the effects of
other "activities" may be limited to the club itself and may involve no prob-
lem of monetary loss or utilization of club assets as in the agency context.
Examples may include expulsion of members, the election and removal of
officers, and the validity of decisions arrived at in a meeting conducted
493. Majority rule is the normal operative standard in both partnerships, see
CRANE, PARTNERSHIPs 276, 348 (2d ed. 1952), and voluntary non-profit associations,
see Powell, Land Capacity of Natural Persons as Unincorporated Groups, 49 COLUM.
L. Rav. 297, 309 (1949); 7 C.J.S. § 18 (1937).
494. See generally Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit,
43 HARv. L. Rav. 993 (1930); Ford, Expulsion From Associations, 1 SYDNEY L.
REv. 186 (1954); Note, 37 B.U.L. REv. 336 (1957); Comments, 65 YALE L.J. 369
(1956), 58 YALE L.J. 999 (1949), 37 YALE L.J. 368 (1928). See also POUND &
CHAFE, EQUITABLE RELIEF 87-126 (2d ed. 1930).
495. The most satisfactory consideration of this problem is contained in Chafee,
supra note 494, at 1020-29.
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in a manner at variance with the by-laws. The need for judicial interven-
tion in these cases is less clear.
Whether judicial review of these club activities should be undertaken
will depend upon a variety of considerations. Such review will certainly
have some undesirable effects upon club operations. It will inevitably
arouse some degree of resentment among the membership, the extent of
which will vary depending upon the character of the restraint placed upon
the club's operations. In this regard it must be remembered that the
formation of a club is in many respects a very informal process. There is
probably little awareness on the part of the members of the problems that
may later arise or the subsequent bent club activities may take. As these
issues develop the membership will want to meet and dispose of them in
a flexible manner. It may well be that the members are better qualified
to select the mode of operation best suited to the growth of the club and the
discharge of its societal functions. The imposition of judicial restraints may
deprive the club of much of this flexibility of action and result in atrophy.
498
The protection from disruptive effects of the purely social relationships
the club provides is another element militating against judicial interference.
Suggesting the same result is the broader policy that people should be left
to manage their own affairs except where the maintenance of some public
policy or the redress of a private injury necessitates the imposition of
restrictions. This concept lies perhaps at the very basis of our form of
society.
497
The substantiality of the injury being complained of would seem to be
a determining factor: exactly what is it that the member has lost and how
important is it in light of the disadvantages that will attend judicial review
of the club activities. 498  It may be that in a given situation the efficacy of
any court action in securing redress may be questionable,4 99 or the injury
may prove amenable to correction without undertaking to meddle in the
club's affairs.5° In some instances the character of the dispute may be such
496. See United States ex rel. Noel v. Carmody, 148 F2d 684, 686 (D.C. Cir.
1945) ; Chafee, supra note 494, at 1027-29. In some associations this way may not
be as true, for the judicial restraints will be upon the action of a few officers
or directors who direct much of the organizational policies. In an investment club
the lack of any centralized management means that any limitations -will be upon
the actions of the majority of the associates.
497. Cf. Chafee, supra note 494, at 1029; Comment, 65 YALE LJ. 369, 389
(1956).
498. See Chafee, supra note 494, at 1000, 1008; Comment, 58 YALE L.J: 999, 1006
(1949).
499. A court cannot, for example, secure an expelled member's interest in the
social relationships the club affords. People cannot be compelled to socialize.
See DeFuniak, Equitable Protection of Personal or Individual Rights, 36 Ky. L.J.
7, 25 (1947) ; Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality,
29 HARv. L. Rv. 640, 678 (1916).
500. Baird v. Wells, L.R. 44 Ch. D. 661 (1890) illustrates the point. Although
refusing to grant an injunction to an expelled member, the court nonetheless
reviewed the expulsion and found it to be wrongful. Thus, the court vindicated
the character of the expelled member which was precisely the relief he sought.
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that the courts are not competent to deal with it.501 In such cases there
would be little to be gained by exercising jurisdiction over the matter. The
manner in which the alleged injury was inflicted may also be a relevant
consideration. Where a member is challenging the validity of a club
decision to purchase particular securities his complaint will be that his
contributions are being applied in an unauthorized way. If the decision
was arrived at in a meeting of which he had no notice a stronger case for
judicial intervention is made than in the situation where it was arrived at
by voice vote rather than by written ballot as the by-laws required.
The ultimate resolution of these issues is not the province of this
paper. The purpose of the discussion has been simply to point out that
the question of intervention or not must be faced by the courts before
the formulation of rules dealing with the merits of the intra-club con-
troversies is undertaken; and that whatever conclusion is reached must
be the product of a circumspect evaluation and balance of many considera-
tions that may not always be readily apparent.
IV. THE IMPACT OF TAX LEGISLATION
UPON INVESTMENT CLUBS
Although investment clubs place much emphasis on their educational
activities, their operations are also designed to produce income. The dis-
position of this income may vary from club to club, but all clubs hope for
a good return on their members' capital contributions. The federal reve-
nue laws apply to virtually all income-producing activities conducted within
the United States. As such, they undoubtedly have an impact upon each
investment club and its members. Although an effort will be made to touch
upon the broad range of state and federal tax laws, the major portion of the
taxation section of this Symposium will be devoted to an examination of the
provisions of the federal income tax laws and the extent of their relation
to investment club operations.
A. THE FEDERAL INCOME TAx
The Tax Status of an Investment Club Under the 1954 Code
The 1954 Code establishes several categories of entities for tax pur-
poses, attempting to assure equal tax treatment to organizations which
have similar characteristics. A "partnership" for tax purposes is defined
to include ". . . a syndicate, group, pool, joint venture, or other unin-
corporated organization through or by means of which any business, finan-
cial operation or venture is carried on, and which is not, within the meaning
of this title, . . . a corporation or a trust or estate." 50 2 The breadth
of this definition dictates that if an investment club is not a trust or cor-
501. Chafee lists the affairs of secret societies and churches as instances of this
difficulty. Chafee, supra note 494, at 1023-26.
502. IN . REv. CODE oF 1954, §§761(a), 7701(a) (2).
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poration for tax purposes, it is at least a partnership. The possibility
that an investment club could be treated as a trust must be quickly elim-
inated, for it has been held that the trust provisions of the Code are ap-
plicable only to so-called strict trusts, i.e., those not set up as a means of
transacting business
0 4
The problem of how the investment club is to be treated resolves itself
into a determination of whether the club is a corporation or a partnership
for tax purposes. There can be no doubt that a club which has formally
incorporated is taxable as a corporation. However, the Internal Revenue
Service also treats certain unincorporated "associations" as corporations
for tax purposes. The line between these "associations" and other un-
incorporated organizations which have been held taxable as partnerships
is not clear. The test is apparently the presence or absence of basic cor-
porate characteristics: "[W]here an entity . . . resembles a corporation
in some respects and a partnership in others . . . the resemblances should
be balanced." ,o Five characteristics tending toward the conclusion of
corporate tax liability were listed by the Supreme Court in Morrissey v.
Commissioner: 507 (1) centralized management; (2) continuity regardless
of death of members; (3) transferability of ownership; (4) limited liability;
and (5) entity ownership of property. Other factors, such as the number
of owners, issuance of share certificates, and whether or not the organiza-
tion is continuing a business formerly carried on by a corporation owned
by substantially the same people, may also influence decisions.508
Not all of the features suggested are of equal weight. Presence of
individual liability of the members, an incident of almost every unincor-
porated enterprise including investment clubs,50 9 does not conclusively
establish partnership treatment where other features of the association may
lean towards the corporate form. Centralization of management, on the
503. Although it might be suggested that an investment club could be merely
an amorphous group and not an entity recognized by the Internal Revenue Code,
the inclusion of all "other unincorporated organizations" carrying on not only
businesses but any "financial operation or venture" within the term "partnership"
renders the suggestion highly improbable.
504. In the leading cases of Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 144 (1924), and
Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935), the Supreme Court has made
it plain that regardless of rigid adherence to trust form, even where control by the
trustee is not subject to direction by the beneficiaries, the trust provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code are to be applied only to those trusts whose purpose is holding
and conserving particular property with incidental management power in the
trustee. Where the trust is used as a medium for conduct of a business it may
be taxed as a corporation or a partnership. See Delores Crabb, 41 B.T.A. 686
(1940), aff'd, 119 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1941).
505. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7701(a) (3) includes within the term "corpora-
tion" an "association, jointstock company and insurance company." The Supreme
Court has accepted similar provisions in earlier income tax laws as an authorization
to the Internal Revenue Service to establish, by regulation, the criteria for treating
unincorporated bodies as corporations. Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 144 (1924).
506. Bert v. Helvering, 92 F.2d 491, 495 (D.C. Cir. 1937).
507. 296 U.S. 344, 359 (1935).
508. Cf. Poplar Bluff Printing Co. v. Commissioner, 149 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir.
1945).
509. See text at p. 886 supra.
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other hand, appears to carry great weight, at least where the enterprise also
issues share certificates. In Burk-Waggoner Oil Ass'n v. Hopkins,5'0
despite the absence of limited liability and entity ownership of property, and
with only limited transferability of shares, the entity was held taxable
as a corporation because it was managed by a board of directors and execu-
tive officers and had a fixed capital divided into shares represented by cer-
tificates.5 1 Similarly in Poplar Bluff Printing Co. v. Commissioner,5 2
management was largely in a managing executive, the principal partner, who
held the property as trustee for the partnership. "Negotiable" certificates of
510. 269 U.S. 110 (1925).
511. But see Guaranty Employees Ass'n v. United States, 241 F2d 565 (5th Cir.
1957). Here employees of a large trust company organized an association whose
membership was limited to employees of the trust company and was represented
by $50.00 units purchased for cash. No member could own more than fifty such
units. Although the association was to continue after the death of a member,
his interest continued only in a limited form for the benefit of his widow or minor
children. Management of the association was wholly in the hands of an executive
committee elected by the members at an annual meeting. The principal activities
of the club were investments in real estate and loans to its members. After
discussing at some length the resemblance features test of the Morrissey case and
its 'adoption in subsequent cases, the court noted that those features had been
suggested in a case involving the trust-association distinction, although there had
been some "tendency" to apply the "not directly applicable Morrissey list" to dis-
tinguish partnerships from associations. The basic difference between partnerships
and corporations, the court said, and the one Congress probably had in mind when
it established the difference in tax treatment, is referable to the "entity" concept
which Congress accepts for corporations and rejects for partnerships. "The economic
fortunes of and the conduct of the business carried on by a corporation are almost
entirely independent of the fortunes of its stockholders. Thus (a) a stockholder or
all stockholders may die, become bankrupt, sell their interest to others, etc. without
affecting in the least the business of the corporations. Similarly (b) the corpora-
tion can become bankrupt or acquire great wealth without directly affecting the
fortunes of its stockholders-this is achieved by limited liability and the discretion
vested in the directors regarding the declaration of dividends; it can greatly expand
or contract its business without reference to the economic condition of its stock-
holders. In short, a corporation is a truly independent business enterprise. A
partnership is not so: (a) if one or more of the partners die, become bankrupt, or
wish to liquidate their interest in the partnership by sale of their portion or other-
wise, the partnership must be reorganized, and frequently this cannot be done
without liquidating or greatly changing the entire business or at least its scope;
(b) if the partnership becomes insolvent or bankrupt the effect is felt directly and
seriously by the partners, nor can a partnership greatly expand its business if the
resources of its owners are limited-the taking in of new partners is not a routine
matter to the extent that the sale of new stock by a corporation is." Id. at 572.
The court went on to find that since the business of the association necessarily
expanded and contracted as the members deposited or withdrew funds because of
their individual financial circumstances, and since insolvency or good fortune of
the association would have an almost immediate direct effect on the personal fortunes
of its members, there was no substantial financial independence of the association
from the members. Because of the lack of independence and lack of continuity
except in management, the association more closely resembled a partnership than
a corporation, and so was held not taxable as an association. Under this view
it would appear that almost any club which permitted voluntary withdrawal of
funds and whose members were unlimitedly liable for club debts could be found to
be a partnership rather than an association regardless of its size and form of manage-
ment. A dissenting opinion points out, however, that the Morrissey tests have
been recognized consistently by the Internal Revenue Service and the courts in
both trust and partnership cases, and that by those tests the association in question
was an association to be taxed as a corporation.
512. 149 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1945).
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shares specifically providing that the principal partner should have first
option to repurchase were issued to the partners, who were apparently ac-
tively engaged in the business. In spite of unlimited liability of members,
the court found the association taxable as a corporation. In this case the
court also stressed the fact that the partnership was merely continuing the
same operations formerly carried on by a corporation owned by the present
partners without any substantial change in organization or practices. 1 a
The management of most investment clubs is not centralized. Invest-
ment decisions are made by a vote of the membership after group discus-
sion. The duties of the officers of most clubs are limited to matters such as
conducting meetings, maintaining records, receipt and disbursement of
funds, transmission of orders to brokers and the like. In the main they are
not responsible for club policy. Investment clubs also as a rule do not
issue share certificates: members may receive copies of the club agreement
and receipts for their periodic contributions;814 but in few, if any, clubs
do they receive share certificates in the corporate sense. With management
in the hands of the entire club membership and in the absence of corporate
type share certificates, investment clubs should not incur tax liability as
corporations.. This conclusion is sustained by decisions such as the Morrow
Trust 15 and Olmstead Hotel 518 cases, involving organizations in which
management decisions were made by all the associates, albeit often in-
formally. The Tax Court in both cases held the organization not taxable as
a corporation, even though in Olmstead, for example, there were provisions
in the association agreement for survival of the "partnership" after the death
of a partner and for transfer of ownership to strangers to the original part-
nership, characteristics mentioned in Morrissey as suggestive of corporate
status for tax purposes.
51 7
The National Association of Investment Clubs reports that several
clubs, in an attempt to determine their status for tax purposes, requested
rulings from the Internal Revenue Service and were advised to report
income as corporations.518 It is suggested that in these cases the Service
513. It is doubtful that many investment clubs, if any, will find themselves
in the position of carrying on their activities as an unincorporated group after'
having incorporated and dissolved.
514. But note, however, that in the field of securities regulation, this may be
additional evidence that membership in the club is a security. See text at p. 837 mtpra.
515. P-H 1951 T.C. Mem. Dec. f 51289.
516. P-H 1952 T.C. Mem. Dec. If 52209.
517. Transferability and survival were provided for in Olnstead by contract
among the partners, not an unusual device in partnership practice. Accomplishing
the same ends by issuing transferable share certificates would very likely be viewed
as a much stronger factor towards treatment as a corporation.
518. Interview with representatives of the National Association of Investment
Clubs, March 1958 (hereinafter cited as INTERViEw). The Association reports
that the Treasury Department advised that it used four tests in determining whether
an organization would be taxed as a corporation rather than as a partnership.
These tests were: (1) the existence of a group of associates; (2) a common ob-
jective to carry on a business and divide the gains thereof; (3) continuity of life;
and (4) centralization of management in a corporate sense. Tests (1) and (2) are
clearly those used by the Supreme Court in Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 144 (1924),
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had imperfect knowledge of the clubs' actual method of operation and,
in all probability, relied only upon the articles of agreement or by-laws
submitted to them. Support for the decisions of the Service may be traced
to the fact that those articles or by-laws indicated possibilities of repre-
sentative management by broadly defining the duties of club officers, and
may have used the term "shares" in connection with the interests of the
members in the organization.m5 19 There seems to be no reason to believe
that clubs generally should find it difficult to meet the requisites for part-
nership status. The risk of disadvantageous classification should be
minimized by. the inclusion of an accurate statement of the purposes and
actual practice of the club in the governing instrument. Particular care
should be used in drafting the provisions governing the making of invest-
ment and other decisions of club policy and those describing the duties of
officers to avoid conveying the impression of centralized management.
Also, since investment clubs are comprised of associates or friends rather
than strangers, and membership is not to be made available to the general
public,152 the club should so specify in the documents governing its opera-
tions, thereby making it clear that no free transferability of shares-as
would be the case with most corporate shares-is contemplated or pos-
sible.
521
In most cases there will be little cause for an unincorporated club to
organize or operate in a manner calculated to lead to its being regarded as
other than a partnership. As will be indicated, there is not apt to be a
tax advantage in so doing. Where a club sees such an advantage, however,
it can either incorporate formally and obtain other, non-tax, advantages
as well, or elect to be treated as a partnership taxable as a corporation in
accordance with Section 1361 of the Internal Revenue Code.2 It should
be noted, however, that such an election must be considered in the light
and Morrissey to distinguish so-called strict or traditional trusts from business trusts.
Tests (3) and (4) are two of the five resemblance features of a business organiza-
tion which the Court in Morrissey said should be balanced to determine whether the
organization more nearly resembled a partnership or a corporation. Tests (1)
and (2) are by definition met by investment clubs, and, for that matter, almost
all business partnerships, joint ventures, or syndicates.
519. INTzvIw.
520. MEBERs NEW YoPx- STocK ExcrANGx INVESTMENT CLUBS (1956);
REYNoLDs & Co., INVESTMENT CLUBS (1956).
521. The National Association of Investment Clubs is in the process of dis-
tributing a new form of sample partnership agreement to members and prospects
which clearly is drawn for this purpose. In it the organization is consistently
described and referred to as a partnership, and the members as partners. (The
terms "partner" and "partnership" appear no fewer than ninety-five times in the
course of the agreement.) No officers are provided for, and management by all the
partners is specified. Provisions concerning additional partners, withdrawals, and
death of partners, while permitting continuation of the club activities, make it clear
that no corporation-like continuity of entity or transfer of shares is contemplated
or possible.
522. See text and notes at notes 531-41 infra.
523. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1361(a), provides that individuals or partnerships
of not more than fifty members may elect, in accordance with regulations prescribed
by the Secretary of the Treasury, to be subject to taxes as a domestic corporation.
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of expected future developments in the club, since it is to a considerable
degree irrevocable. 524 At this time there are no provisions enabling a cor-
poration or an "association" to report in any manner but that specified for
corporations, although such a proposal has been made.525
The Filing of a Tax Return by the Investment Club
Whether an investment club is a partnership or a corporation, it should
file a tax return on its income. If the club reports as a partnership, it is
required to file a return for purposes of information only, showing the
income and expenses of the organization and the allocation of net income
to the various members.sn  Apparently, many clubs have not been filing
returns, but have merely informed each member of his share 6f the club
income to be included in the member's individual return.52 While it is
true that as long as the members do include this income in their own
returns the government suffers no loss, it is advisable for a club to comply
with the law. It would appear likely that a showing by the club of its
having filed regularly as a partnership might be considered a factor in its
favor should the Internal Revenue Service later suggest that the club is an
"association" taxable as a corporation5 2 8 If a club for some reason desires
to be free of the filing requirement, it may apply to the Commissioner for
exemption from the partnership provisions of the Code. 29
If an investment club is found to be a corporate tax "association",
the implications of a failure to file a tax return are somewhat more serious.
In addition to the fact that its actions may amount to a technical violation
of the law, the club might incur liability for unpaid taxes with added inter-
est and penalties5 ° Again, it is not unrealistic to assume that the Service
might be more inclined to assess a club which failed to file any return than
it would one which had filed, even though incorrectly, as a partnership. It
should be borne in mind that excessive tax liability in turn may affect the
continuing operation of the club.
524. IniT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1361 (e).
525. See S. 3194, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1957), providing for tax relief for
small business; see also Bowen, Optional Partnership Treatment of Corporate
Earnings, in How SHoULD CoPaORATios BE TAXED 61 (1947).
526. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6031.
527. Questionnaire described at note 7 supra; see NATIONAL AssocIATION OF
INVESTMENT CLUBS, ORGANIZATION PLANS, Bulletin No. 4 (1956).
528. This idea has been strengthened by discussion with a member of the staff
of the Philadelphia office of the Internal Revenue Service, April 11, 1958.
529. The Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate may, at the election
of the members of a partnership, exclude such partnership from the application
of all or part of the provisions of the subchapter on partnerships if the partnership
is availed of for investment purposes and not for the active conduct of business
or if it is for the joint production, extraction, or use of property, if the income
of the members may be adequately determined without computing partnership tax-
able income. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 761(a).
530. Id. §§6651, 6653, 6655.
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Tax Advantages and Disadvantages of Classification
as a Partnership or Corporation
The most significant result of operating as a partnership for tax pur-
poses is the fact that club income is subject to only a single tax: 531 Mem-
bers treat their shares of dividend income and capital gains and losses as if
received by them directly.3 2 The principal disadvantage is, however, that
the members must pay a tax on all club income, whether it is distributed
to them or not. If a club adheres to the principle recommended by invest-
ment advisors of compounding income by reinvesting earnings rather than
distributing them, the members must pay a tax on income which is not
available to them. The members may be reluctant or even hard-pressed
to pay such a tax in the absence of an actual distribution. Partial dis-
tributions to furnish members with sufficient cash to pay the investment
club portion of their tax bills will, of course, serve to reduce the assets
available for reinvestment, thereby affecting the future earning potential
of the club.
Filing as a corporation, though it eliminates the possibility of members
having to pay a tax on undistributed income, renders the earnings of the
club subject to a double taxation. However, the corporate tax rate on a
club having a moderate income would be only twenty-five per cent 5 and,
in addition, cighty-five per cent of the ,arnings of the club derived from
dividends may be deducted in determining the club's taxable income ma
This insulation of corporate earnings from taxes on the members creates
a possibility of an actual tax saving over the partnership method in some
cases. By accumulating dividends, which are ordinary income, and limiting
its distributions, an investment club might be able not only to retain a
greater amount of capital for reinvestment purposes, but may also "con-
vert" the ordinary dividend income into long term capital gain to the mem-
bers by distributing it upon the liquidation of the club.me But it must be
remembered that a considerable portion of an investment club's earnings,
even if it is not a "trading" club, will probably consist of capital gains, which
are subject to no exclusion corresponding to that available for dividend
income. For the alchemic conversion of ordinary dividend income into
531. Id. §§61(a) (13), 701.
532. Id. § 702.
533. MEMBERS NEw YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INVESTMENT CLUBS (1956); NA-
TIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INVESTMENT CLUBS, ORGANIZATION PLANS, Bulletin No. 2
(1956).
534. The corporate tax rate for the first $25,000 of annual income is 25%.
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 11 (b)(2), (c).
535. Id. §§243-46.
536. Long term capital gains treatment, which for individuals means taxing only
half the net gain to a maximum of 25%o of the total gain, is applied to income from
the sale or exchange of certain assets, including shares of corporations, held longer
than six months. INT. REy. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1201(b), 1221. Since distributions to
shareholders upon complete liquidation of corporations are treated as sales or ex-
changes, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 331(a) (1), a considerable saving on the member's
own tax bill is possible if he receives earnings upon liquidation rather than as divi-
dends of either the club or the corporation originally paying the dividends.
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capital gains to result in less total tax than would be the case under the
treatment afforded partnerships, the club members would have to be in
relatively high tax rate brackets, probably in the neighborhood of fifty
per cent or higher.P
7
Investment clubs which are taxable as corporations are confronted, in
addition, by two provisions of the Internal Revenue Code the purpose of
which is to render impractical accumulation of earnings by a corporation
to avoid taxes on its shareholders. An accumulated earnings tax of twenty-
seven and one-half per cent is imposed, in addition to other taxes, on earn-
ings accumulated in excess of $60,000 which are not reasonably necessary
for the business and are therefore presumed to be for shareholder tax
avoidance.1 s Most small clubs, of course, will not be likely to exceed the
permitted $60,000 limit on accumulations, but there will no doubt be some
clubs whose size and success might cause them to be affected by these
restrictions. The provisions more likely to be encountered by the ordinary
investment club, if taxed as a corporation, are those dealing with the taxa-
tion of so-called personal holding companies. Section 541 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 imposes a tax, in addition to other taxes, upon un-
distributed personal holding company income of every "personal holding
company" at the rate of. seventy-five per cent on amounts up to $2,000 and
eighty-five per cent on amounts in excess of that figure. There are essen-
tially but two requirements for qualification as a personal holding company,
both of which might unfortunately be held to have been met by an ordinary
investment club. They are: (1) that at any time during the last half of the
taxable year more than fifty per cent in value of the ownership interest in
the company being taxed is owned, directly or indirectly, by or for not more
than five individuals, and (2) that at least eighty per cent of the income for
the taxable year is personal holding company income, as defined in section
543, which may consist of, among other items, dividends and gains from
the sale or exchange of stock or securities.3 9 Unlike the case under the
accumulated earnings tax, no intention to avoid shareholder tax is required
and no amount of accumulated earnings is excluded. Although investment
clubs may, for other reasons, find the corporate form advantageous, com-
pounding of earnings would be rendered virtually impossible for clubs whose
structure subjected them to the personal holding company tax.
Capital losses present another area where partnership status may prove
superior to corporation tax treatment. Individuals are permitted to deduct
537. There can be no tax saving by taking capital gains income through a corpo-
ration since it is given the advantageous treatment even if received by the member
directly. For the accumulation-liquidation device to result in less total tax than the
partnership method, therefore, the difference between the amount of the members' tax
on the club's ordinary income at ordinary income rates (which vary with the indi-
viduals' taxable income) and their tax on the same income at long term capital gains
rates must exceed the total taxes paid by the club entity. The size of such difference
will of course depend on the tax rates of the individual members and the amount of
the club's dividend income.
538. INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, §§ 531-37.
539. Id. § 543(a) (1).
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up to $1,000 net capital loss annually from other income.540 Therefore
capital losses of a partnership may be used by the partners as a deduction
from their outside income. Corporations, on the other hand, may offset
capital losses only against capital gains." 1 -Thus, an investment club which
is incorporated or which is treated as a corporation for tax purposes may
not use its capital losses to cut down the individual income of its members,
nor may it use capital losses to offset the club's own dividend income. It is
understandable that, due to the spirit of optimism which generally attends
the launching of a venture such as an investment club, the possibility of
future losses will not receive much thought. However, downturns occur
in the business cycle making this undoubtedly one of the considerations to
be weighed by the organizers in determining the form that the club will
assume.
Conclusions
Investment clubs may be taxed as either partnerships or corporations.
With some exceptions, and in spite of some advantages afforded by the
corporate device, notably the relief of the members from tax liability until
income is actually distributed to them, the partnership status is more favor-
able taxwise. For the small incorporated club and unincorporated one not
qualifying for partnership treatment, the personal holding company tax
makes compounding of earnings through accumulation and reinvestment
difficult. The tax status of a particular unincorporated investment club
under the Federal Internal Revenue Code will depend on whether the
several aspects of its organization, management, and operation tend to re-
semble more closely those of a partnership or a corporation. It appears
that most clubs can, if they choose, organize and operate in a manner en-
titling them to partnership status while adhering to the basic principles of
successful investment club operation.
Regardless of the form of the organization, it is apparent that invest-
ment clubs cannot reinvest all earnings tax free. Furthermore, as ad-
vantageous as such tax free compounding might seem, there is no real basis
for seeking such treatment. The whole structure of the federal income tax
contemplates taxation of income when earned by or available to the tax-
payer. No reason seems apparent for favoring investment club members
over all other taxpayers by allowing their earnings to go untaxed until
sometime in the indefinite future.a
540. Id. § 1211(b).
541. Id. § 1211(a).
542. One feature of investment club taxation which might merit adjustment, how-
ever, is the double taxation of income of those clubs reporting as corporations. Taxing
the income of what is essentially a non-business investing activity at two stages seems
uncalled for and unduly restrictive of a means of promoting widespread informed
ownership of industry. Moreover, that the two stage taxation does not apply to
organizations quite similar to it falling into the partnership category, nor to the regu-
lated investment companies seem to be unjustifiable discrimination. (Sections 851-55
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 permit a deduction from a regulated investment
company's income for distributions to shareholders. Shareholders pay tax on the dis-
tributed earnings as though received by them in the form in which they were earned
by the corporation, i.e., as capital gains, dividends, etc. The provisions, in effect,
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B. STATE: TAXATION
State income taxes, 54 gross receipts taxes,
544 and property taxes, 45
particularly those specifically applicable or construed to include intangibles,
may all have an impact upon investment club operations. The number of
taxes for which the members are liable, both as a group and as individuals,
and the number of times they may be subject to a particular tax may play
an important role in determining not only how and where an investment club
should be organized, but even whether one should be organized at all.
Determining the status and liabilities of an investment club in particular
states would require an examination" of numerous state and local tax laws
not feasible here. However, several problems and principles of general
importance relating to state taxation of investment clubs will be discussed.
Frequently, state or local statutes impose taxes, usually upon or
measured by income or gross receipts, applicable to "businesses" or organ-
izations "doing business." -46 Is an investment club a "business"? The
answer must, of course, depend largely on the language of a particular
statute; but where the language is not clear or so broad as to be vague,547
subject regulated investment companies and their shareholders to but a single appli-
cation of the income tax.) An amendment to the Internal Revenue Code allowing
small corporations to elect to be taxed as partnerships would of course solve most of
the double tax and discrimination problems for investment clubs as well as other
.small corporations and associations. Failing passage of such an amendment, however,
special treatment for investment clubs seems in order. It is suggested that provisions
permitting income of all investment clubs to be taxed solely to the members as in the
case of partnerships or the regulated investment companies would do away with the
discriminatory treatment of the corporate type clubs and reduce the drawbacks to
an investor arising from his use of the investment club principle.
543. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, §§ 1101-87 (1953); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58-77
to 58-151 (1950).
544. E.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. §§7.557(1)-(24) (Supp. 1957); PHILADELPHIA
CODE GEN. ORDINANCES §§ 19-1001 to 1005 (1956).
545. E.g., CAL REv. & TAx CoDE ANN. § 201 (West 1956); ILL. ANN. STAT.
c. 120, § 499 (Smith-Hurd 1954).
546. E.g., MicH. STAT. ANN. §§7.557(1)-(24) (Supp. 1957); PHILADELPHIA
CODE GEN. ORDINANCES §§ 19-1001 to 1005 (1956).
547. E.g., in Philadelphia every person (including partnerships, corporations and
associations) engaged in business is required to procure a mercantile license and pay
a mercantile license tax based on the gross receipts of the business. PHILADELPHIA
CODE GEN. ORDINANCES §§ 19-1002 to 1003 (1956). "Business" is defined as "the
carrying on or exercising for gain or profit within the City of Philadelphia of any
trade, business, profession, vocation, -or making sales to persons within the City of
Philadelphia, or of any manufacturing, commercial, or financial activity, service or
business, including but not limited to manufacturers, brokers, wholesale dealers or
wholesale vendors, retail dealers or retail vendors." Since it is not clear from the
ordinance itself whether investment clubs are covered, reference to the administrative
regulations is in order. There the definition of "business" and the explanation of the
persons liable for the tax repeat substantially the language of the ordinance itself.
The final word is apparently to be found in the PHILADELPHIA MEReANIEz TAX
REGuLATIONS §§ 101, 103(a) (1953). Section 101 provides: "Gross Receipts. Cash,
credits and property of any kind or nature received in, or attributable to, Philadelphia
from any business or by reason of any sale made or services rendered or commercial
or business transaction occurring in Philadelphia or attributable to Philadelphia."
Section 103 (a) provides: "What Constitutes Doing Business in Philadelphia. Whether
or not a person carries on a taxable activity within the meaning of the Mercantile
License Tax Ordinance is essentially a question of fact. In general, taxable activity
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there seems to be good reason for holding investment clubs not to be
"businesses" subject to tax. Many such taxes may be regarded as an excise
on the privilege of doing business within the jurisdiction of the taxing
authority.58 Those availing themselves of the opportunity to deal with
the residents, occupy a place of business, and receive protection by police
and fire departments pay the government on the basis of their receipts, in-
come, or other measure. There are obvious and substantial differences
betwen the organization and activities of an investment club and those of an
ordinary business. The club normally maintains no place of business, has
no dealings with the general public, and does not exist to profit from supply-
ing goods or services, but rather to acquire interests in firms which do, in
fact, carry on business in the full sense of the word. The investment club
is essentially an educational avocation of its members.&5 49 Where such
investment activity is not considered as a "business" when carried on by
individual investors it would seem unfair and unwise to increase the tax
burden of investors who, for mutual enlightenment and safety, carry out
their private investment programs by means of investment clubs.
A few investment clubs do not confine their investments to
securities, but extend their activities into the fields of real estate 5"
or even tangible personal property.P 1 In some states, although a
club need pay no tax on its portfolio of securities,m2 tax will be payable
on real estate or tangible personalty. By the same token, income from the
venture might be taxable even though the club's dividend income was not.
Perhaps even more important is the possibility that expansion beyond the
field of corporate and government securities investment might cause a club
to be considered a "business" and as such subject to taxes from which it
had theretofore been exempt.-5e If this were to subject the club to a tax,
for example, on all receipts, a small venture beyond the securities field could
result in tax liabilities in excess of the added profit expected.
As in the federal income tax field, the question of the tax treatment of
incorporated versus unincorporated clubs arises.5 -' It would appear that
in many states formal incorporation is likely to result in higher taxes on an
investment club. It is not uncommon for corporations to be subject to taxes
includes any trade, business, profession, vocation or any manufacturing, commercial,
service, financial or utility business or activity that is carried on in Philadelphia or
attributable to Philadelphia." Research has failed to disclose any cases shedding
further light on the point.
548. Two other reasons for taxing businesses may be (1) that taxes on businesses
may, by being passed on to consumers, be in effect taxes on the general population,
and (2) that business establishments utilize services of the state or local government
just as do individuals and should therefore share in the cost. Neither of these reasons
seems to commend itself to the case of investment clubs, which have no customers and
seem to require little in the -way of government services.
549. MEMBaRS NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INVESTMENT CLUBS (1956);
REYNOLDS & Co., INVESTMENT CLUBS (1956).
550. INTERVIEW.
551. INTERviEw.
552. See text and note at note 560 infra.
553. See text at notes 548-49 supra.
554. Cf. discussion in text and notes at notes 502-21 supra.
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not applicable to individuals or unincorporated organizations.5 5 Nor is it
inconceivable that a corporation might be taxed as an entity on its assets
or income while its shareholders are taxed on the same assets or income, in
the form of shares or dividends, under the same or similar tax statutes. 5 6
The apparent discrimination between incorporated and unincorporated clubs,
however, does not seem unjustified. State taxes on corporations may be
viewed as excises or franchise taxes on the privilege, extended by the state
itself, of operating an organization with the special advantages and im-
munities achieved by incorporation. 557 There is, in this situation, an ele-
ment beyond merely spreading the cost of government fairly over all the
citizens. The additional taxes paid by an incorporated club are the quid
pro quo for the privileges granted by the state. s58 To argue that all clubs
should be taxed alike by the states would seem to say that the states could
charge nothing for the valuable privilege of incorporation.
Prospective investment club members should also be aware, however,
of the possibility of double taxation of the same assets or income in the case
of unincorporated organizations. Such would be the case, for example,
if a tax on intangible property were held to cover interests in partnerships
or similar organizations as well as the stock held by the organization. Many
state tax systems are designed so as to avoid taxing the same items of
property or income to more than one person or organization559 Generally,
two methods of limiting double taxation are utilized. By the first
method, items of income or property likely to have been subject to prior
tax are excluded from the subjects of taxation. Partnership interests, for
example, or shares of stock or dividends might not be taxed.56° The second
method, however, attempts to be more precise in excluding from taxation
only that income or property which has in fact been taxed previously by
the particular state. This may be accomplished, for example, by exemption
of stock of domestic corporations,5 61 exclusion of income from domestic busi-
nesses,56 2, or exemption of ownership interests in assets already taxed.5
The latter type of statute reaches a club's investment and the income there-
from, in foreign corporations, which would not be taxed under -the first
method. More important, however, the second method may seriously
555. E.g., the Pennsylvania Capital Stock Tax, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 1871
(1949).
556. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 199.01, 200.01 (1943).
557. BEixmy & JOHNsoN, STAT INCOME TAXEs 9 (1942).
558. It is probably for this reason that there is no evidence in state taxation of
that phenomenon of the federal income tax, the unincorporated association or the
association taxable as a corporation. So far as can be determined, state corporation
taxes are applied only to corporations and other organizations given similar statutory
privileges.
559. B Ex, & JoHNsON, STATE IN cOME TAxEs 8-11 (1942).
560. Statutes which exclude from tax corporate stock or dividends will, of course,
relieve investment clubs of most, if not all, tax problems since almost all of their
assets and income are of the excluded classes.
561. MAss. ANN. LAws c. 59, § 5 (1953).
562. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58-81 (12) (1950).
563. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 199.02 (2), (3) (1943).
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curtail investment club activities where members (or prospective members)
live in different states or live in one state and operate an investment club
in another. 64  It is quite possible, particularly if the club were to be in-
corporated,- that each state might tax the income and assets of the club,
either directly or through its members. 66 Although each of the states nfight
avoid second stage taxation in cases wholly within its borders, neither would
give credit for taxes paid in the other. Close examination of the statutes of
the respective states seems imperative where there is a possibility of inter-
state membership or operation.
Concusion
Because of the multiplicity and divergence of state tax laws a prediction
of the state tax status and liabilities of investment clubs is not feasible. It is
possible that certain business taxes may be levied. It is quite likely that
adoption of the corporate form of organization will result in greater overall
tax liability in many states. Applicable tax laws should be examined care-
fully for instances of double taxation both of assets and of income, and
wherever possible investment clubs should be organized so as to minimize
such double taxation. In the case of wholly single state operations this may
not pose a serious problem, although where the tax laws of two or more
states are involved, formation of an investment club may be found to be
impractical. It may be that where the tax laws of a single state place a
heavier burden on investing through an investment club than on individual
investment activity, the similarity to individual investing and the value of the
clubs' educational and ownership dissemination functions calls for amend-
ment to put the clubs on a par with individual investing.
S.D.B.
J.J. R.
J. P. McK., Jr.
R.W.S.
564. The fact that most clubs are composed of friends or neighbors would seem
to make unlikely problems of interstate relations. But business associates, for ex-
ample, in a metropolitan area extending into two or more states might form clubs
which operate in the state in which they work although the residences of the members
are in another state. In fact, the members themselves might be residents of different
states commuting to work in the same city.
565. See text and notes at notes 554-58 m.pra.
566. E.g., Massachusetts taxes all personal property within the state and all
personal property not in the state but owned by Massachusetts residents. MAss. ANN.
LAws c. 59, §2 (1953). Thus assets of partnerships located within the state are
taxable although some or all of the partners live elsewhere, and persons residing in
Massachusetts are liable for tax on their shares of property of partnerships in other
states. Cf. Putnam v. Middleborough, 209 Mass. 456, 95 N.E. 749 (1911). In Virginia,
dividends are taxable income; but a deduction is granted on dividends received from
corporations operating within the state, to the extent that such dividends arise from
income taxable to the corporation by the state. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-81 (12) (1950).
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